{"title":"论道德责任的相容起源","authors":"S. Cuypers","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82149","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Derk Pereboom defends a successor view to hard determinism in the debate on free will and moral responsibility. Pereboom‘s hard incompatibilism challenges libertarians and compatibilists alike to address the problem of origination. In the present article, I discharge this task on behalf of compatibilism.","PeriodicalId":126298,"journal":{"name":"Moral Responsibility","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the Compatibilist Origination of Moral Responsibility\",\"authors\":\"S. Cuypers\",\"doi\":\"10.21825/philosophica.82149\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Derk Pereboom defends a successor view to hard determinism in the debate on free will and moral responsibility. Pereboom‘s hard incompatibilism challenges libertarians and compatibilists alike to address the problem of origination. In the present article, I discharge this task on behalf of compatibilism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":126298,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Moral Responsibility\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-01-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Moral Responsibility\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82149\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Moral Responsibility","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82149","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
On the Compatibilist Origination of Moral Responsibility
Derk Pereboom defends a successor view to hard determinism in the debate on free will and moral responsibility. Pereboom‘s hard incompatibilism challenges libertarians and compatibilists alike to address the problem of origination. In the present article, I discharge this task on behalf of compatibilism.