{"title":"Sustainability Reporting and Family Firms","authors":"Mitchell Van der Zahn, L. Cong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3442807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3442807","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the magnitude of sustainability reporting during a transition period from a voluntary reporting regime to a mandated ‘comply or explain’ regime. Our study focuses on investigating the impact of a firm’s designation as family or non-family firm on sustainability disclosure during the transition period. We also concentrate on examining the moderating influence of firm size and family firm type. Empirical tests are based on a sample of 436 Singapore publicly listed firms from April 1, 2014 to March 31, 2019 that yields 1,744 firm-year observations. Across the transition period average sustainability disclosure increased across all firm types (i.e., family and non-family). Results show family firms reported less sustainability information than non-family firms (included when government linked firms are excluded from non-family firms) during the transitory period. Multivariate tests indicate family firm designation is not a significant explanatory variable for the entire sample. However, the family firm designation is negative (positive) and significant among large and medium (small and micro) firms. Further tests show that the type of family firm (based on the power dimensions of ownership, management and governance) influenced the magnitude of sustainability disclosure, particularly among large and medium sized family firms. Finally, extended analysis found family firm designation influence the delay in issuing of standalone sustainability reports and integrated sustainability/annual reports once mandated ‘comply or explain’ requirements became effective from December 31, 2017.","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115429454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Family Firms and the Stock Market Performance of Acquisitions and Divestitures","authors":"R. Amit, Emilie R. Feldman, Belén Villalonga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3303061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3303061","url":null,"abstract":"Research Summary This paper explores the stock market performance of acquisitions and divestitures where both, one, or neither of the companies in the transaction are family firms. We find that acquirer shareholder returns are highest when family firms buy businesses from non‐family firm divesters, especially when family chief executive officer (CEO) acquirers buy businesses from non‐family CEO divesters. Additionally, divester shareholder returns are highest when family firms sell businesses to non‐family firm acquirers, especially when family CEO divesters sell businesses to non‐family CEO acquirers. These findings reveal that it is important to consider the characteristics of both the acquiring and divesting firms when analyzing acquisition and divestiture performance, and that the expected gains to family firm acquisitions and divestitures are driven by transactions in which the counterparties are non‐family firms. Managerial Summary This paper explores how investors react to acquisitions and divestitures where both, one, or neither of the companies in the deal are family firms. The stock market performance of acquiring firms is highest when family firms buy businesses from non‐family firms, relative to the other three possible combinations of family and non‐family firm acquirers and divesters. Likewise, the stock market performance of divesting firms is highest when family firms sell businesses to non‐family firms, again relative to the other three possible combinations of family and non‐family acquirers and divesters. These findings suggest that investors take into consideration the identities of both the acquiring and divesting firms when evaluating acquisitions and divestitures, and that this has significant implications for the expected performance gains of these transactions.","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"154 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124890802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pay for Outsiders: Compensation Incentives for Nonfamily Executives in Family Firms","authors":"Zhi Li, Harley E. Ryan, Lingling Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1929072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1929072","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how the unique contracting environment with modified agency conflicts in family firms influences compensation incentives for nonfamily executives. Nonfamily executives receive weaker pay-for-performance incentives as family monitoring reduces the need to use costly performance-based incentives. Family firms offer nonfamily executives weaker risk-taking incentives to protect family’s concentrated wealth and private benefits of control. The CEO-VP pay gap in family firms does not include tournament incentives when there are family vice-presidents as potential heirs and thus, is not related to firm performance in these firms. Nonfamily executives receive higher fixed pay in exchange for a lower upside potential in promotion and pay. Family influence on incentives depends on both the founding family ownership and founding family involvement in management. The effect of family ownership is significantly stronger than that of nonfamily blockholders, which suggests that family influence goes beyond concentrated ownership.","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126668535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Sustainability of Family Businesses in the UAE","authors":"Waleed Saeed Al Awadi, H. Koster","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3084378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3084378","url":null,"abstract":"This study focuses on the corporate governance issues faced by family businesses in the UAE and the mechanisms that can assist in resolving them, ensuring their sustainability over generations.","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127246967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Family Firms IPO Activity and Pricing: Evidence from Poland","authors":"P. Perz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2884709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2884709","url":null,"abstract":"Lack of sufficient capital is sometimes one of the barriers for the development of family firms. In a situation when the company owners do not have the possibility to recapitalize the company, or no possibility of increasing the scale of the use of foreign capital, an important source of funding may become an issue of shares directed to external entities. The article analyzes the activity of family firms in the process of raising capital through the issue of shares on the public market of securities - Stock Exchange and in the alternative trading system – NewConnect market. The analysis was conducted based on data from 2013-2015. In that period the share issues of family firms accounted for 30% of all IPOs on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and 43% on the NewConnect market. The article also examined the phenomenon of stock prices underpricing in the initial public offering. The scale of underpricing in family firms and other companies was compared.","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124131983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rethinking Self-Dealing and the Fairness Standard: A Law and Economics Framework for Internal Transactions in Corporate Groups","authors":"S. Kang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2802471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802471","url":null,"abstract":"In the controlling shareholder ownership, tunneling (i.e., wealth transfer from a corporation to a controlling shareholder) is a prevailing business practice. In corporate groups — which are main business associations in many emerging markets — it is reported that tunneling primarily takes place in the form of internal transactions among affiliated companies. Regarding a controlling shareholder’s incentive to attain private benefits, this Article analyzes three components of a controller’s internal-transaction tunneling: ownership gap, price gap, and the quantity of goods or services. In addition, based on two leading U.S. cases on conflicted transactions, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., this Article develops an analytical tool to reinterpret the fairness standard in the context of internal-transaction tunneling in corporate groups. Specifically, three conditions of the Sinclair standard — a controller’s domination on both sides of a transaction, exclusion of non-controlling shareholders from benefits available to a controller, and detriment of non-controlling shareholders — are rigorously reviewed. This Article also provides courts with law and economics logic for a fair range of price gap, and reinterprets Weinberger to examine a special issue of substantially large internal transactions without abnormal profits (i.e., with normal profits). In addition, this Article explains market-based mechanisms to mitigate tunneling such as non-controlling shareholders’ discounted purchase of stocks and diversified portfolios. In sum, this Article suggests a new, more sophisticated law and economics-based analysis of tunneling/self-dealing. In doing so, this Article will shed light on corporate governance scholarship on tunneling in corporate group settings.","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121497128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Executive Compensation When a Firm is a Business Group Member","authors":"Hyungseok Kim, Woochan Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2571504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2571504","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how executive pay is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea as a laboratory setting, we find that member firm’s cash compensation for its executives is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link to other members’ performance is consistent with the hypothesis of corporate resources being tunneled from one member to another for the benefit of the controlling family. We find that this link is stronger to the performance of others that are more likely to benefit from tunneling (firms in which the controlling family has cash flow rights greater than those of the subject firm) and in firms that are more likely to suffer from tunneling (firms in which the controlling family has control-ownership disparity above the sample median).","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"149 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122350911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Influencia Del Protocolo Familiar En Los Resultados De Las Empresas Familiares (Family Protocol Influence on the Family Businesses Results)","authors":"Rocío Arteaga, Susana Menéndez-Requejo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2518938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2518938","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: El objetivo de esta investigacion es analizar la influencia de la implantacion del Protocolo Familiar en los resultados (performance) de las empresas familiares.Si bien los Protocolos Familiares se presentan como una herramienta clave para favorecer la continuidad de las empresas familiares, hay una laguna en las investigaciones empiricas sobre esta tematica, por la dificultad que implica identificar las empresas que lo implementan. Sin embargo, la casuistica de las ayudas publicas existentes en el Principado de Asturias (Espana) permite disponer de la base de datos de las empresas familiares que durante el periodo 2005-2011 han desarrollado un Protocolo Familiar, asi como un grupo de empresas familiares de control, examinandose asi en esta investigacion una base de datos de 264 empresas familiares.El analisis realizado muestra diferencias significativas en el performance a favor de las empresas que realizan el protocolo familiar. Las empresas familiares con Protocolo Familiar obtienen un ano despues de su implantacion una rentabilidad financiera significativamente mayor que las que no lo implantan. Dos anos despues, es significativamente mayor tanto la rentabilidad economica como la financiera de las empresas con Protocolo Familiar.English Abstract: In this paper we analyze the performance of 264 Asturian family companies (Spain) from 2005 until 2011, in order to determine the possible impact on the performance of Family Constitution. The results obtained in this work show the presence of a positive impact for firms with Family Constitution.","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115017436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martin R. W. Hiebl, H. Neubauer, C. Duller, Birgit Feldbauer-Durstmüller
{"title":"The Relationship between Corporate Governance Configuration in Family Businesses and the Use of Management Accounting","authors":"Martin R. W. Hiebl, H. Neubauer, C. Duller, Birgit Feldbauer-Durstmüller","doi":"10.18374/IJBR-14-2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18374/IJBR-14-2.5","url":null,"abstract":"Extant research has shown that family businesses use less management accounting practices than non-family businesses. In our study, we extend the research in this field by analysing the effects of various corporate governance configurations in family businesses on the usage of management accounting. We find that the composition of the supervisory board (with or without family members) does not have a positive impact on management accounting usage, whereas the introduction of non-family members into the top management team partly does. Our findings suggest that the mere existence of corporate governance bodies such as the supervisory board in family businesses is positively associated with the use of management accounting. Our study also indicates that management accounting information may play a pivotal role in the communication between the top management team and the supervisory board of a family business.","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129926658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Family Control of Firms on Leverage: Australian Evidence","authors":"Harijono, Mohammed Ariff, G. Tanewski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.487706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.487706","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether leverage of family controlled firms differs from that of non-family controlled firms. Using data from publicly listed industrial firms in Australia traded over 1998 to 2002, family controlled firms appear to have higher levels of leverage than non-family counterparts. Results indicate that the families' incentive to use debt as a means of concentrating voting power outweighs the need to reduce debt in order to mitigate firm risk. Additional analyses show that the desire to use debt as a means for concentrating control is stronger for both smaller family firms and family firms operating in the mining sector. These results add new findings to the leverage literature.","PeriodicalId":123554,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Family Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134285437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}