Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou, D. Gounopoulos, Kamran Malikov, H. Pham
{"title":"Earnings Management by Classification Shifting and IPO Survival","authors":"Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou, D. Gounopoulos, Kamran Malikov, H. Pham","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3493585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493585","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The study examines the effect of earnings management by classification shifting on firm success, focusing on the survival of newly listed firms. We argue that shifting income-decreasing expenses from core to special items should negatively associate with future operating performance because of improper signaling of actual repeatable core profitability. We find that classification shifting strongly and negatively affects future Initial Public Offering (IPO) success and survival. We further identify the economic mechanisms that drive this finding and observe that our results are mitigated when the quality of external corporate governance alleviating agency concerns is stronger, also for IPO firms operating within stronger business contexts. Therefore, in an environment that facilitates firm survivability, the existence of weaker than reported sustainable performance may not end up materializing in the form of lower firm survivability as these factors aid firms' continuing operations from a business perspective. Our findings provide evidence of the longer-term implications of a method of earnings management that has long been considered “soft” and without any longer-term reversing consequences.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"103 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78550929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contract Features and the Informativeness of Insider Trades","authors":"Brian D. Cadman, M. Szeles","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3732761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3732761","url":null,"abstract":"Economic theory predicts that insiders reveal private information when they trade equity in their firm. However, insider purchases to meet equity holding requirements or sales to satisfy liquidity needs do not reveal private information. We predict that contract terms stipulating CEO equity holdings and vesting conditions help market participants unravel the private information revealed by an insider trade. In support of our predictions, we document that the market reaction to a CEO equity trade is greater when the CEO holds a large portfolio of unconstrained equity in the firm. We also find that the one-year abnormal return following a CEO equity sale is significantly more negative when the CEO holds a large portfolio of unconstrained equity. Collectively, we show that publicly disclosed contract features provide context that help investors interpret the information revealed by insider trades and unravel private information.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84352692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Examining the Phenomenon of Rounding in Analysts’ EPS Forecasts: Evidence from Singapore","authors":"Clarence Goh","doi":"10.1108/ajar-09-2020-0083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/ajar-09-2020-0083","url":null,"abstract":"PurposePrior studies have documented the phenomenon of rounding of analysts' earnings per share (EPS) forecasts in the USA. From the outset, it is unclear if analysts following Singapore firms also similarly engage in the rounding of their EPS forecasts. This study aims to investigate the extent to which analysts engage in rounding of EPS forecasts of firms listed on the Singapore Exchange.Design/methodology/approachThe author conducted his analysis on a sample of analyst EPS forecasts of companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange, downloaded from the International Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). This sample consists of 24,219 annual EPS forecasts announced from June 2011 to September 2019. These forecasts were made for 285 unique firms by 48 unique analysts.FindingsThe author finds that there is substantial rounding of EPS forecasts, with 9.59% of EPS forecasts examined ending in five- or ten-cent intervals. In supplementary analysis, the author further finds that the level of rounding was comparable across two periods under examination, from 2011 to 2015 and from 2016 to 2019. The author also finds that there was substantial rounding even for forecasts of relatively large magnitudes (i.e. US$1.00 and above).Originality/valueThis study is the first to examine the rounding of analysts' EPS forecasts of Singapore firms. It extends the literature on analyst EPS forecasts and highlights how the phenomenon of rounding of analyst EPS forecasts of US firms extends to Singapore.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79916867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nonfinancial Resources Management: A Qualitative Study of Retention and Engagement in Nonprofit Community Fund Management","authors":"Jude Edeigba, Deepica Singh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3726815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3726815","url":null,"abstract":"This study identifies the factors affecting volunteer retention and engagement in New Zealand. A dearth of research has focused on volunteering for nonprofit financing organisations in New Zealand. These organisations are involved particularly in raising funds through public benevolence. There have been rising trends of nonprofit organisations around the world while the number of volunteers decreases. Information on the factors influencing volunteer retention and engagement is expected to support the management of nonprofit community services. Therefore, this study uses a case study of a nonprofit organisation to identify the factors contributing to volunteer retention and engagement. The interview data is analysed using thematic data analysis. Benightedness, communication, management support, volunteer skills and volunteer participation in management decision making are associated with volunteer retention and engagement. These findings are expected to enhance the operation process of nonprofit Community Fund Management Organisations. Future research is suggested to enhance the management of volunteers in other types of nonprofit organisations.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90602957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incorrect Inferences When Using Generated Regressors in Accounting Research","authors":"Wei Chen, P. Hribar, Sam Melessa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3724730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3724730","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the bias associated with the use of generated regressors, i.e., independent variables generated from a first-step auxiliary regression, in accounting research settings. Widely used generated regressors in accounting include discretionary accruals, the Dechow and Dichev [2002] measure of accrual quality, asymmetric timeliness coefficients, the Khan and Watts [2009] C-score, earnings persistence coefficients, real earnings management proxies, discretionary book-tax differences, and predicted values capturing litigation risk, bankruptcy risk, and the likelihood of a tax shelter. Under general conditions, the presence of generated regressors does not affect the consistency of coefficient estimates. However, commonly used generated regressors can bias standard errors towards zero, producing type I errors. We discuss various types of generated regressors (predicted values, residuals, coefficients, etc.) and demonstrate the associated standard error bias and factors affecting the bias using simple regression models and simulation analyses. We also show the bias can be substantial in common accounting settings by examining the magnitude of the bias when examining the effect of litigation risk on management forecast characteristics. Finally, we outline two corrections for the bias and show how the corrections, including bootstrapping standard errors, improve inferences.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90386569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disclosure Regulation in the Hands of Bank Regulators","authors":"Sehwa Kim, Seil Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3416204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3416204","url":null,"abstract":"Using a unique setting where stand-alone banks submit filings to bank regulators instead of the SEC, we examine the consequences of disclosure regulation in the hands of bank regulators. Consistent with theory, we find that bank regulators are less concerned about transparency than the SEC. Bank regulators’ disclosure requirements are less strict and the disclosure system maintained by bank regulators generates higher information-processing costs. Consistently, stand-alone banks make fewer disclosures and are more likely to violate filing deadlines. In addition, market reaction to filings by stand-alone banks are less timely, suggesting a cost to stock price efficiency. We also examine potential benefits of the reduced emphasis on transparency, such as timelier regulatory intervention and fewer runs on deposits. However, we do not find evidence supporting these potential benefits.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80772504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Debate Over Subsequent Accounting for Goodwill","authors":"Thomas J. Linsmeier, Erika Wheeler","doi":"10.2308/horizons-19-054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/horizons-19-054","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper evaluates whether alternative methods of subsequent accounting for goodwill result in accounting numbers that are significantly different from previous methods prescribed by standard setters. Financial statement users have identified significant flaws in both the amortization-and-impairment and impairment-only methods of subsequent accounting for goodwill. In this paper, we (1) summarize the current debate over subsequent accounting for goodwill, (2) empirically examine the decline in goodwill value under the amortization-and-impairment and impairment-only regimes, and (3) empirically investigate whether there are alternative methods that result in significantly different rates and patterns of decline in the value of goodwill (and thus have the potential to address the identified weaknesses of each method). We conclude that the proposed alternative methods provide markedly different patterns and periods over which goodwill is written off and, therefore, have the potential to provide a more faithful representation of the economics of goodwill.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90486112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Governance Through Trading on Acquisitions of Public Firms","authors":"E. C. Chang, Tse-Chun Lin, Xiaorong Ma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2263837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2263837","url":null,"abstract":"This paper empirically identifies an important external corporate governance mechanism through which the institutional trading improves firm values and disciplines managers from conducting value-destroying activities. We propose a reward-punishment intensity (RPI) measure, and show that it is positively related to firm’s subsequent Tobin’s Q. Importantly, we find that firms with higher RPI exhibit less subsequent empire building and earnings management. Furthermore, we show that the exogenous liquidity shock of Decimalization augments the governance effect of institutional trading. We also find that the discipline effect is more pronounced for firms with moderate institutional ownership concentration, higher managers’ wealth-performance sensitivity, and higher trading liquidity, which further supports the governance role of the RPI. The results are robust to using a subsample containing firms with reduced institutional ownership and to using two instrumental variables.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79595255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On The Legitimacy of Accounting Standards","authors":"Mark Penno","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3238742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3238742","url":null,"abstract":"While it is widely agreed upon that accounting standards must be legitimate, ‘legitimacy’ is not well-defined. Accordingly, I model three widely accepted hallmarks of legitimacy: (1) an increasing likelihood that independent experts with the same facts will arrive at the same classification (objectivity), (2) an increasing similarity of otherwise identically classified transactions (financial transparency) and (3) promoting management’s stewardship (governance) while providing financial statement users with a better understanding of that stewardship (governance transparency). The results indicate that factors commonly associated with increased enforcement (e.g., career concerns, securities regulation, or courts) unambiguously increase all three aspects of legitimacy, while specifying an accounting standard in more detail may have little or no effect on objectivity, or have ambiguous effects on financial transparency. Surprisingly, the model demonstrates that the level of governance and governance transparency may change in opposite directions as a standard’s specificity changes.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73314662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managerial Discretion to Delay the Recognition of Goodwill Impairment: The Role of Enforcement","authors":"Andrei Filip, Gerald J. Lobo, Luc Paugam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3704191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3704191","url":null,"abstract":"Under IFRS, managers can use two approaches to increase the estimated fair value of goodwill in order to justify not recognizing impairment: (1) make overly optimistic valuation assumptions, and (2) increase future cash flow forecasts by inflating current cash flows. Because enforcement constrains the use of optimistic valuation assumptions, we hypothesize that enforcement influences the relative use of these two choices. We test this hypothesis by comparing a sample of 1,958 firms from 36 countries that are likely to delay recognizing goodwill impairment (suspect firms) to a sample of control firms. First, we find that firms in high enforcement countries use a higher discount rate to test goodwill for impairment than firms in low enforcement countries. We also find a more positive association between discount rate and upward cash flow management for suspect firms than for control firms. This result is consistent with suspect firms substituting optimistic valuation assumptions with inflated current cash flows. Second, we find that, relative to control firms, suspect firms exhibit higher upward cash flow management in high enforcement countries than in low enforcement countries. Third, we show that suspect firms in high enforcement countries are more likely to eventually impair goodwill.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"35 8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82706769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}