{"title":"Belonging and Trust: Divorce and Social Capital","authors":"M. Brinig","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1767431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1767431","url":null,"abstract":"To whom do spouses belong? Do they belong to their communities as well as each other and their immediate families? These questions are explored in an empirical paper demonstrating ways in which social capital in communities may affect even the marriages of people living in them.","PeriodicalId":122941,"journal":{"name":"Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133358976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Potential Lesson from the Israeli Experience for the American Same-Sex Marriage Debate","authors":"Shahar Lifshitz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1633832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1633832","url":null,"abstract":"In the past decade American marriage law has been the arena for a major controversy regarding same-sex marriage. Typically, liberals tend to support same-sex marriage, while conservatives oppose it. The liberal-conservative dispute concerning Same Sex Marriage is usually related to a broader debate on the legitimacy of limiting the possibilities for marrying: liberals present marriage as a private arrangement between the partners, and they therefore oppose restricting the right to marry The opponents of single-sex marriage, in contrast, legitimize legal limits to the right to be married by presenting marriage as a public institution.Based on the unique experience amassed in Israel on this question, I seek to reveal the potential consequences of the struggle between liberals and conservatives regarding limitations of the right to marriage for an additional liberal-conservative confrontation concerning the uniqueness of legal marriages, and the difference between them and alternative family types.The conservative position limiting entry to marriage won a decisive victory in Israel. Accordingly, partners of the same sex, like partners from different religious communities, are not allowed to formally marry. Generally speaking, the right to marry is subject to a broad range of civil and religious restrictions. Ironically, the strict limitations on the right to marry were a trigger for the development of the institution of cohabitation as a substitute for formal marriage. Accordingly, the array of the rights and obligations of cohabitants is approaching that of married partners, and at times even exceeds the latter. I will argue for the existence of a similar dynamic in the United States, where the distress of same-sex partners serves as the basis for notions and proposals, both in the academic realm and in the more general public realm, for strengthening the institution of cohabitation, the weakening of the institution of marriage, and at times even the abrogation of marriage as a legal institution.On the background of this developing dynamic, and taking into account the aggregate Israeli experience, I will advance three arguments: First, I will present a conservative critique of the conservative position against same-sex partners. I will argue that, in the final analysis, the conservative camp's relative success in negating the possibility of same-sex marriages harms this camp's broader agenda for the preference of legal marriages.Second, I will present a liberal critique of the liberal camp. My proposition is that, despite the essentially liberal motivation for weakening legal marriages in order to decrease the gap between them and cohabitation, in many instances this activity harms the liberal values of freedom of choice and autonomy in the name of which they act.Finally, I will argue on behalf of democratic compromises such as civil union in the United States and spousal registry in Israel.","PeriodicalId":122941,"journal":{"name":"Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130550128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption.","authors":"R. Wilson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3268319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3268319","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":122941,"journal":{"name":"Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116550797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"\"Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights\": The Child's Voice in Defining the Family","authors":"B. Woodhouse","doi":"10.4324/9781315095769-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315095769-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":122941,"journal":{"name":"Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129049623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulatory Takings: A Chronicle of the Construction of a Constitutional Concept","authors":"G. Power","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1129774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1129774","url":null,"abstract":"In the American constitutional system the sovereign has the power to enact regulations which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. But the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes that: No person shall be. . .deprived of. . .property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. And the question of whether a sovereign regulation has taken private property without just compensation has puzzled the United States Supreme Court for over two hundred years in over four hundred cases. This paper chronicles the leading cases and finds that the Court's present interpretation of regulatory takings sits upon a shaky foundation of split decisions; the Court's construction of the constitutional property remains a work in progress. It finds today's Supreme Court is fundamentally split into two blocs. This Great Divide is sometimes attributed to a difference in judicial philosophy. Those in the Court's conservative wing are typically described as practitioners of judicial restraint. Those in the Court's liberal wing are said to be judicial activists who are intent on reconstructing the Constitution's language to meet the exigencies of the times. The Court's constitutional property jurisprudence belies this stereotype. Its right wing is seeking to define the Takings Clause, beyond its original meaning, so as to discourage government activity. Conversely the left wing is more than willing to give wide discretion to legislative bodies to impose regulations without paying compensation to disappointed property owners.","PeriodicalId":122941,"journal":{"name":"Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127428624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}