管制征收:宪法概念建构的编年史

G. Power
{"title":"管制征收:宪法概念建构的编年史","authors":"G. Power","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1129774","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the American constitutional system the sovereign has the power to enact regulations which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. But the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes that: No person shall be. . .deprived of. . .property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. And the question of whether a sovereign regulation has taken private property without just compensation has puzzled the United States Supreme Court for over two hundred years in over four hundred cases. This paper chronicles the leading cases and finds that the Court's present interpretation of regulatory takings sits upon a shaky foundation of split decisions; the Court's construction of the constitutional property remains a work in progress. It finds today's Supreme Court is fundamentally split into two blocs. This Great Divide is sometimes attributed to a difference in judicial philosophy. Those in the Court's conservative wing are typically described as practitioners of judicial restraint. Those in the Court's liberal wing are said to be judicial activists who are intent on reconstructing the Constitution's language to meet the exigencies of the times. The Court's constitutional property jurisprudence belies this stereotype. Its right wing is seeking to define the Takings Clause, beyond its original meaning, so as to discourage government activity. Conversely the left wing is more than willing to give wide discretion to legislative bodies to impose regulations without paying compensation to disappointed property owners.","PeriodicalId":122941,"journal":{"name":"Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Regulatory Takings: A Chronicle of the Construction of a Constitutional Concept\",\"authors\":\"G. Power\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.1129774\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In the American constitutional system the sovereign has the power to enact regulations which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. But the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes that: No person shall be. . .deprived of. . .property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. And the question of whether a sovereign regulation has taken private property without just compensation has puzzled the United States Supreme Court for over two hundred years in over four hundred cases. This paper chronicles the leading cases and finds that the Court's present interpretation of regulatory takings sits upon a shaky foundation of split decisions; the Court's construction of the constitutional property remains a work in progress. It finds today's Supreme Court is fundamentally split into two blocs. This Great Divide is sometimes attributed to a difference in judicial philosophy. Those in the Court's conservative wing are typically described as practitioners of judicial restraint. Those in the Court's liberal wing are said to be judicial activists who are intent on reconstructing the Constitution's language to meet the exigencies of the times. The Court's constitutional property jurisprudence belies this stereotype. Its right wing is seeking to define the Takings Clause, beyond its original meaning, so as to discourage government activity. Conversely the left wing is more than willing to give wide discretion to legislative bodies to impose regulations without paying compensation to disappointed property owners.\",\"PeriodicalId\":122941,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1129774\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1129774","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

摘要

在美国宪法制度中,君主有权颁布对公共利益和普遍福利必不可少的法规。但是,美国宪法第五修正案规定:未经正当法律程序,不得剥夺任何人的财产;私有财产未经合理补偿不得挪作公用。一项主权法规是否在没有得到公正补偿的情况下侵占了私有财产的问题,两百多年来一直困扰着美国最高法院,涉及四百多起案件。本文记录了主要案例,并发现法院目前对监管收入的解释建立在分裂决定的不稳定基础上;法院对宪法财产的建构仍在进行中。它发现今天的最高法院从根本上分为两个集团。这种巨大的分歧有时被归因于司法哲学的不同。最高法院的保守派通常被描述为司法克制的实践者。据说,最高法院的自由派人士是司法活动人士,他们打算重建宪法的语言,以满足时代的迫切需要。最高法院的宪法财产判例掩盖了这种刻板印象。它的右翼正试图定义征收条款,超越其最初的含义,以阻止政府的活动。相反,左翼更愿意给予立法机构广泛的自由裁量权,让它们在不向失望的业主支付补偿的情况下实施监管。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Regulatory Takings: A Chronicle of the Construction of a Constitutional Concept
In the American constitutional system the sovereign has the power to enact regulations which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. But the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes that: No person shall be. . .deprived of. . .property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. And the question of whether a sovereign regulation has taken private property without just compensation has puzzled the United States Supreme Court for over two hundred years in over four hundred cases. This paper chronicles the leading cases and finds that the Court's present interpretation of regulatory takings sits upon a shaky foundation of split decisions; the Court's construction of the constitutional property remains a work in progress. It finds today's Supreme Court is fundamentally split into two blocs. This Great Divide is sometimes attributed to a difference in judicial philosophy. Those in the Court's conservative wing are typically described as practitioners of judicial restraint. Those in the Court's liberal wing are said to be judicial activists who are intent on reconstructing the Constitution's language to meet the exigencies of the times. The Court's constitutional property jurisprudence belies this stereotype. Its right wing is seeking to define the Takings Clause, beyond its original meaning, so as to discourage government activity. Conversely the left wing is more than willing to give wide discretion to legislative bodies to impose regulations without paying compensation to disappointed property owners.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信