Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation最新文献_第2页

Mathematical modeling of incentive policies in p2p systems p2p系统激励政策的数学建模

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403049

B. Zhao, John C.S. Lui, D. Chiu

引用次数: 20

Incentivizing outsourced computation 鼓励外包计算

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403046

Mira Belenkiy, Melissa Chase, C. Erway, John Jannotti, Alptekin Küpçü, Anna Lysyanskaya

{"title":"Incentivizing outsourced computation","authors":"Mira Belenkiy, Melissa Chase, C. Erway, John Jannotti, Alptekin Küpçü, Anna Lysyanskaya","doi":"10.1145/1403027.1403046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403046","url":null,"abstract":"We describe different strategies a central authority, the boss, can use to distribute computation to untrusted contractors. Our problem is inspired by volunteer distributed computing projects such as SETI@home, which outsource computation to large numbers of participants. For many tasks, verifying a task's output requires as much work as computing it again; additionally, some tasks may produce certain outputs with greater probability than others. A selfish contractor may try to exploit these factors, by submitting potentially incorrect results and claiming a reward. Further, malicious contractors may respond incorrectly, to cause direct harm or to create additional overhead for result-checking.\u0000 We consider the scenario where there is a credit system whereby users can be rewarded for good work and fined for cheating. We show how to set rewards and fines that incentivize proper behavior from rational contractors, and mitigate the damage caused by malicious contractors. We analyze two strategies: random double-checking by the boss, and hiring multiple contractors to perform the same job.\u0000 We also present a bounty mechanism when multiple contractors are employed; the key insight is to give a reward to a contractor who catches another worker cheating. Furthermore, if we can assume that at least a small fraction h of the contractors are honest (1% - 10%), then we can provide graceful degradation for the accuracy of the system and the work the boss has to perform. This is much better than the Byzantine approach, which typically assumes h > 60%.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"2006 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127636390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 84

Reputation markets 声誉市场

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403045

X. Yan, Benjamin Van Roy

{"title":"Reputation markets","authors":"X. Yan, Benjamin Van Roy","doi":"10.1145/1403027.1403045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403045","url":null,"abstract":"A reputation system should incentivize users to obtain and reveal estimates of content quality. It should also aggregate these estimates to establish content reputation in a way that counters strategic manipulation. Mechanisms have been proposed in recent literature that offer financial incentives to induce these desirable outcomes. In this paper, to systematically study what we believe to be fundamental characteristics of these mechanisms, we view them as information markets designed to assess content quality, and refer to them as reputation markets. Specifically, we develop a rational expectations equilibrium model to study how incentives created by reputation markets should influence community behavior and the accuracy of assessments. Our analysis suggests that reputation markets offer a number of desirable features:\u0000 - As the quality of information improves or the cost of information acquisition decreases, reputation assessments become increasingly robust to manipulation.\u0000 - If users can pay to acquire information, errors in reputation assessments do not depend on uncertainty in the manipulator's intent.\u0000 - Reputation distortion incurs cost to the manipulator, resulting in cash transfers to other users.\u0000 - Pseudonyms do not help a manipulator distort reputations.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117317947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Optimal pricing strategy for wireless social community networks 无线社交社区网络的最优定价策略

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403050

Amin Mazloumian, M. Manshaei, M. Félegyházi, J. Hubaux

引用次数: 16

Cooperative content distribution and traffic engineering 协同内容分发和流量工程

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403030

Wenjie Jiang, Rui Zhang-Shen, J. Rexford, M. Chiang

{"title":"Cooperative content distribution and traffic engineering","authors":"Wenjie Jiang, Rui Zhang-Shen, J. Rexford, M. Chiang","doi":"10.1145/1403027.1403030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403030","url":null,"abstract":"Traditionally, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) make profit by providing Internet connectivity, while content providers (CPs) play the more lucrative role of delivering content to users. As network connectivity is increasingly a commodity, ISPs have a strong incentive to offer content to their subscribers by deploying their own content distribution infrastructure. Providing content services in a provider network presents new opportunities for coordination between server selection (to match servers with subscribers) and traffic engineering (to select efficient routes for the traffic). In this work, we utilize a mathematical framework to show that separating server selection and traffic engineering leads to a sub-optimal equilibrium, even when the CP is given accurate and timely information about network conditions. Leveraging ideas from cooperative game theory, we propose that the system implements a Nash bargaining solution that significantly improves the fairness and efficiency of the joint system. This study is another step toward a systematic understanding of the interactions between those who generate and distribute content and those who provide and operate networks.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115089489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 29

Dynamics of competition between incumbent and emerging network technologies 现有和新兴网络技术之间的竞争动态

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403039

Youngmi Jin, S. Sen, R. Guérin, K. Hosanagar, Zhi-Li Zhang

{"title":"Dynamics of competition between incumbent and emerging network technologies","authors":"Youngmi Jin, S. Sen, R. Guérin, K. Hosanagar, Zhi-Li Zhang","doi":"10.1145/1403027.1403039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403039","url":null,"abstract":"The Internet is by all accounts an incredible success, but in spite or maybe because of this success, its deficiencies have come under increasing scrutiny and triggered calls for new architectures to succeed it. Those architectures will, however, face a formidable incumbent in the Internet, and their ability to ultimately replace it is likely to depend equally on technical superiority as on economic factors. The goal of this paper is to start developing models that can help provide a quantitative understanding of a competition between the Internet and a new system, and show what factors affect it most strongly. A model for the adoption of competing network technologies by individual users is formulated and solved. It accounts for both the intrinsic value of each technology and the positive externalities derived from their respective numbers of adopters. Using this model, different configurations are explored and possible outcomes characterized. More importantly, configurations are identified where small differences in the attributes of either technology can lead to vastly different results. The paper provides initial results that can help identify parameters that significantly affect the likelihood of success of new network technologies.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128247322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 64

Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks 战术数据网络中带宽分配拍卖机制中相互依赖值的处理

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403044

M. Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, D. Parkes, Daniel Plakosh, Sven Seuken, K. Wallnau

引用次数: 16

Interconnecting eyeballs to content: a shapley value perspective on isp peering and settlement 将眼球连接到内容:isp对等和结算的shapley价值视角

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403041

Richard T. B. Ma, D. Chiu, John C.S. Lui, V. Misra, D. Rubenstein

{"title":"Interconnecting eyeballs to content: a shapley value perspective on isp peering and settlement","authors":"Richard T. B. Ma, D. Chiu, John C.S. Lui, V. Misra, D. Rubenstein","doi":"10.1145/1403027.1403041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403041","url":null,"abstract":"Internet service providers (ISPs) must interconnect to provide global Internet connectivity to users. The payment structure of these interconnections are often negotiated and maintained via bilateral agreements. Current differences of opinion in the appropriate revenue model in the Internet has on occasion caused ISPs to de-peer from one another, hindering network connectivity and availability.\u0000 Our previous work demonstrates that the Shapley value has several desirable properties, and that if applied as the revenue model, selfish ISPs would yield globally optimal routing and interconnecting decisions. In this paper, we focus our investigation of Shapley value in networks with two basic classes of ISP: content and eyeball. In particular, we analyze the revenue distribution between ISPs with elastic and inelastic customer demands, and calculate the bilateral payments between ISPs that implement the Shapley revenue. Our results illustrate how ISP revenues are influenced by different demand models. In particular, the marginal revenue lost by de-peering for an eyeball ISP with inelastic demand is inversely proportional to the square of its degree of connectivity to content ISPs. In practice, these results provide a guideline for ISPs, even in peering relationships, to negotiate bilateral payments and for regulatory institutions to design pricing regulations.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116017809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 83

User-directed routing: from theory, towards practice 用户导向路由:从理论走向实践

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403029

Paul Laskowski, Benjamin Johnson, J. Chuang

{"title":"User-directed routing: from theory, towards practice","authors":"Paul Laskowski, Benjamin Johnson, J. Chuang","doi":"10.1145/1403027.1403029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403029","url":null,"abstract":"User-directed routing technologies - that is, systems in which users choose their own routes through a communications network - have generated considerable interest in recent years. Despite their numerous theoretical advantages, ISPs have so far resisted these technologies, even as users have learned to capture some routing power through overlay networks. This study responds to this disconnect between theory and practice by asking how user-directed routing would affect three prominent objectives of network operators: maintaining control over the network, earning profits, and keeping inner details of the network secret. Contrary to the modern theme in routing proposals, we argue that user-directed routing is not fundamentally incompatible with ISP-control, as long as a flexible pricing system is in place. Instead - and under surprisingly general assumptions - an ISP can use prices on the open market to induce any feasible traffic pattern. Moreover, we argue that the market-based approach maximizes welfare for any given traffic pattern. In general, our model does not guarantee whether an ISP will earn more money under user-directed routing. Nevertheless, we provide some intuition to suggest why a typical ISP may expect higher profits. Finally, we suggest that giving routing power to users conflicts with an ISP's desire for secrecy. At the same time, widespread adoption of user-directed routing, perhaps promoted through regulation, may facilitate a transparent and civil industry, to the benefit of many ISPs.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128771301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

Efficiency of selfish investments in network security 网络安全中自私投资的效率

Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation Pub Date : 2008-08-22 DOI: 10.1145/1403027.1403035

Libin Jiang, V. Anantharam, J. Walrand

引用次数: 26