{"title":"Innovations and upgrades in virtualized network architectures","authors":"Paul Laskowski, J. Chuang","doi":"10.1145/1879082.1879091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879091","url":null,"abstract":"The difficulty of making changes to the internet architecture has spawned widespread interest in virtualized testbeds as a place to deploy new services. Despite the excitement, uncertainty surrounds the question of how technologies can bridge the gap from testbed to global availability. It is recognized that no amount of validation will spur today's ISPs to make architectural changes, so the testbed itself must somehow provide global availability. We investigate whether a virtualized architecture that is widely offered by commercial ISPs would support the adoption of new services or upgrades to the infrastructure, and whether ISPs would ever support such an architecture. According to our economic analysis, the answer depends critically on how money flows to network and service providers. If the virtualized network inherits the market structure prevalent on the internet today, which we call network-gatekeeper, investment levels are likely to be poor. On the other hand, we identify two superior market types, mix-and-match and service-gatekeeper, which can improve incentives to invest in services, and even in network upgrades. We discuss how these market types may be implemented.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116047766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution","authors":"Dinh Nguyen Tran, Jinyang Li, L. Subramanian","doi":"10.1145/1879082.1879085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879085","url":null,"abstract":"With growing demand for high-quality multimedia content, content providers face enormous pressure to scale the serving capacity. Peer-to-peer content distribution is a natural low cost option to scale system capacity. In a P2P CDN model, content providers serve content using a small number of \"official\" seeder nodes and rely on participating users to act as individual seeders for others in the system. Although P2P CDNs have the potential to drastically reduce the required serving capacity of official seeders, they must address the challenge of incentivizing users to stay online in the P2P network and act as seeders.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129374643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A decision-analytic approach for P2P cooperation policy setting","authors":"G. Vakili, Thanasis G. Papaioannou, S. Khorsandi","doi":"10.1145/1879082.1879089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879089","url":null,"abstract":"While overall performance of peer-to-peer systems depends strongly on the amount of resource contributions made by individual peers, autonomous and rational peers make decisions on their cooperation policies (resource contributions) according to their individual utilities. To deal with the inherent conflict among individual utilities of the rational peers to improve overall performance of the system, we propose a decision-analytic approach that determines the appropriate cooperation policies of the individual peers in a distributed manner and coordinates their rational decisions in compliance with the social welfare improvement.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132476362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Content pricing in peer-to-peer networks","authors":"Jaeok Park, M. Schaar","doi":"10.1145/1879082.1879086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879086","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a game theoretic model of content production and sharing in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. We characterize two benchmark outcomes: Nash equilibrium (NE) without any incentive scheme and social optimum. We show that the P2P network is not utilized at an NE outcome, whereas social optimum in general requires the utilization of the P2P network. In order to obtain a socially optimal (SO) outcome among self-interested peers, we introduce a pricing scheme where downloading peers compensate uploading peers for content provision. For any SO outcome, we can find a pricing scheme with link-dependent linear prices that achieves the SO outcome as an NE. We illustrate our results with several examples. Our illustration shows that the structures of social optimum and optimal prices vary depending on the characteristics of peers such as cost parameters and connectivity.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"209 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124695532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Subscription dynamics and competition in communications markets","authors":"Shaolei Ren","doi":"10.1145/1879082.1879095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879095","url":null,"abstract":"Multiple technologies, possibly administered by different entities, are expected to coexist in the rapidly-expanding communications market. In order to understand the complex interactions between different technologies, it is of fundamental importance to understand how technologies affect the demand of users and competition between network service providers (NSPs). To this end, we analyze user subscription dynamics and competition between NSPs in a duopoly communications market. First, we investigate the impact of technologies on the users' dynamic subscription and show that, for any charged prices, the equilibrium point of the considered user subscription dynamics exists and is unique. Next, we derive a sufficient condition on the technologies of the NSPs that ensures the user subscription dynamics to reach the equilibrium point. Then, we model the NSP competition using a non-cooperative game, in which the two NSPs choose their market shares independently, and provide a sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium in the market competition game.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125939412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tiered incentives for integrity based queuing","authors":"Fariba Khan, Carl A. Gunter","doi":"10.1145/1879082.1879093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879093","url":null,"abstract":"We propose an tiered incentive system called Integrity-Based Queuing (IBQ) for protection against Internet Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. Our proposal can be implemented step-by-step where each integrity improvement brings a direct benefit to the autonomous system making it. IBQ proposes preferential queuing based on integrity: good, bad and middle. Since implementation can rarely be complete or network-wide we provide incremental benefit by prioritizing service for domains with better integrity. We have provided a basic analysis to relate performance to measurable integrity of the client. We have designed the architecture for authentication, queuing and defense. We have tested IBQ for applications with real-time requirements and show how performance improves with higher assurance.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115196678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A network formation model for internet transit relations","authors":"Aemen Lodhi, C. Dovrolis","doi":"10.1145/1879082.1879088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879088","url":null,"abstract":"Most Autonomous Systems in the Internet need to select one or more transit providers. The provider selection process is complex, influenced by dynamic pricing, contracts, performance, marketing and other factors. We propose a simple dynamic model that captures the salient features of the provider selection process. The model creates a positive feedback effect, where \"the bigger a provider is the bigger it gets\". We then study the resulting internetwork formation process, showing that it always leads to a stable, but not unique, internetwork. We also use computational experiments to understand how the convergence delay scales with the size of the network, the factor(s) that affect the number of distinct equilibria, and the impact of three key model parameters.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124938428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Using insurance to increase internet security","authors":"Svetlana Radosavac, J. Kempf, U. Kozat","doi":"10.1145/1403027.1403037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403037","url":null,"abstract":"Managing security risks in the Internet has so far mostly involved methods to reduce the risks and the severity of the damages. Those methods reduce but do not eliminate risk, and the question remains on how to handle the residual risk. Current schemes applied by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) penalize the users, who suffer from the consequences. In this paper, we take a new approach to the problem of Internet security and advocate managing the residual risk by buying insurance against it and consequently re-arranging the incentive chain. We first analyze the current state of the Internet and investigate if it is possible to alleviate the existing problems by introducing insurance schemes. By performing detailed analysis we define an insurance policy that can survive in a competitive market. Following that, we analyze the impact of insurance-based ISPs on the rest of the network and attempt to answer whether using insurance can increase the overall security of the system and provide incentive to other ISPs to implement such policies.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126018087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dave Levin, Randolph Baden, C. Lumezanu, N. Spring, Bobby Bhattacharjee
{"title":"Motivating participation in internet routing overlays","authors":"Dave Levin, Randolph Baden, C. Lumezanu, N. Spring, Bobby Bhattacharjee","doi":"10.1145/1403027.1403048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403048","url":null,"abstract":"PeerWise is an Internet routing overlay that reduces end-to-end latencies by allowing peers to forward through a relay instead of connecting directly to their destinations. Fundamental to PeerWise is the notion of peering agreements between two peers, wherein they agree to forward for one another. In this paper, we consider the problem of motivating users to establish and maintain peerings in a completely decentralized, scalable manner. We show that routing overlays present unique challenges and goals. For instance, since participants can always \"fall back\" on standard Internet routing, we must encourage users to stay in the system and maintain long-lived peering agreements. To address these challenges, we propose two mechanisms: First, we use Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to expressively negotiate peers' demands and the recourses they will take when SLAs are violated. Second, we propose a mechanism to address SLA violations that differs from the standard notion of punishment via service degradation. Our simulation results demonstrate that our mechanism causes peers to avoid SLA violators in favor of long-lived peerings. Lastly, we discuss potential, emergent behaviors in a selfish routing overlay.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132840915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"SpySaver: using incentives to address spyware","authors":"S. Saroiu, A. Wolman","doi":"10.1145/1403027.1403036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403036","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the many solutions proposed by industry and the research community to address spyware, this problem continues to grow. Many of today's anti-spyware approaches are inspired by techniques used against related security problems, such as worms, DoS attacks, computer viruses, and spam. Although these techniques have been retrofitted to address spyware, they remain ineffective because they rely on the compromised host to detect and remove spyware. Once a host is compromised, attackers often find simple ways to escape spyware detection and removal.\u0000 This paper presents SpySaver - a novel anti-spyware approach that reduces the incentive to deploy spyware. Our approach does not prevent spyware installations, nor does it recover from them. Instead, SpySaver decreases the value of the information spyware collects by creating counterfeit information. Our goal is to generate enough counterfeit information to devalue the information gathered by spyware to the point that we eliminate the incentive to collect it in the first place. In this paper, we present our approach and an initial design of a tool that produces realistic counterfeit information about the browsing patterns of Web users.","PeriodicalId":122327,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129417458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}