{"title":"Ontological Pluralism","authors":"J. Turner","doi":"10.4324/9781315112596-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315112596-14","url":null,"abstract":"According to ontological pluralism, there are different ways, kinds, or modes of being. Aristotle may have espoused it when he claimed that being is said in many ways.1 Perhaps Bertrand Russell endorsed it when he said that the relation to the north of does not exist in the same sense that London does.2 Insofar as students in their first philosophy class have a particular view in mind when they say that what it is for there to be a number is very different than what it is for there to be a coffee cup, this is that view. Not surprisingly, philosophers disagree about who in fact held this view, but the accused include such notable figures as Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Russell, Moore, and Heidegger.3 But it has not fared well at the hands of analytic philosophers in the past half-century or so, historical notoriety notwithstanding. With few exceptions (perhaps Gilbert Ryle,4 and more recently Kris McDaniel5), what little attention it has received has been largely derisive. Most contemporary analytic philosophers do not think ontological pluralism is a going concern. And the majority of philosophers do not just disagree with the view — they seem to think it untenable, perhaps unthinkable, and almost certainly devastatingly refuted. From whence comes this refutation? Widespread dismissal of a view ought to be backed by serious argument. If ontological pluralism deserves the sort of treatment it has been getting at the hands of contemporary analytic philosophers, we must have a solid argument or two against it. Yet, insofar as I can see, there is no such argument. After getting clearer on just what the view is, I consider all of the arguments against it that I can think","PeriodicalId":120708,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129579146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ideology and Ontology","authors":"Sam Cowling","doi":"10.4324/9781315112596-29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315112596-29","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":120708,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129059396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Phenomenology as Metaphysics","authors":"D. Zahavi","doi":"10.4324/9781315112596-26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315112596-26","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":120708,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121270983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fictionalist Strategies in Metaphysics","authors":"L. Skiba, Richard Woodward","doi":"10.4324/9781315112596-20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315112596-20","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":120708,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124204676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ontological Commitment and Quantifiers","authors":"T. Parent","doi":"10.4324/9781315112596-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315112596-7","url":null,"abstract":"And here arises one of the oldest philosophical conundrums, going back to Parmenides—the problem of Non-Being. If one assumes the truth of ‘Pegasus lacks being’, then it follows (does it not?) that there is nothing to which the subject-term refers. So it does not refer to Pegasus in particular. In which case, the statement fails to say anything in reference to Pegasus. But of course, it is saying something in reference to Pegasus—that Pegasus is not. But if you can refer to Pegasus, it seems that Pegasus must in some sense “be.” Legions of responses to this problem have ensued.","PeriodicalId":120708,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117005814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Natural Language Ontology","authors":"Friederike Moltmann","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780199384655.013.330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780199384655.013.330","url":null,"abstract":"Certainly the same sort of reasoning should apply to consider it universal, in a suitable sense, as has been applied for the case of (generative) syntax.","PeriodicalId":120708,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121146860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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