Ontological Pluralism

Abstract

According to ontological pluralism, there are different ways, kinds, or modes of being. Aristotle may have espoused it when he claimed that being is said in many ways.1 Perhaps Bertrand Russell endorsed it when he said that the relation to the north of does not exist in the same sense that London does.2 Insofar as students in their first philosophy class have a particular view in mind when they say that what it is for there to be a number is very different than what it is for there to be a coffee cup, this is that view. Not surprisingly, philosophers disagree about who in fact held this view, but the accused include such notable figures as Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Russell, Moore, and Heidegger.3 But it has not fared well at the hands of analytic philosophers in the past half-century or so, historical notoriety notwithstanding. With few exceptions (perhaps Gilbert Ryle,4 and more recently Kris McDaniel5), what little attention it has received has been largely derisive. Most contemporary analytic philosophers do not think ontological pluralism is a going concern. And the majority of philosophers do not just disagree with the view — they seem to think it untenable, perhaps unthinkable, and almost certainly devastatingly refuted. From whence comes this refutation? Widespread dismissal of a view ought to be backed by serious argument. If ontological pluralism deserves the sort of treatment it has been getting at the hands of contemporary analytic philosophers, we must have a solid argument or two against it. Yet, insofar as I can see, there is no such argument. After getting clearer on just what the view is, I consider all of the arguments against it that I can think