Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal最新文献_第3页

Is Media Really the Great Information Equalizer? The Effects of WSJ Coverage of Firm Earnings Announcements on Peer Information Asymmetry in Information Transfers 媒体真的是伟大的信息均衡器吗?《华尔街日报》对企业财报的报道对信息传递中同伴信息不对称的影响

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3837808

Jing Xia

{"title":"Is Media Really the Great Information Equalizer? The Effects of WSJ Coverage of Firm Earnings Announcements on Peer Information Asymmetry in Information Transfers","authors":"Jing Xia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3837808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3837808","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research generally finds that the financial media levels the playing field among investors by reducing information acquisition costs for unsophisticated investors. In the setting of information transfers, I demonstrate that when media coverage is likely to reduce the industry information acquisition costs for both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, their information gap may be widened. Specifically, I find that same-day Wall Street Journal (WSJ) coverage of a focal firm’s earnings announcement (EA) exacerbates information asymmetry of its industry peers around the focal firm’s EA day. However, when the WSJ article is published one day after the EA, there is no change in peer information asymmetry on both the EA day and the day after. Additional analysis shows that the effects of same-day WSJ coverage on peer information asymmetry are stronger when it is more likely to reduce peer investors’ industry information acquisition costs and when inferring the implications of the focal firm EA for the peer entails higher information integration costs. These findings suggest that media coverage may increase information asymmetry among investors despite its importance in information dissemination.","PeriodicalId":119201,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123476083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Partial Information Disclosure in a Contest 竞赛中的部分信息披露

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-04-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3808118

Derek J. Clark, Tapas Kundu

引用次数: 2

Private Compensation and Organizational Design 私人薪酬与组织设计

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3410479

A. Buffa, Qing Liu, L. White

引用次数: 1

Screening while Controlling an Externality 在控制外部性的同时进行筛选

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-03-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3823180

Franz Ostrizek, Elia Sartori

引用次数: 2

Contracts Without Courts or Clans: How Business Networks Govern Exchange 没有法庭或宗族的契约:商业网络如何管理交易

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-03-10 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3780925

Sadie Blanchard

{"title":"Contracts Without Courts or Clans: How Business Networks Govern Exchange","authors":"Sadie Blanchard","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3780925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3780925","url":null,"abstract":"Legal scholars have long recognized the clan or close-knit community as alternative institutions for supporting trade when contract law and trusted courts are unavailable. But recent research finds that heterogeneous business networks engage in high-stakes transactions that are not fully susceptible to formal, judicially backed contracting. These networks lack features seen as undergirding clan- or community-supported trade. They lack preexisting noncommercial social ties that allow reliable and trusted information to spread at low cost, make exiting the network difficult, and enable coordinated sanctioning of cheaters. Consequently, some leading scholars doubt that these networks are doing the work of sustaining cooperation. Can business networks sustain cooperation? If so, how? This Article offers an answer by presenting and theorizing an original case study into a long-term, sophisticated, high-stakes trade network that relied on neither the court nor the clan. When the gains from trade are sufficiently large, parties can build mechanisms to produce and disseminate reliable information needed to support trade by starting with transactions that align incentives and commit to high transparency about behavior. Parties can then strengthen their commitments by investing in the bilateral relationship and by building a network in which each party is connected to multiple other parties, which facilitates the dissemination of information about behavior in trading relationships. The targeted cultivation of strong personal ties together with the construction of a trading network allow for bonding of higher-risk transactions and a greater variety of transactional terms than can be supported by incentive alignment alone. The reinsurance trade suggests that cultivated, freestanding business networks can support extralegal private ordering under a larger set of circumstances than legal scholars currently appreciate.","PeriodicalId":119201,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128587523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Weight on Earnings in Incentive Contracting: Dynamic Response or Status Quo? 激励契约对收益的影响:动态反应还是现状?

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-02-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3796180

Katharine D. Drake, Melissa A. Martin

{"title":"The Weight on Earnings in Incentive Contracting: Dynamic Response or Status Quo?","authors":"Katharine D. Drake, Melissa A. Martin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3796180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3796180","url":null,"abstract":"As firms evolve, the tasks required to generate firm value change, as does the ability of earnings to reflect changes in that value. To the extent earnings differentially captures managers’ effort toward desire tasks, contracting theory suggests its role in incentive pay should also change. However, anecdotal evidence suggests boards often fail to alter the weights on earnings in response to changes in the firm over time, relying instead on the status quo. In this study, we use a large longitudinal sample research design to investigate whether and how boards alter the weight on earnings in bonus contracts as its contracting usefulness changes over time. Our results suggest that although some contract evolution occurs, it often lacks timeliness. We find that boards often rely on contracting decisions made in prior periods, suggesting evidence of the status quo bias. Consistent with the status quo bias affecting board decisions, we document that process accountability mitigates a lack of concurrent contract evolution with shifts in firm evolution. Finally, we show that firms trade off earnings for other more idiosyncratic performance measures, suggesting alternate measures incrementally inform manager effort in early and late stages of firm development.","PeriodicalId":119201,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","volume":"252 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123591196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Parametric Rules for State Contingent Claims 国家或有债权的参数规则

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3777083

S. Chatterjee, Sinan Ertemel, Rajnish Kumar

{"title":"Parametric Rules for State Contingent Claims","authors":"S. Chatterjee, Sinan Ertemel, Rajnish Kumar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3777083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3777083","url":null,"abstract":"We study bankruptcy rules in a setting where individuals have state contingent claims. A rule must distribute shares before uncertainty resolves. Within a wide class of parametric rules, we first characterize rules of ex-ante form in terms of the way that the rule processes inherent uncertainty in the individual claims. The key property is: No Penalty for Risk. It says that the rule does not penalize an individual in a situation that differs from another only in terms of the this individual's claim in that the former situation has a risky version of the riskless claim in the latter situation. With regard to the ex-post characterization, our key property is: Indifference to Independent Combinations. It says that if an individual is risk neutral with expected utility preferences then any rule that makes her indifferent between any bankruptcy problem and a corresponding independent combination of gamble between a degenerate gamble and a zero game (any bankruptcy game with zero endowment) forces the rule to be in the ex-post form. Finally, a partial comparative static result is provided which formalizes the claim that individuals generally and ex-ante rules more appealing when the level of the resource is suffciently low.","PeriodicalId":119201,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","volume":"210 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132561027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Non-Deal Roadshows, Informed Trading, and Analyst Conflicts of Interest 非交易路演，知情交易和分析师利益冲突

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3302687

D. Bradley, Russell Jame, Jared Williams

引用次数: 6

The Crisis of Expertise 专业知识的危机

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3768185

Allen I. K. Vong

引用次数: 0

Who Should Pay the Bill for Employee Upskilling? 谁应该为员工的技能提升买单?

Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3719009

R. Vranceanu, A. Sutan

引用次数: 0