Non-Deal Roadshows, Informed Trading, and Analyst Conflicts of Interest

D. Bradley, Russell Jame, Jared Williams
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Non-deal roadshows (NDRs) are private meetings between management and institutional investors, typically organized by sell-side analysts. We find that around NDRs, local institutional investors trade heavily and profitably, while retail trading is significantly less informed. Analysts who sponsor NDRs issue significantly more optimistic recommendations and target prices, coupled with more “beatable” earnings forecasts, consistent with analysts issuing strategically biased forecasts in order to win NDR business. Our results suggest that NDRs result in a substantial information advantage for institutional investors and create significant conflicts of interests for the analysts that organize them.
非交易路演,知情交易和分析师利益冲突
非交易路演(ndr)是管理层和机构投资者之间的私人会议,通常由卖方分析师组织。我们发现,围绕存托凭证,本地机构投资者进行了大量且有利可图的交易,而散户投资者的知情程度明显较低。赞助NDR的分析师给出了更为乐观的建议和目标价,同时给出了更为“可战胜”的盈利预测,这与分析师为了赢得NDR业务而发布的有战略偏见的预测相一致。我们的研究结果表明,ndr为机构投资者带来了实质性的信息优势,并为组织它们的分析师带来了重大的利益冲突。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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