Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge最新文献_第4页

How to Agree without Understanding Each Other: Public Announcement Logic with Boolean Definitions 如何在互不理解的情况下达成一致:布尔定义的公告逻辑

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2019-07-19 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.297.14

Malvin Gattinger, Yanjing Wang

引用次数: 1

Reasoning about Social Choice and Games in Monadic Fixed-Point Logic 一元不动点逻辑下的社会选择与博弈推理

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2019-07-19 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.297.8

Ramit Das, R. Ramanujam, Sunil Simon

引用次数: 0

When Do Introspection Axioms Matter for Multi-Agent Epistemic Reasoning? 什么时候内省公理对多智能体认知推理很重要?

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2019-07-19 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.297.9

Yifeng Ding, W. Holliday, Cedegao Zhang

{"title":"When Do Introspection Axioms Matter for Multi-Agent Epistemic Reasoning?","authors":"Yifeng Ding, W. Holliday, Cedegao Zhang","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.297.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.9","url":null,"abstract":"The early literature on epistemic logic in philosophy focused on reasoning about the knowledge or belief of a single agent, especially on controversies about \"introspection axioms\" such as the 4 and 5 axioms. By contrast, the later literature on epistemic logic in computer science and game theory has focused on multi-agent epistemic reasoning, with the single-agent 4 and 5 axioms largely taken for granted. In the relevant multi-agent scenarios, it is often important to reason about what agent A believes about what agent B believes about what agent A believes; but it is rarely important to reason just about what agent A believes about what agent A believes. This raises the question of the extent to which single-agent introspection axioms actually matter for multi-agent epistemic reasoning. In this paper, we formalize and answer this question. To formalize the question, we first define a set of multi-agent formulas that we call agent-alternating formulas, including formulas like Box_a Box_b Box_a p but not formulas like Box_a Box_a p. We then prove, for the case of belief, that if one starts with multi-agent K or KD, then adding both the 4 and 5 axioms (or adding the B axiom) does not allow the derivation of any new agent-alternating formulas -- in this sense, introspection axioms do not matter. By contrast, we show that such conservativity results fail for knowledge and multi-agent KT, though they hold with respect to a smaller class of agent-nonrepeating formulas.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133711826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Arrow's Theorem Through a Fixpoint Argument 通过不动点论证的阿罗定理

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2019-07-19 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.297.12

F. Feys, H. Hansen

引用次数: 0

Social Choice Methods for Database Aggregation 数据库聚合的社会选择方法

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2019-07-17 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.297.4

F. Belardinelli, Umberto Grandi

引用次数: 1

What Drives People's Choices in Turn-Taking Games, if not Game-Theoretic Rationality? 如果不是博弈论理性，是什么驱使人们在回合制游戏中做出选择?

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2017-07-27 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.251.19

Sujata Ghosh, A. Heifetz, R. Verbrugge, H. D. Weerd

{"title":"What Drives People's Choices in Turn-Taking Games, if not Game-Theoretic Rationality?","authors":"Sujata Ghosh, A. Heifetz, R. Verbrugge, H. D. Weerd","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.251.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.251.19","url":null,"abstract":"In an earlier experiment, participants played a perfect information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in each game, the computer was nevertheless optimizing against some belief about the participant's future strategy. In the aggregate, it appeared that participants applied forward induction. However, cardinal effects seemed to play a role as well: a number of participants might have been trying to maximize expected utility. In order to find out how people really reason in such a game, we designed centipede-like turn-taking games with new payoff structures in order to make such cardinal effects less likely. We ran a new experiment with 50 participants, based on marble drop visualizations of these revised payoff structures. After participants played 48 test games, we asked a number of questions to gauge the participants' reasoning about their own and the opponent's strategy at all decision nodes of a sample game. We also checked how the verbalized strategies fit to the actual choices they made at all their decision points in the 48 test games. Even though in the aggregate, participants in the new experiment still tend to slightly favor the forward induction choice at their first decision node, their verbalized strategies most often depend on their own attitudes towards risk and those they assign to the computer opponent, sometimes in addition to considerations about cooperativeness and competitiveness.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"263 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114565067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

A Knowledge-Based Analysis of the Blockchain Protocol 基于知识的区块链协议分析

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2017-07-27 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.251.22

Joseph Y. Halpern, R. Pass

引用次数: 19

Condorcet's Principle and the Preference Reversal Paradox 孔多塞原理与偏好反转悖论

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2017-07-27 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.251.34

Dominik Peters

引用次数: 9

Arbitrary Arrow Update Logic with Common Knowledge is neither RE nor co-RE 带有常识的任意箭头更新逻辑既不是正则，也不是核心正则

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2017-07-27 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.251.27

Louwe B. Kuijer

引用次数: 10

A Formal Approach to the Problem of Logical Non-Omniscience 逻辑非全知问题的形式化方法

Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Pub Date : 2017-07-27 DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.251.16

Scott Garrabrant, Tsvi Benson-Tilsen, Andrew Critch, N. Soares, Jessica Taylor

引用次数: 9