{"title":"Empathy, Not Truth: Can a Dialectical and Skeptical Argumentation Enhance Both Democracy and Human Rights Courts?","authors":"A. Puppo","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.370","url":null,"abstract":"Who is the best moral reasoner, the judge or the legislator? The aim of this paper is to refine this question, by distinguishing between different metaethical assumptions. If the meta-ethical assumptions of arguers are incompatible or if their institutional goal is to establish some truth, there is no way of entering into a constructive argumentative activity. My claim is that only when arguers renounce any epistemic temptation and feel empathy with respect to others’ arguments, caninstitutions improve the quality of their judicial and democratic arguments, and therefore gain authority.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"6 2-3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120901694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Quietist’s Gambit","authors":"R. Mena","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.366","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I develop a semantic theory of vagueness that is immune to worries regarding the use of precise mathematical tools. I call this view semantic quietism. This view has the advantage of being clearly compatible with the phenomenon of vagueness. The cost is that it cannot capture every robust semantic fact.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"170 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114417104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moderate Epistemic Akrasia","authors":"Nicolás Lo Guercio","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.04","url":null,"abstract":"Moderate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment, moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically irrational. The paper starts with a brief introduction that makes explicit some background notions and clarifies the dialectics of the debate. Second, the well-known distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality is introduced and some cases of improper basing are discussed (Turri 2011). Third, two different cases are considered in which one might argue that moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically rational, and it is argued that none is successful. Fourth, several objections are presented and answered. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114984117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"José A. Díez y Andrea Iacona, Del amor y otros engaños. Breve tratado filosófico sobre razones y pasiones","authors":"Eulalia Pérez Sedeño","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.104","url":null,"abstract":"José A. Díez y Andrea Iacona, Del amor y otros engaños. Breve tratado filosófico sobre razones y pasiones, Alpha Decay, Barcelona, 2016, 160 pp.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132398898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legal Positivism’s Legitimate Heir?","authors":"Samuel Tschorne","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.17","url":null,"abstract":"Fernando Atria, La forma del derecho, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2016, 465 pp.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126225082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tras las raíces de Kuhn: un ejercicio de arqueología. Nota crítica sobre Thomas S. Kuhn: la búsqueda de la estructura","authors":"Pablo Melogno","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.18","url":null,"abstract":"J. Mayoral, Thomas S. Kuhn: la búsqueda de la estructura, Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 2017, 523 pp.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130773182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Respuesta a Sebastián: en defensa de la naturaleza consciente de las creencias de primera persona","authors":"Javier Vidal","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.16","url":null,"abstract":"En esta revista, argumenté en favor de la naturaleza consciente de las creencias de primera persona (2014). En un artículo más reciente, Miguel Ángel Sebastián (2017) trata de mostrar que tal argumento no es sólido. Aquí procedo a lidiar con sus tres críticas principales. En primer lugar, sostengo que el argumento es válido si conocer una creencia de primera persona consiste en creer que uno la tiene. Defiendo también que no hay ninguna regresión al infinito de creencias conscientes de orden superior que sea dañina. En segundo lugar, argumento que la noción de conciencia en juego es aquella que es relevante en la discusión acerca de la naturaleza de la conciencia y del inconsciente. Por último, reviso la justificación del principio (SC*) para mostrar que no prejuzga la cuestión.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116338602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Causalidad y emergencia","authors":"S. Castillo","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2018.14","url":null,"abstract":"Se propone entender la relación mente-cuerpo partiendo del emergentismo, aunque esta propuesta no ha estado exenta de dificultades. Los esfuerzos del fisicalismo emergentista por encontrar poderes causales en lo mental han derivado en un liminativismo de lo mental o a aceptarlo como fenómeno superveniente. En este artículo se intenta mostrar lo mental como un estadio emergente de lo físico pero sin pérdida de propiedades, pasando necesariamente por lo biológico como otro estadio de lo físico. Las propiedades mentales y biológicas, entonces, no se restringen a un ámbito separado del mundo físico, sino que constituyen formas diferentes de la fisicalidad pura.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124444703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"La comicidad como perjuicio de sujetos intencionales","authors":"Manuel Pérez Otero","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.1075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.1075","url":null,"abstract":"En este artículo presento, clarifico y exploro algunas virtudes potenciales de una determinada teoría —de carácter intencionalista— sobre lo cómico. Su tesis mínima principal establece una condición necesaria para la comicidad: quien evalúaaprecia una situación como humorística/cómica reconoce un perjuicio o daño ocasionado a ciertos sujetos intencionales (pueden ser sujetos involucrados en la situación cómica, o el propio evaluador-apreciador). Una versión más fuerte establece que la comicidad deriva (al menos en parte) de dicho perjuicio. El perjuicio es aquello que, cuando se combina con otros factores, encontramos humorístico/cómico. Clarificar la teoría conlleva una tarea de comparación con otras concepciones del humor, en particular, con la teoría de la incongruencia.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126045677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"La diferencia sexual en las neurociencias y la neuroeducación","authors":"Sonia Reverter-Bañón, María Medina-Vicent","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.13","url":null,"abstract":"Los argumentos neurocientíficos focalizados en demostrar diferencias sexuales en el cerebro gozan de una gran popularidad. Algunas de las conclusiones de dichos experimentos han derivado en propuestas neuroeducativas que promueven la educación segregada por sexos. Estas propuestas carecen del rigor necesario para poder ser aplicadas. No sólo porque los estudios neurocientíficos están lejos de poder aseverar diferencias sexuales significativas en el cerebro, sino porque falta un diálogo crítico entre las ciencias que fundamente estrategias educativas adecuadas en el ámbito de las diferencias sexuales del cerebro. Concluimos que es necesario establecer un diálogo entre los diferentes ámbitos que conforman la neuroeducación, porque solamente de este modo se pueden fundamentar modelos educativos democráticos donde la igualdad de género sea un valor irrenunciable.","PeriodicalId":117174,"journal":{"name":"Crítica (México D. F. En línea)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115380823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}