ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)最新文献

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Corruption and Corporate Governance in Namibia: An Analysis of the Strategic Approaches in the 4th Industrial Revolution 纳米比亚的腐败与公司治理:第四次工业革命战略路径分析
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-09-13 DOI: 10.17159/1727-3781/2021/v24i0a10738
Ndatega Asheela-Shikalepo
{"title":"Corruption and Corporate Governance in Namibia: An Analysis of the Strategic Approaches in the 4th Industrial Revolution","authors":"Ndatega Asheela-Shikalepo","doi":"10.17159/1727-3781/2021/v24i0a10738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2021/v24i0a10738","url":null,"abstract":"The advent of new technology and the 4th industrial revolution has introduced new facets of corporate crimes and regulatory challenges for the enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Acknowledging the negative effects of corruption on the private sector, corporate governance mechanisms may help reduce corruption in the private sector by ensuring that corporations are managed in the best interest of the corporation and the shareholders or investors. This article aims to evaluate the adequacy of the regulatory measures intended to promote good corporate governance in Namibia thereby cushioning the Namibian financial market from the negative effects of corporate corruption. It provides an exposition of the concepts corporate corruption and corporate governance by considering the relationship between the two. It further provides an analysis of the Namibian corporate governance regime and the anti-corruption legislative framework. It is submitted that if Namibia is to realise the financial market objectives set out in its policy documents, there is a need for the introduction of robust strategic approaches in corporate governance directed at curbing and/or reducing corporate corruption responsive to the 4th industrial revolution challenges, amongst others.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123040212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Solvency II Capital with Correlated Risks: Evidence from General Insurance 偿付能力ⅱ资本与相关风险:来自一般保险的证据
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-08-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3921745
DINABANDHU BAG
{"title":"Solvency II Capital with Correlated Risks: Evidence from General Insurance","authors":"DINABANDHU BAG","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3921745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3921745","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines dependency among the line of business in the non-life insurance industry towards arriving at solvency II margin capital requirements. The accurate dependence between lines of business is crucial for capital allocation. The factors attributed to variability in claim volumes by segments are derived by longitudinal analysis using a simpler way than the loss triangle chain-ladder method. We estimate the correlation among major segments of losses of all non insurance firms in India during the period 2001 to 2020. The important insight is the degree of dependency that remain stable across the lines of business, irrespective of the changes to the growth or fall in market share of the firm. We show that dependency among lines are crucial in determining the insurer’s risk capital. Our results show that there exists strong relation between segments of fire, marine and property & miscellaneous, respectively. Further, the profit transfers to shareholders have remained negatively correlated with the net premiums earned. The implications of these findings are important in respect of making provisions for solvency capital reserve by non-life insurers.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126840743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Is Corporate Governance 什么是公司管治
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3892403
Kelvin Kamande, Dr.Halima Ibrahim Mohamed
{"title":"What Is Corporate Governance","authors":"Kelvin Kamande, Dr.Halima Ibrahim Mohamed","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3892403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3892403","url":null,"abstract":"What is corporate governance? The paper velges into the world of corporate governance and its place under the law, by identifying its inept principles and governing values to ensure better financial performance and a competitive edge.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"85 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123176247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Directors’ Career Concerns: Evidence from Proxy Contests and Board Interlocks 董事职业关注:来自代理权竞争和董事会联锁的证据
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-01-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2825786
Shuran Zhang
{"title":"Directors’ Career Concerns: Evidence from Proxy Contests and Board Interlocks","authors":"Shuran Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2825786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2825786","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies the disciplinary spillover effects of proxy contests on companies that share directors with target firms, that is, interlocked firms. In difference-in-differences tests, I find that interlocked firms reduce excess cash holdings, increase shareholder payouts, cut CEO compensation, and engage in less earnings management in the year after proxy contests. The effects are more pronounced when both the interlocked and target firms have a unitary board and when the interlocking director is up for election, is younger, or has shorter tenure. Overall, the evidence highlights the importance of directors’ career concerns in policy spillovers across firms with board interlocks.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123819570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Family Firms and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence From India 家族企业与盈余管理:来自印度的经验证据
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-12-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3754485
Mani Bansal
{"title":"Family Firms and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence From India","authors":"Mani Bansal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3754485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3754485","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the earnings management among family firms in India after taking into account the moderating the effect of board independence. Discretionary accruals have been used to measure the magnitude of earning management, which has been estimated using the Modified Jones model (1995). The proportion of independent directors in the board and CEO duality have been used as proxies of board independence. Based on a sample of 2074 companies listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) of India, spanning over 13 years from 2005 to 2017, we find that family firms are less likely to be engaged in earning management in comparison to their non-family counterparts after controlling for firm-specific variables such as firm size, financial leverage, sales growth, and operating performance. Family firms’ lower engagement in earning manipulation consistent with the notion of alignment effect rather than the entrenchment effect; there is greater alignment of interest between majority and minority shareholders in family firms due to their long-term focus. The findings also suggest that corporate governance is ineffective in India to control the financial irregularities due to a domination of management in controlling in the board, which jeopardizes the capability of independent directors to fulfill their monitoring role, consistent with managerial hegemony theory (Abdullah, 2004). In family firms, the board members have implicit ties with the dominant family, which results in a lack of substantial independence. The positions of CEO and chairman in family firms are mostly held by the family members themselves; therefore, holding these positions by the same person or two different persons, do not impact the earning management significantly. In particular, we find that family ownership limits the earnings management, which in turn, could affect their quality of financial reporting.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133272241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Corporate Governance, Islamic Governance and Financial Flexibility 公司治理、伊斯兰治理和财务灵活性
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3716197
Abdullah A. Aljughaiman, A. Salama, Thanos Verousis
{"title":"Corporate Governance, Islamic Governance and Financial Flexibility","authors":"Abdullah A. Aljughaiman, A. Salama, Thanos Verousis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3716197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3716197","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate the relationship between corporate governance structures and financial flexibility for conventional and Islamic banks in the Middle East and North Africa region. We construct a novel financial flexibility index for the banking sector. We show that corporate governance has a significant effect on banks’ financial flexibility. However, Shari’ah governance rules determine how that relationship is manifested in Islamic banks. Our results show that Western corporate governance structures and one-size-fits-all approaches to corporate governance may lead to suboptimal financial flexibility positions. Importantly, we show that “soft policies” to banking regulation are value-enhancing for the banking sector.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129310041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Economic Performance of State‐Owned Enterprises Under the Chinese Communist Party's Supervision: Some Reflection on China's Economic Reform 中国共产党监管下的国有企业经济绩效:对中国经济改革的一些思考
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1111/1468-0106.12298
Len-Kuo Hu, Daniel C. Lee
{"title":"Economic Performance of State‐Owned Enterprises Under the Chinese Communist Party's Supervision: Some Reflection on China's Economic Reform","authors":"Len-Kuo Hu, Daniel C. Lee","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12298","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the economic behaviour of state‐owned enterprises in China with special emphasis on the role of the state's sole party as either an agent (management) or supervisor in the enterprises. It is found that with the construction of an incentive‐compatible compensation design and the Chinese Communist Party orchestrating an appropriate objective guideline for its members to follow, state or socialist capitalism could still achieve efficient economic performance. If party members did not behave prudently or pursued their personal interests instead of the state's overall welfare, there could be grave consequences, including corruption, nepotism or even the breakdown of the system.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116528613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Effect of Diversity in the Board of Directors and Top Management Team on Corporate Social Responsibility 董事会和高层管理团队多元化对企业社会责任的影响
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-09-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3701302
Priscila Prudêncio, Hyane Forte, V. Crisóstomo, A. Vasconcelos
{"title":"Effect of Diversity in the Board of Directors and Top Management Team on Corporate Social Responsibility","authors":"Priscila Prudêncio, Hyane Forte, V. Crisóstomo, A. Vasconcelos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3701302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3701302","url":null,"abstract":"This study analyzes the effect of corporate governance, with an emphasis on gender and age diversity in the board and Top Management Team, on Corporate Social Responsibility in Brazil. The sample was composed of Brazilian firms with corporate governance published in the CVM reference form, financial information in the Economatica® database, and CSR assessed by the CSRHub database, in the 2016-2017 biennium, with a total of 194 firm-year observations. Diversity is measured by the presence of women, age heterogeneity, and average age in the board of directors and top management team. The results indicate that gender diversity in the board of directors and the higher average age of the top management team have a favorable effect on the CSR practices of Brazilian firms. Additionally, it was observed that age heterogeneity among board members has a negative influence on CSR practices. The research contributes to a better understanding of the behavior of more diverse boards of directors and top management teams regarding CSR strategies.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122555261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
The Determinants and Effects of Board Committees 董事会委员会的决定因素和影响
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-09-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3530217
Wei-Ming Lee
{"title":"The Determinants and Effects of Board Committees","authors":"Wei-Ming Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3530217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530217","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The governance reforms of 2003 require corporate boards to establish various committees. This paper studies how these committees are structured and the corresponding impacts. I find that independent directors with long tenures and multiple board seats tend to multitask and sit on more committees. The firms that multitask their independent directors are associated with comparatively low CEO compensation and high ROA. In particular, the benefits of multitasking independent directors are more pronounced in firms with long-tenured CEOs. I contribute to the literature by showing that board performance depends not only on the directors' identities, but also on their task assignments.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"205 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132348239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Agency Theory, Accounting Based Performance Evaluation Systems and IFRS: A Brief Relational Overview 代理理论,基于会计的绩效评估系统和国际财务报告准则:简要的关系概述
ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-09-07 DOI: 10.31014/AIOR.1992.03.03.271
Bruce H. Geddes
{"title":"Agency Theory, Accounting Based Performance Evaluation Systems and IFRS: A Brief Relational Overview","authors":"Bruce H. Geddes","doi":"10.31014/AIOR.1992.03.03.271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31014/AIOR.1992.03.03.271","url":null,"abstract":"This paper covers multiple related topics. To begin, the use of a performance evaluation system is helpful to the success of an organization (Wu et al., 2018). Performance evaluation systems drive corporate governance by results. The metrics used in the evaluation determine the direction that the executives of a company will govern it; corporate governance influences firm performance (Brahmana et al. 2018). The research topic covered is Agency Theory, its relation to corporate governance on an international scale related to IFRS. The paper concludes the issues with a look at the possible future effect on corporate governance and areas of future research.","PeriodicalId":117141,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Emerging Markets Economics) (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115447951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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