LSN: Mortgages (Sub-Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Living with Tied Priority","authors":"R. Bernhardt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1992702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1992702","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes a recent California appellate decision holding that two lenders had equal priority because their mortgages were deemed received by the county recorder’s office at the same time when the overnight mail was opened.","PeriodicalId":113000,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Mortgages (Sub-Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133750756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Priority Fight Between the Second Mortgagee and the Subrogated Insurance Carrier","authors":"R. Bernhardt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1956213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1956213","url":null,"abstract":"Analysis of a recent decision holding that the insurance carrier who had paid the first mortgagee had a superior right to the remaining value of the property by virtue of subrogation than did the second mortgagee, even though the second was also insured under the same policy.","PeriodicalId":113000,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Mortgages (Sub-Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132206907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"To Empower, Prohibit, or Delegate?: Regulatory Strategies for the Consumer Credit Market","authors":"Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, K. Ko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1903595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1903595","url":null,"abstract":"Much has been written about the state of U.S. consumer credit market. In this Article, we provide an overview of the scholarship in this area and an interim diagnosis of the market failure. We identify the chief problem as various epistemic failures on the consumers’ part, which lead to poor competitive dynamics and are perpetuated in turn as a result of insufficient competition. From an economic perspective, the government has several avenues of enhancing consumer welfare. Based on a cost-effectiveness framework – which asks how decision-making powers should be allocated among the consumer, the government, and other parties – we highlight empowerment, prohibition, and delegation as three regulatory approaches the government has in addressing these failures. We argue that the current regulation, consisting largely of variations of empowerment and prohibition, neglects the dynamic aspect of the consumer credit market. Given the market’s constantly evolving nature, we believe a well-structured delegation is a potentially powerful approach to enhancing consumer welfare. The provisions of the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act are generally a step in the right direction. While the Act does not go far enough in certain directions, we argue that it does grant wide discretion to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection to pursue more creative avenues, including possibly those along the lines of delegation, as we suggest.","PeriodicalId":113000,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Mortgages (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126155425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mortgage Modification Meltdown: When Will Congress Take the Plight of Homeowners Seriously?","authors":"J. Rodgers","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1738672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1738672","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2007, over two million families have lost their homes, and studies show that many more millions will lose theirs over the next several years. Even though the crisis has impacted all people across the United States, Hispanic and African-American communities have been considered the “ground zero” of this economic catastrophe, and this problem is coupled with the fact that minorities have generally suffered the greatest job losses as well. Although Congress and the mortgage servicing industry have attempted loan modification reform in the past, many of these efforts have not produced effective results. As part of a multi-pronged approach to combat the foreclosure crisis, the Homes Act adds incentives and extra pressures to encourage mortgage servicers to modify loans, instead of foreclosing on residential property. These provisions involve protecting servicers from TILA liability if they enter into “qualified loss mitigation plans” with homeowners, creating additional TILA disclosure requirements to increase transparency in the secondary mortgage market, and offering payments to servicers if they refinance mortgages in cooperation with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter “HUD”) through the Hope for Homeowners program. A judicial approach to the foreclosure crisis is also important, but in passing this bill Congress rejected Senator Dick Durbin’s proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would have allowed U.S. Bankruptcy Judges to modify residential mortgages in the face of impending foreclosure. It is critical for the federal government and mortgage industry to follow through with this legislation that increases consumer ability to modify home mortgages, in addition to promoting potential judicial mortgage modification authority, in order to stabilize the U.S. housing market. Other strategies for mitigating the foreclosure crisis include promoting the spread of financial information, making significant improvements to the standard mortgage contract, and developing new financial consumer products to reduce the strain upon homeowners who face periods of financial distress. This Note starts by addressing the background of the U.S. home mortgage crisis that began in the latter half of 2007, and continues as of the date of this publication. There follows an examination of a few of the major types of mortgages that exist today, some important past legislation regarding home mortgage lending, and previous failed attempts at reform. Next, this Note analyzes the Homes Act to see if it offers a better source of reform, and compares it to a piece of parallel state legislation from New Jersey. This Note concludes by recommending other avenues for home mortgage modification and reform, including the potential for judicial modification via bankruptcy court, and modern pro-consumer financial products that might alleviate the distressful situation affecting millions of Americans today.","PeriodicalId":113000,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Mortgages (Sub-Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130430243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation","authors":"Michael S. Barr, S. Mullainathan, E. Shafir","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1121199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1121199","url":null,"abstract":"Choosing a mortgage is one of the biggest financial decisions an American consumer will make. Yet it can be a complicated one, especially in today's environment where mortgages vary in dimensions and unique features. This complexity has raised regulatory issues. Should some features be regulated? Should product disclosure be regulated? And most basic of all, is there a rationale for regulation or will the market solve the problem? Current regulation of home mortgages is largely stuck in two competing models of regulation - disclosure and usury or product restrictions - neither of which take adequate account of behavioral psychology or market incentives. This paper seeks to use insights from both psychology and economics to provide a framework for understanding both these models as well as to suggest fundamentally new models. We understand outcomes as an equilibrium interaction between individuals with specific psychologies and firms that respond to those psychologies within specific markets. Regulation must then account for failures in this equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":113000,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Mortgages (Sub-Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131834287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}