Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency最新文献

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Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2020-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-014

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1. Incorporating Cultural Intelligence into Joint Intelligence: Cultural Intelligence and Ethnographic Intelligence 1. 将文化情报纳入联合情报:文化情报和民族志情报

Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2020-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-003

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4. Weapons of the Not So Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization 4. 阿富汗不那么弱的武器:普什图农业结构和部落组织

Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2020-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-006

Thomas H. Johnson, B. Zellen, Alexei J. D. Gavriel, M. Tyrrell, Steffen Merten, T. Barfield, F. Khan, Michael R. Fenzel, R. J. Bebber

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9. Implementing a Balanced Counterinsurgency Strategy in Northeast Afghanistan, May 2007–July 2008 9. 在阿富汗东北部实施平衡的反叛乱战略，2007年5月- 2008年7月

Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2020-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-011

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3. Employing Data Fusion in Cultural Analysis and COIN in Tribal Social Systems 3.文化分析中的数据融合与部落社会系统中的代币分析

Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2020-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-005

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6. The Durand Line: Tribal Politics and Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations 6. 杜兰德线:部落政治与巴基斯坦-阿富汗关系

Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2020-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-008

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8. Developing an IO Environmental Assessment in Khost Province, Afghanistan: Information Operations at Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost in 2008 8. 在阿富汗霍斯特省开展IO环境评估:2008年霍斯特省重建小组的信息业务

Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2020-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-010

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Frontmatter

Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2020-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-fm

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2. The Use of Evolutionary Theory in Modeling Culture and Cultural Conflict 2. 进化论在文化和文化冲突建模中的应用

Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2020-12-31 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-004

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7. The Maneuver Company in Afghanistan: Establishing Counterinsurgency Priorities at the District Level 7. 在阿富汗的机动公司:在地区一级建立反叛乱优先事项

Culture, Conflict, and Counterinsurgency Pub Date : 2010-03-01 DOI: 10.1515/9780804789219-009

Michael R. Fenzel

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