7. 在阿富汗的机动公司:在地区一级建立反叛乱优先事项

Michael R. Fenzel
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Many authors, strategists, and politicians have offered measured opinions and recommendations on how to improve the situation, but most agree that to fix these problems and allow Afghanistan to develop without the constant pressure of an insurgency, we must establish and maintain security and develop governance in the rural districts. Completing these tasks may appear impossible to a casual observer of the conflict. Indeed, while fighting a growing insurgency, coalition casualties mount. Historically, the rural population in modem Afghanistan has rejected all large-scale reforms attempted by a central government. Unfortunately, change acceptable to the tribes will simply not come from the center. Establishing security in this war-torn land is achievable only if we focus our efforts and resources at the district level, where the sub-tribes are culturally dominant. 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引用次数: 1

摘要

反叛乱战争的基本单位是其领导人与民众直接和持续接触的最大单位。这是反叛乱行动中最重要的部队,是大多数实际问题出现的地方,也是决定战争胜负的地方。——David Galula《反叛乱战争:理论与实践》最近国家关注的焦点从伊拉克转移到阿富汗,以及奥巴马政府增加的兵力,已经把更多的注意力转移到阿富汗当前的问题上。美国军队和联盟伙伴正在许多方面努力确保阿富汗的稳定未来,但他们面临的障碍不止几个。在宏观层面上,阿富汗中央政府软弱无力,腐败肆虐,对农村选区的困境漠不关心,然而,如果没有部落间的协议,政府就没有真正的机会将其影响力扩展到全国其他地区。阿富汗国民军、警察和边境警察正在增加他们的人数和提高他们的技能,但是,除了少数几个特殊的阿富汗国民军营外,他们还没有能力独立行动。阿富汗南部和东部的罂粟田和毒品贸易继续蓬勃发展。与巴基斯坦的边界仍然漏洞百出,足以让复兴的塔利班将其作为渗透到该国偏远农村地区的主要和最不受限制的途径。这些只是阿富汗政府和美国领导的联军面临的众多问题中的一小部分。许多作家、战略家和政治家都对如何改善局势提出了谨慎的意见和建议,但大多数人都同意,要解决这些问题,让阿富汗在没有叛乱持续压力的情况下发展,我们必须在农村地区建立和维持安全,并发展治理。完成这些任务对于冲突的旁观者来说似乎是不可能的。事实上,在打击日益增长的叛乱活动的同时,联军的伤亡人数也在上升。从历史上看,现代阿富汗的农村人口拒绝中央政府尝试的所有大规模改革。不幸的是,部落所能接受的改变不会来自中央。只有把我们的努力和资源集中在地区一级,才能在这片饱受战争蹂躏的土地上建立安全,因为在地区一级,各小部落在文化上占主导地位。在阿富汗,没有什么地方比巴基斯坦联邦直辖部落地区(FATA)边境地区更紧迫了。人们普遍认为,塔利班、基地组织和其他外国武装分子将联邦直辖部落地区作为避风港,在那里策划、提供资源、策划和发动对边境地区的袭击,并深入阿富汗内陆。自2006年以来,参与边境战斗的外国叛乱分子数量大幅增加,这加强了叛乱活动,降低了安全水平。保卫这一地区的斗争已成为反叛乱斗争的前线,也是联军最重要的战略任务。如果我们能够在阿富汗南部和东部的边境省份和地区建立安全和稳定,那么随之而来的势头可能会引导该国其他地区实现可持续和平。问题是,叛乱分子在这些农村地区最有效,而有限的部队水平使得在更大范围内挑战他们成为一个令人困惑的问题。我建议我们从根本上改变在阿富汗打击叛乱的方式。为了创造成功的条件,我们需要与部落领导人接触,并建立一个地区一级的安全架构,在这个架构中,地区省长是由协商会议选出的关键领导人。同时,我们需要一个自下而上的重点,使联合机动连指挥官能够与地区总监密切合作。接下来,我们需要将目前位于省级的关键资产重新分配到地区一级。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
7. The Maneuver Company in Afghanistan: Establishing Counterinsurgency Priorities at the District Level
The basic unit of counterinsurgency warfare is the largest unit whose leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population. This is the most important unit in counterinsurgency operations, the level where most of the practical problems arise, where the war is won or lost. - David Galula in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice THE RECENT SHIFT in national concern from Iraq to Afghanistan and the increase in forces committed by the Obama administration have directed greater attention to the current problems in Afghanistan. United States forces and coalition partners are working on many fronts to secure a stable future for the country, but they face more than a few obstacles. At the macro level, the Afghan central government is weak and plagued by corruption and indifference to the plight of its rural constituency, yet without tribal accord, the government has no real chance of extending its reach to the rest of the country. The Afghan National Army, Police, and Border Police are increasing their numbers and improving their skills but, with the exception of a few exceptional Afghan National Army battalions, they are not yet capable of operating on their own. The poppy fields and drug trade in southern and eastern Afghanistan continue to flourish. The border with Pakistan remains porous enough for a resurgent Taliban to use it as its primary and most unfettered means of infiltration into remote rural sections of the country. These are just a few of the many problems for the government of Afghanistan and the U.S.-led coalition. Many authors, strategists, and politicians have offered measured opinions and recommendations on how to improve the situation, but most agree that to fix these problems and allow Afghanistan to develop without the constant pressure of an insurgency, we must establish and maintain security and develop governance in the rural districts. Completing these tasks may appear impossible to a casual observer of the conflict. Indeed, while fighting a growing insurgency, coalition casualties mount. Historically, the rural population in modem Afghanistan has rejected all large-scale reforms attempted by a central government. Unfortunately, change acceptable to the tribes will simply not come from the center. Establishing security in this war-torn land is achievable only if we focus our efforts and resources at the district level, where the sub-tribes are culturally dominant. Nowhere in Afghanistan is this more pressing than along the border of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is commonly accepted that the Taliban, AI-Qaeda, and other foreign fighters use the FATA as a safe haven from which to plan, resource, stage, and launch attacks in the border districts and deeper into Afghanistan's interior. Since 2006, the number of foreign insurgents involved in the border fight has substantially increased, which strengthens the insurgency and decreases security. The struggle to secure this area has become the front line in the counterinsurgency fight and the coalition's most important strategic task. If we can establish security and stabilize the border provinces and districts in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the accompanying momentum may guide the rest of the country to a sustainable peace. The problem is that the insurgents are most effective in these rural areas, and limited troop levels make challenging them on a wider scale a confounding proposition. I propose a fundamental shift in the way we think about fighting the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. To set the conditions for success, we need to engage tribal leaders and establish a district-level security architecture in which the district governor is the key leader elected by the shura. In conjunction, we need a bottom-up focus that places the coalition maneuver company commander where he can work closely with the district governor. Next, we need to redistribute critical assets now located at the provincial level down to the district level. …
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