Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal最新文献

{"title":"The Origins of Common Identity: Evidence from Alsace-Lorraine","authors":"Sirus H. Dehdari, Kai Gehring","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3338764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3338764","url":null,"abstract":"We study how more negative historical exposure to the actions of nation-states—like war, occupation, and repression—affects the formation of regional identity. The quasi-exogenous division of the French regions Alsace and Lorraine allows us to implement a geographical regression discontinuity design at the municipal level. Using measures of stated and revealed preferences, we find that more negative experiences with nation-states are associated with a stronger regional identity in the short, medium, and long run. This is linked to preferences for more regional decision-making. Establishing regional organizations seems to be a key mechanism to maintaining and strengthening regional identity. (JEL H77, N43, N44, N93, N94, Z13)","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131252365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Important Role of Time Limits when Consumers Choose their Time in Service","authors":"P. Feldman, Ella Segev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3424317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3424317","url":null,"abstract":"A main challenge that service providers face when managing service systems is how to generate value and regulate congestion at the same time. To this end, classical queueing models suggest managers charge per-use fees and invest in capacity to speed up the service. However, in discretionary services, in which consumers value time in service and choose how long to stay, per-use fees result in suboptimal performance and speeding up does not apply. We study a queueing model of a service provider and rational consumers who are heterogenous in their requirements for service duration. Consumers incur disutility from waiting and choose whether to join and how long to spend in service. We consider time limits as a novel mechanism that may help in controlling congestion. Time limits put a cap on the maximum time that customers can spend in service. We analyze their effectiveness when combined with two price schemes: per-use fees and price rates. Time limits are effective because they reduce time in service and impact waiting times and joining behavior. Revenue maximizing firms and social planners who maximize social welfare benefit from implementing time limits in addition to price rates. Social planners who seek to maximize consumer welfare, however, focus on regulating congestion and should, therefore, offer the service for free but implement time limits if congestion levels are high. The attractiveness of time limits goes further. We show that time limits are not only a useful lever that works well when combined with simple price mechanisms, but they are in fact optimal when congestion is high. Service providers can achieve the first-best outcome and extract all customer surplus by coupling a time limit with an optimal price mechanism. The attractiveness of time limits stems from their ability to reduce not only the average time spent in service, but also its variance. This is highly effective in settings in which customers’ service times impose externalities on others’ waiting times. Thus, we conclude that providers of discretionary services should set time limits when congestion is an issue. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125439086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Employment as a Relational Obligation to Work","authors":"Michael Raith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3914740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914740","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares employment with spot trade of labor, formalizing arguments by Coase, Simon, and Williamson. With spot trade, an entrepreneur and a wealth-constrained worker bargain over different actions, and without agreement there is no trade. Employment is a relational contract that gives the entrepreneur the authority to choose the worker's actions. Because of incomplete information about benefits and costs, either spot trade or employment may lead to inefficient outcomes. I derive a wide range of results about the entrepreneur's optimal choice between employment and spot trade. Employment is more efficient than spot trade the greater is the quasi-rent between the parties. Additionally, employment enables the entrepreneur to minimize the worker's rent. On the other hand, a wage premium is required to ensure the worker's obedience. My results suggest that the worker's obligation to provide his service is essential to the nature of employment. By contrast, whether the worker has multiple tasks, or the entrepreneur has an information advantage, or the entrepreneur owns important assets, all matter much less than the literature has suggested. The model also provides a simple theory of the firm that captures key ideas of transaction-cost economics.","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117296955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Information System Development Plan for APC Laundry House","authors":"Trixy Sharmaine Ladipe, Sherwin Lepranum, Michael James Virtudazo, Ton Jasper Espinosa, Jovito Bolacoy Jr.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3894784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3894784","url":null,"abstract":"Strategic in business and individual living practices has developed over the past several years and is continuing to develop. One of the business developed for the several years of now is the laundry shop, it helps a lot of people to make their clothes is greatly basic to supply individuals with a put to wash and clean clothing this has been the base of the laundry services for a long time and it has been a tolerably difficult one. But there are issues that the laundry services have such as inconsistency of services and the slow process of inventory management, we the researchers proposed the Customer Relationship management, appointment, and reservation system. This application is developed to manage the laundry service and provide a management of information in the laundry that will help the shop manages its customer, so that the customer will not bother to let them know on what time are they going to get the item and also, we want to improve the services of this business will help to improve the performance of current situation and overcome the problems that arise nowadays. It is an integrated approach to managing relationships by focusing on customer retention and relationship development.","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"161 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128259126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Subjective Beliefs about Contract Enforceability","authors":"J. Prescott, Evan Starr","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3873638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3873638","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the content, role, and adaptability of subjective beliefs about contract enforceability in the context of postemployment covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”). We show that employees of all stripes tend to believe that their noncompetes are enforceable, even when they are not. We provide evidence in support of both supply- and demand-side stories that explain employees’ persistently inaccurate beliefs. Moreover, we show that mistaken beliefs are not innocuous. Rather, believing that unenforceable noncompetes are enforceable causes employees to forgo better job options and to perceive that their employer is more likely to take legal action against them if they choose to compete. However, despite mobility-reducing effects ex post, we find no evidence that mistakenly believing that a noncompete is enforceable causes employees to be more likely to negotiate over such provisions ex ante. Finally, we use an information experiment to simulate an educational campaign that informs employees about the enforceability (or lack thereof) of their noncompete. We find that this information matters a good deal to employee beliefs and prospective behavior; however, information alone does not appear to entirely eliminate an unenforceable noncompete as a factor in the decision whether to take a new job. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for policy debate regarding the enforceability of noncompetes.","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"163 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127284937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Earnings Management in Australian Not-for-Profit Disability Services","authors":"D. Gilchrist, Dane Etheridge, Z. Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3864804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3864804","url":null,"abstract":"The Australian not-for-profit and charitable sector is an important component in that country’s social capital. It delivers services and supports to some of the most vulnerable people in the community. However, up until recently, poor data sets related to the sector’s financial performance and position have meant that the examination of its financial capacity has been unable to be undertaken. This paper reports on our findings relative to earnings management in the context of Not-for-profit disability service providers. Assessing a longitudinal data set providing financial data relative to 154 such not-for-profits, we have identified that the sector is subject to earnings management, that such activities are aimed at reducing reported profit likely in order for these organisations to meet the normative financial expectations of stakeholders including public sector funders and philanthropists. This finding has significant implications for our understanding of not-for-profit financial, regulatory and audit arrangements in place and accounting standards as they apply to this sector.","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128139832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Preferences and Productivity in Organizational Matching: Theory and Empirics from Internal Labor Markets","authors":"Bo Cowgill, Jonathan Davis, B. Montagnes, P. Perkowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3793899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3793899","url":null,"abstract":"We study the design of managerial practices for matching workers to divisions. Our methods use both sides' preferences to match with each other, and on the employer's expectations about resulting productivities. Our model derives boundary conditions for when dictating assignments outperforms delegating matching preferences to worker/division preferences (and vice versa). Our model highlights the tradeoffs between the coordination benefits of dictating versus informational advantages of delegating. We then turn to a large organization's internal labor market for empirics. We find that optimal matching is highly productive. Using the organization's preferred metric, the optimal match is 36% more productive than randomly assigned matches within job categories. However, it achieves this through negative assortative matching, and by placing a majority of workers and managers with assignments they did not rank. By contrast, preference-based matches (using deferred acceptance) are much less productive (only 3% better than random), and feature positive assortative matching. Workers and managers are significantly more likely to be assigned to a preferred partner. We show how a novel method -- integrating both firm and employees/division preferences -- can improve firms' matchmaking.","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"601 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123199108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nonprofit Board Turnover and Financial Performance: Examining Optimal Board Turnover Rate in United Way Organizations","authors":"Seung‐Ho An","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3810977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3810977","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the effects of board turnover on nonprofit financial performance: resource acquisition and utilization. Governing board members play key roles in connecting organizations with external environments and ensuring that executives properly manage the organizations to achieve organizational missions. They also help in effectively attracting and appropriately utilizing financial resources. Given the importance of governing board members, any turnover occurring in the board should affect nonprofit financial performance. Using insights from organizational theories, we argue that the relationship between board turnover and the ability of UW organizations to acquire and utilize funds is nonlinear (first positive and then negative). We find general support for the hypothesis, which yields implications for both research and practice of board governance and human resources management in the nonprofit sector.","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127799280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Illiquidity and the Theory of the Firm: An Exploration of a New Perspective","authors":"Matthias Bank","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3796937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3796937","url":null,"abstract":"Illiquidity has a negative connotation (Tirole (2011)). We focus on the neglected 'bright' side of illiquidity: glue. We argue that the economic forces leading to or supporting illiquidity are key to the theory of the firm. Accumulated skills of agents are always threatened by competition. Firms emerge as powerful solutions to these problems, since they may be interpreted as tools to mutually insure economic agents temporarily from competition by providing a short-term stable but long-term fragile environment built on illiquid resources. In short: firms can be interpreted as illiquid, self-enforcing entities.","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114486581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Platform Scope Choices and Ecosystem Heterogeneity: A Configurational Approach","authors":"R. K. Murthy, A. Madhok","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3758124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3758124","url":null,"abstract":"Though the burgeoning literature on platform ecosystems has sought to understand different aspects of this emerging phenomenon, the different types of ecosystems are treated in a somewhat homogenous manner. In this paper, we fill this gap and provide an organizing framework to examine the distinctiveness of different types of ecosystem structures based on the platform sponsor scope which then enables heterogeneous treatment of the different forms as they exhibit distinct characteristics. Finally, we explain that an alignment between the platform sponsor scope and the characteristics influences ecosystem performance. We empirically test the causal relations of our alignment argument using the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis methodology.","PeriodicalId":112052,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Formal & Informal Structures eJournal","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126862129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}