Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2151127
Damien Ma
{"title":"The Digital Silk Road and China’s grand strategic ambition","authors":"Damien Ma","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2151127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2151127","url":null,"abstract":"Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"77 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116309231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2151125
Meia Nouwens
{"title":"Identifying the Digital Silk Road","authors":"Meia Nouwens","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2151125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2151125","url":null,"abstract":"Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124102574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2151126
Paul Triolo
{"title":"The Digital Silk Road and the evolving role of Chinese technology companies","authors":"Paul Triolo","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2151126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2151126","url":null,"abstract":"Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133840758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2151124
R. Koepp
{"title":"Locating the Digital Silk Road in the Belt and Road Initiative","authors":"R. Koepp","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2151124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2151124","url":null,"abstract":"Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116120772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2151123
Marcus Willett
{"title":"China’s investment in digital technologies and the Digital Great Game","authors":"Marcus Willett","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2151123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2151123","url":null,"abstract":"Concerns about China’s ambitions to return to the global centre stage as a great power have recently begun to focus on the Digital Silk Road (DSR), an umbrella term for various activities – commercial and diplomatic – of interest to the Chinese government in the cyber realm. Part of (or a spin-off from) the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, by 2020 the DSR had become a focal point of China’s foreign policy. But the DSR remains ill-defined and poorly understood. At the heart of such concerns is not that Chinese technology companies are becoming globally competitive, but rather that Beijing could use them to ‘rewire’ the global digital architecture, from physical cables to code. Dominance by Chinese technology could shift global norms from a free cyber commons to competing systems of cyber sovereignty or cyber freedom. This Adelphi book brings together eight experts to examine the development of the DSR; explore its impact on economics, security and governance in recipient countries; and assess its broader impact on patterns of economic and technological dependence, on the emerging rules and norms of tech globalisation, and on global geopolitics and great-power relations. Beijing has grasped the opportunity to leverage the entrepreneurial strengths of its private tech sector to gain prominence in the world’s digital ecosystem. But the more interventionist Beijing becomes, the more Chinese firms will be seen as instruments of the state, and the greater the pushback against Chinese technology and the DSR may be. To achieve great-power status and global centrality, Beijing might ultimately need to change tack. How it innovates in further rolling out Chinese tech across the world, and what the DSR will then look like, will have far-reaching impacts on global economics, politics and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114824380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2092290
J. Stevenson
{"title":"Optimising US regional footprints: China and the Indo-Pacific","authors":"J. Stevenson","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2092290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2092290","url":null,"abstract":"‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128790196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2092287
J. Stevenson
{"title":"Overseas bases and US strategic posture","authors":"J. Stevenson","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2092287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2092287","url":null,"abstract":"‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116643243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2092289
J. Stevenson
{"title":"Optimising US regional footprints: the Middle East","authors":"J. Stevenson","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2092289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2092289","url":null,"abstract":"‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123105681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2092288
J. Stevenson
{"title":"Basing and US grand strategy","authors":"J. Stevenson","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2092288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2092288","url":null,"abstract":"‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123427215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adelphi SeriesPub Date : 2020-05-03DOI: 10.1080/19445571.2020.2092292
J. Stevenson
{"title":"Optimising US regional footprints: Europe","authors":"J. Stevenson","doi":"10.1080/19445571.2020.2092292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.2092292","url":null,"abstract":"‘In this timely Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson reminds us of the size and complexity of the American global footprint, and how foreign-policy imperatives have tended to override pressures to cut back on the number of overseas bases. In today’s tense strategic environment, this will most likely remain the case.’ Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London ‘Jonathan Stevenson offers an indispensable look at the United States’ overseas bases in 2022 and persuasively explains why they remain critical to American strategy today and for the foreseeable future.’ Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security Overseas military bases have been the bedrock of the United States’ ability to project military power, exert political influence and deter potential adversaries since the Second World War. But fatigue with America’s ‘forever wars’, as well as more nuanced financial and strategic reasons, have inclined the public and policy community to favour reducing US global military activities and overseas presence. In this Adelphi book, Jonathan Stevenson argues that this desire does not necessarily translate into sound strategy. Overseas bases are a key element of the reassurance required to resurrect and bolster America’s reputation among its allies and adversaries. Meanwhile, strategic imperatives and geopolitical realities impose restraints in every theatre. The fluidity prevailing in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific counsels maintaining forward-deployed forces there at roughly the current level. Russia’s confrontational posture towards NATO and invasion of Ukraine, as well as NATO’s short- and medium-term reliance on US capabilities, require the American presence in Europe to increase and expand eastward. The US should not commit itself to a foreign policy that is heavy on forward-deployed military power and light on diplomacy. But paradoxically, reducing forward military presence may not be consistent with a policy that is less focused on military power as a means of achieving stability and security.","PeriodicalId":111922,"journal":{"name":"Adelphi Series","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131600165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}