{"title":"8. Moral Deference and the Proto-authority of Affect","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.1515/9780691208701-009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691208701-009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that deferring to the feelings of an exemplar of virtue is sometimes the best way to figure out what the morally right thing to do is in a given practical situation. It stresses that ordinary people are sometimes warranted in deferring to an exemplar of virtue about what should be done in some practical situation. It also points out that the authority of an exemplar of virtue's advice is partly constituted by the proto-authority of the emotional response to the agent's situation. The chapter explores the proposition that moral deference is sometimes warranted, clarifying that the prescription or advice to which deference is warranted concerns the requirements of some virtue. It emphasizes that critics of moral deference distinguish accepting moral advice from moral deference proper.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123626823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Emotion and VirtuePub Date : 2020-11-24DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.003.0001
Gopal Sreenivasan
{"title":"Credo","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on the role that emotion plays in virtue, emphasizing that acting virtuously is the central and most important dimension of virtue. It analyses the centrality of roles in virtue as a matter of their being tied to virtuous action, which is more central than every role in virtue that is not tied to virtuous action. It also discusses reference to virtue in other traditions that serves to emphasize the moral significance of certain ways of being, instead of doing. The chapter concentrates on two virtues: compassion and courage, and two emotions: sympathy and fear. It argues that having a modified sympathy trait is indispensable to being a reliably correct judge of which action require compassion in a practical situation.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"271 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132634998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Character Traits","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter defends the traditional definition of virtue against the situationist critique, which is wielded by empirically minded philosophers and originate in the situationist tradition in social psychology. It demonstrates philosophical arguments and position that are consistent with a scientific psychology. It also organizes the use of virtue terms as evaluations of rightness and connect this use to a significant additional way in which exemplars of virtue are relevant. The chapter defines virtue as a species of character trait, which exposes a theory of virtue to what has come to be known as the situationist critique of virtue ethics. It analyses experimental results in social psychology that demonstrate that most people do not have any character traits.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128240732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against the Priority of Principle","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.14","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter shows how and why the modest assignment of priority to agents is theoretically consequential. It talks about philosophers who extol the importance of virtue and are inclined to some form of anti-theoretical stance in ethics or to some form of particularism. It also argues significant restrictions on the role that moral principles can play in moral justification. The chapter examines the structure of moral justification, elaborating how one is justified in arriving at moral conclusions about specific cases. It addresses questions about the acquisition of moral knowledge, rather than practical questions about how to deliberate in particular cases or metaphysical questions about what makes a given action morally correct.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116673115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"INDEX","authors":"","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.19","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"221 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116981242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Agents versus Acts","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.13","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter mentions philosophers who take it as criterial of virtue to be theoretically distinctive that the definition of virtue somehow assign priority to the agent. It discusses a coherent intermediate position called the modest agent-centred view, which holds that some non paradigmatic acts of kindness can only be identified as kind acts by exploiting the fact that they are the characteristic act expressions of a kindness. It also highlights how the modest agent-centred view survives certain objections that are damaging to the extreme agent-centred view. The chapter describes the modest agent-centred view and the extreme act view as true contenders in the epistemological priority debate. It confirms whether the act is required by compassion in the sense that the value to which compassion corresponds gives the agent good reason to perform the act.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115329773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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