{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9780691208701-fm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691208701-fm","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131999818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"11. Against the Priority of Principle","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9780691208701-012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691208701-012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115628076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"5. Character Traits","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/9780691208701-006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691208701-006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129750065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should Virtue Be Taught?","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.15","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter traces philosophical discussions of character education that typically assume that virtue should be taught and clarifies whether it can be taught. It develops several different arguments for the paradoxical conclusion that virtue should not be taught, even when it can be taught. It also cites a dialogue in Plato's Meno, in which the character named Meno evidently presupposes that virtue should be acquired, if only it can be. The chapter examines the extent to which the viability of Meno's presupposition is affected by the specific modalities of character education on how virtue is to be acquired, rather than if it can be acquired. It distinguishes between two different models of virtue acquisition: the ham-fisted Aristotelian model and the Fosbury model.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125959231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Emotion and VirtuePub Date : 2020-11-24DOI: 10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.003.0003
Gopal Sreenivasan
{"title":"Emotion","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691134550.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter talks about Ronald de Sousa's dramatic claim that emotions are species of determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies. It provides an adequate background on emotion and arguments on the integral view of the role of emotion in virtue. It also analyzes the psychology of emotion, a judicious smattering of philosophy that harness Christine Tappolet's overview. The chapter investigates the biological hypothesis on the function of emotion in solving the philosopher's frame problem, meaning the problem of how to make use of just what is needed from the stupendous quantity of knowledge and how not to retrieve what is not needed. It narrates a story from Daniel Dennett about a robot that is informed a bomb is set to go off in its vicinity that resents a moral that pure reason is not sufficient to solve de Sousa's problem.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"2018 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128732348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adverbial Requirements","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.9","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the nature of the virtue of compassion, in which every exemplar of compassion's generic ability is to make correct moral judgements in situations that call for compassion that is partly constituted by a morally rectified sympathy trait. It discusses the role assigned to emotion by the structure of the integral view that can be filled by an emotion that is conveniently both independently familiar and independently marked. It also distinguishes between sympathy and empathy, as well as between emotion traits and virtue traits. The chapter examines the two distinctions that yield a clean contrast between the emotion of 'sympathy' and the virtue of 'compassion.'","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120968903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Salience without a Black Box","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.10","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter defends the integral view of compassion against black box views. It argues that the combination of cleverness, a morally rectified sympathy trait, and supplementary moral knowledge suffices in principle to explain an agent's ability to pass the central test of virtue (CTV) for compassion. It also isolates the disagreement between the integral view and black box views against the background of a pair of parallel stipulations, whereby it was assumed that each view provides a set of conditions sufficient to explain an agent's ability to pass CTV for compassion. The chapter looks at the integral view of compassion, which can be seen to explain an agent's ability to pass CTV. It claims that the nature of the virtue of compassion is that every exemplar of compassion's generic ability to pass CTV is partly constituted by a morally rectified sympathy trait.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122624986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Integral View","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.5","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter defends the view that a virtuous character trait is, in a sense, a modified emotion trait. It explains a particular conception of the role that emotion plays in virtue, a role that must be recognised by any moral psychological account of virtue that is both adequate and complete. It also examines the role that emotion plays in enabling an agent to pass the 'central test' of virtue and describes the role assigned to emotion in virtue that is at best secondary or peripheral. The chapter identifies specific virtues, such as generosity, courage, and kindness. It rejects the reciprocity of the virtues and discusses individual disunified virtues, considering several distinct virtues as unified.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"194 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113989868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Recap with Courage","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv125jsfd.12","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews arguments with the pairing of courage and fear, and emphasize courage's character as an executive virtue, as distinct from run-of-the-mill virtues like compassion or generosity. It proposes that a morally rectified fear trait is a functionally integrated constituent of the virtue of courage. It also claims that the nature of the virtue of courage is exemplar of courage that employs a morally rectified fear trait to pass the central test of virtue (CTV) for courage. The chapter describes the emotion pole that includes both fear and sympathy, and at the virtue pole that contains compassion and courage, which exhibits significant heterogeneity. It articulates the basic conceptual features of courage as a virtue, emphasizing some crucial respects in which it differs from ordinary virtues.","PeriodicalId":110277,"journal":{"name":"Emotion and Virtue","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116986436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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