Emory University School of Law最新文献

{"title":"State-to-State Espousal of Human Rights Claims","authors":"D. Bederman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1832718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1832718","url":null,"abstract":"This short symposium piece examines the use of diplomatic protection and state-to-state espousal of human rights claims. Espousal occurs where a government takes up a claim on behalf of an aggrieved national and presents the claim to another State that was the author of the injury. There is a growing body of international practice (including that of the United States) to allow such claims to be presented in certain circumstances. While such a right to espousal remains permissive, some domestic courts are moving in the direction of holding that such espousals should not be unreasonably or capriciously refused. For the United States, it is highly unlikely that this approach will be adopted, but espousals may continue to be employed, and human rights claims presented, in appropriate cases.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132131781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Juvenile Transfer Laws on Juvenile Crime","authors":"J. Cohn, Hugo M Mialon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1606002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1606002","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the effects of tougher and weaker state laws governing the transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal justice system (including the statutory exclusion, once adult/always adult, direct file, presumptive waiver, discretionary waiver, and mandatory waiver laws, which make juvenile transfers to the adult system easier, and the reverse waiver law, which makes transfers to the adult system harder) on juvenile crime in different crime categories (including the general categories of total, property, and violent crime and the specific categories of murder, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson). We find that each of the tougher juvenile transfer laws is positively correlated with juvenile crime in at least one category, while the weaker juvenile transfer law (the reverse waiver) is negatively correlated with juvenile crime in several categories. Moreover, instrumental variable regressions indicate that increases in the combined severity of all the juvenile transfer laws cause increases in juvenile burglary.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121817798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Climate as an Innovation Imperative: Federalism, Institutional Pluralism and Incentive Effects","authors":"William W. Buzbee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1694166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1694166","url":null,"abstract":"To combat climate change successfully will require innovations in regulatory design and technology. This article was prepared for the September 2010 Yale Law School and Unitar Conference on \"Strengthening Institutions to Address Climate Change and Advance a Green Economy.\" The article focuses on the innovation incentive effects of national legislation that could, in the alternative, either preempt or displace climate-related actions of state and local governments or federal officials under other laws, or welcome climate actions by others. These are choices regarding federalism and institutional pluralism (or diversity). The challenge is to create effective climate regulation and a robust trading market in GHG allowances without the risks of reliance on a single regulator. Compared to an institutionally diverse regulatory regime, a unitary climate regulator would be more vulnerable to implementation failures, rigidity, and loss of legal authority. Regulatory failure and risks of regulatory instability could undercut confidence in carbon markets and thereby deter essential investments in governmental implementation of climate laws, in technological innovation, energy efficiency, green economy businesses and other means to combat climate change.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124379963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Privatization, Free Riding, and Industry-Expanding Lobbying: Additional Materials","authors":"A. Volokh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2459019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2459019","url":null,"abstract":"This document, first created in 2007 and last updated in 2010, has now been superseded by the technical discussion in my 2010 article, “Privatization, Free Riding, and Industry-Expanding Lobbying,” in the International Review of Law and Economics and the plain-English discussion in my 2008 article, “Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy,” in the Stanford Law Review.This document —which I refer to as Volokh (2007) is now limited to additional supporting materials referred to in those two articles.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115622738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics","authors":"Robert B. Ahdieh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1518836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1518836","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last twenty years, law and economics has effectively internalized behavioral critiques of its assumption of individual rationality. By contrast, it has failed to appreciate the implications of growing challenges to the other crucial pillar on which it is built: methodological individualism. Where social norms shape choices, network externalities are strong, coordination is the goal, or knowledge is a substantial determinant of value, a methodology heavily oriented to the analysis of individuals will overlook at least as much as it reveals. Indicia of consent may be given greater weight than they deserve, the evolution of norms may be underemphasized, and the regulation of information and knowledge may be flawed - among other potential distortions. As with the shift to a more careful approach to rationality, then, an appreciation of the limits of methodological individualism promises a richer account of law and economics.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115409033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tolerance and HIV","authors":"Andrew Francis‐Tan, Hugo M Mialon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1091788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091788","url":null,"abstract":"We empirically investigate the effect of tolerance for gays on the spread of HIV in the United States. Using a state-level panel dataset spanning the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, we find that tolerance is negatively associated with the HIV rate. We then investigate the causal mechanisms potentially underlying this relationship. We find evidence consistent with the theory that tolerance for homosexuals causes low-risk men to enter the pool of homosexual partners, as well as causes sexually active men to substitute away from underground, anonymous, and risky behaviors, both of which lower the HIV rate.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127864177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Privacy and the Commercial Use of Personal Information: The Case of Customer Proprietary Network Information","authors":"Thomas M. Lenard, Paul H. Rubin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1006206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1006206","url":null,"abstract":"Recent efforts to regulate the use of Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) attempt to address consumer concerns regarding privacy and possible fraudulent use of information. However, the FCC rulemaking issued earlier this year would do little to curtail illegal uses of CPNI. The FCC itself acknowledges that there is no evidence of unauthorized disclosures by the very entities it is regulating. Also, there is no evidence that the proposed security provisions improve on methods the telecom companies themselves already are using to prevent costumer data from being illegitimately obtained. Regulations restricting the sharing of CPNI with outside contractors or partners would impose substantial compliance costs. Businesses could be forced to in-source some functions, such as marketing, which could be more cheaply and effectively performed by a specialized firm. Some businesses may also choose to restructure or reorganize their companies in order to comply with the restrictions. The significant costs of restructuring would vary from company to company and could be unfairly influenced by existing discrepancies in regulation. This extra cost would ultimately be passed onto the consumer. Significant costs would also be incurred if businesses chose to make do with less information. Businesses would find it difficult to accurately tailor product marketing to consumers. Also, less information would be available for the successful development of new products to fit the needs of consumers. Consumers would lose out on these potential new services and would not be as informed about products already available. We conclude that the inefficiency created in the market by lack of free-flowing information would therefore harm businesses and consumers alike.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116132628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Large Price Discrimination Imply Great Market Power?","authors":"R. McAfee, Hugo M Mialon, Sue H. Mialon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.784804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.784804","url":null,"abstract":"A simple model demonstrates that there is no theoretical connection between the extent of price discrimination and the extent of market power.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129726308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Economic Analysis of Notification Requirements for Data Security Breaches","authors":"Thomas M. Lenard, Paul H. Rubin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.765845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.765845","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we examine the costs and benefits of laws requiring businesses to notify consumers if their private data is compromised, such as the law in California and other state and federal laws recently passed or proposed. Identity theft and related frauds do not seem to be increasing in recent years, and may be decreasing. A 2004 Survey finds virtually identical results to a survey in 2003, and industry reports find no increase. This may be because credit card companies have increasingly sophisticated detection methods to prevent fraud. In addition, there are strong industry incentives to maintain security. Firms bear almost all of the cost of fraud, and firms suffering such fraud exhibit large stock losses in event studies. The cost to individuals of all sorts of identity theft, weighted by frequency and adjusting for time costs, are about $1000 for actual victims. Most identity theft (at least 70%) is based on data obtained offline, not online. The probability of a victim whose data is compromised actually being victimized is about 2%, so the maximum savings from notice is only $20. For various reasons (including time to receive notice and likely action if notice is received) the actual benefits are more likely to be about $10. The costs of notice include actions such as fraud alerts which consumers may take which are likely to be more costly than the benefits. New credit cards cost between $10 and $20. Even though online commerce is safer than offline commerce, consumers receiving notice may decide to do business offline, thus increasing their risk. Firms may also react strongly to minimize reputation losses; this may have perverse effects, as when it becomes more expensive for new businesses to obtain data about potential customers. Thus, any laws mandating notice should be limited. Finally, state laws that have already passed differ in significant ways, but since this is at least a national market, notice will probably be the same in all states. This means that the most restrictive set of state laws will overall govern in all states. This is an argument for federal preemption in this issue.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132688811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Biological and Cultural Camouflage: The Challenges of Seeing the Harmful Invasive Species Problem and Doing Something About it","authors":"M. Miller, L. Gunderson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.452982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.452982","url":null,"abstract":"This essay introduces a forthcoming volume addressing legal and policy responses to harmful non-indigenous species. Invasive species may be a more difficult problem to perceive than many other types of environmental problems, such as air or water pollution, extinction of species, or changes in land use. Some of the reasons for the difficulties in perception reflect the limits of everyday human observation of the natural environment. In addition, many non-indigenous plant and animal species serve as the cornerstones of modern agriculture and commerce. Drawing a line between welcome (strongly beneficial) and unwelcome (harmful or invasive) non-indigenous species is often difficult, a difficulty magnified when the harms and benefits from a species inure to different groups of people. Establishing sound law and policy with regard to invasive species would be hard enough if the puzzles were merely biological, psychological, economic and political. However, the ultimate questions about the law and policy with regard to non-indigenous species, and invasive species, reflect deep value preferences, values that reflect more general philosophical tenets that may border on religious beliefs. This morass of human and social dimensions swirling around the issue of invasive species makes the lack of coherent and comprehensive laws easier to understand, even in the face of longstanding recognition that some non-indigenous species could be very harmful indeed. After reviewing the disjunction between key international instruments and the laws of nation-states, with a focus on the possible meanings of a recommended \"precautionary principle\" in some of these instuments, the essay suggests three steps should come first: an assessment of the status of alien species in the country, a focus on prevention of new introductions, and the integration of a holistic approach, aware of the social, psychological and commercial aspects of the invasive species problem.","PeriodicalId":107284,"journal":{"name":"Emory University School of Law","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131533972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}