ERN: Networks (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Automating Governance: Blockchain Delivered Governance for Business Networks","authors":"D. Petersen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3856908","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3856908","url":null,"abstract":"This conceptual article seeks to integrate blockchain into current theory on the governance of inter-organizational exchanges within business networks.  It is posited that a blockchain governance structure comprised of administrative, platform, and application level mechanisms represents a significant new antecedent and causal factor determining the extent of the need for the traditional contractual and relational mechanisms of governance.  Further, that blockchain delivered governance can perform the functions of transaction coordination and safeguarding which are required in order to substitute for those traditional mechanisms of governance.  A discussion points the way towards empirical verification of the model created, and examines the implications of blockchain delivered governance for practitioners.  In developing this model, this article also seeks to make a contribution by placing attention on the need for the building of theory applying to blockchain, and for quantitative measurement of the effects of blockchain on organizations and business networks.  This article concludes that the emergence of blockchain technology now provides the means by which automation of the specification, validation, and enforcement of private ordering between exchange participants can be achieved, and that this will justify a reformulation of existing theories of inter-organizational governance.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126157868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is Fair Advertising Good for Platforms?","authors":"Di Yuan, Manmohan Aseri, T. Mukhopadhyay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3913739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3913739","url":null,"abstract":"There is sufficient empirical evidence that some groups, e.g., females, are less likely to see advertisements related to economic opportunities, such as employment ads or education degree program ads. More importantly, such biases in advertisements may not be due to any deliberate discrimination by advertisers. Instead, they may occur due to the nature of ad-auctions. For example, females are very lucrative customers for retailers like Macy’s and Target; thus, these retailers place a very high bid in ad-auctions for female impressions and, therefore, win most of these impressions. As a result, an economic-opportunity advertiser, such as an employer, ends up showing its ad to the remaining (male) users. In this paper, we analyze some popular methods of ensuring fairness in the outcome of ad-auctions, on advertising platforms like Facebook, Google, etc. Specifically, we try to understand how these methods of fair-advertising affect the incentives and welfare of various stakeholders. A popular fairness notion in the literature, referred to as equal-exposure in our paper, requires the advertising platforms to artificially increase the bid of an economic-opportunity advertiser for female impressions in ad-auctions (or give away some free female impressions). The increased bid makes economic-opportunity advertisers more competitive against retailers on female impressions and ensures that both males and females are equally exposed to economic-opportunity ads. However, requiring a profit-maximizing platform to artificially increase the bid of an advertiser might lead to a loss of revenue for the platform. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, our results suggest that enforcing equal-exposure fairness in advertising might increase the profit of advertising platforms. This is because equal-exposure fairness intensifies the competition between an economic- opportunity advertiser and a retail advertiser (e.g., Macy’s). This intensified competition leads to a higher ad-spending by both types of advertisers, which increases the profit of the advertising platform. This result highlights that it is in the interest of the advertising platforms to adopt equal-exposure fairness.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"141 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123046465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Democratizing the Opportunities: Who Benefits from the Airbnb Market?","authors":"Abdollah Farhoodi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3480518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3480518","url":null,"abstract":"Peer-to-peer markets allow small suppliers to enter markets traditionally occupied by large firms and provide a potential decentralized distribution of opportunities. This paper investigates how these opportunities are distributed across agents and affected by government regulations. Using daily panel data of Airbnb rentals in Chicago, I develop an individual-level multinomial logit model to estimate consumer and producer surpluses across differentiated agents. The results find higher surpluses for low-income property owners but indicate a disproportionate concentration of welfare in high-income neighborhoods. The counterfactual analysis shows that restricting institutional hosts reinforces this concentration. However, increasing tax rates potentially helps redistribute welfare.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126438822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Modeling Team Competition on On-Demand Service Platforms","authors":"Tingting Dong, Xiaotong Sun, Qi Luo, Jian Wang, Yafeng Yin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3886735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3886735","url":null,"abstract":"Activating self-scheduling workers on on-demand platforms when services are most needed is challenging because of a lack of cooperation between workers. To align workers' interests with the platform's profit-driven goals, various ride-sharing and food delivery platforms have recently embraced team competition. The platform declares payment schemes to allocate individual workers' payoffs and stimulate productivity gains, and workers collaborate with team members to compete for customers with other teams. This payment scheme design problem is modeled as a single-leader multi-follower game. The lower-level equilibrium analysis employs quasi-variational inequalities to capture intra-team coordination and inter-team competition. The upper-level optimal payment schemes are computed by a novel algorithm that integrates Bayesian optimization, duality, and a penalty method. The benefits of team competition are manifold. The team competition with a well-designed payment scheme can direct work schedules toward the profitable market equilibrium. When workers have an inaccurate perception of the market, team competition benefits both the platform and workers. Teams can strategically mitigate the negative externalities caused by individual workers' over-competition. By establishing a model framework for studying hierarchy team-based structures, this work helps operators gain a deeper understanding of mixed decentralized and centralized control in on-demand services.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123183784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Model of the Formation of Multilayer Networks","authors":"P. Billand, C. Bravard, Sumit Joshi, A. Mahmud, S. Sarangi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3874577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3874577","url":null,"abstract":"We study the formation of multilayer networks where payoffs are determined by the degrees in each network and explore distinct network relationships by allowing for inter-network and intra-network spillovers through five properties: supermodularity and submodularity for internetwork spillovers, and convexity, concavity, and strategic complementarity for intra-network spillovers. We show the existence of multilayer equilibrium networks, provide a characterization and examine how inter-network spillovers determine the pattern of links between players.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"1990 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130856559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Market Structure, Investment and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications","authors":"G. V. Houngbonon, M. Ivaldi, Paul Scott","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4503412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4503412","url":null,"abstract":"to pay for a marginal unit of spectrum.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133173280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Platform Encroachment and Own-Content Bias","authors":"Yusuke Zennyo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3683287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3683287","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a model of platform encroachment, in which a platform not only acts as an intermediary between consumers and third-party sellers, but also sells its first-party products. When encroaching, the platform chooses between fair and biased search engines. Under the fair search, all products are equally likely to appear in search results, whereas the first-party product is more likely to appear under biased search. Biased encroachment makes the platform impose a lower commission on sellers, which leads to a lower equilibrium price which consequently attracts more consumers. Increased consumer participation can raise seller participation through indirect network externalities.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"141 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116392555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dynamic Formation of Knowledge Networks and Innovating Firm","authors":"Jie Cai, Can Tian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3783373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3783373","url":null,"abstract":"We document a series of new facts about the very first firms and patents that form new edges in the directed citation networks across patent categories. We call them pathfinder firms and patents. First, the typical pathfinder firms are very larger firms. Second, the average pathfinder patents have higher quality than other patents in different quality measures. Third, firms innovate faster, market value, profit and productivity increase in the future, when they invent a large number of pathfinder patents or are cited by pathfinder patents currently. Fourth, new citation links generate positive externalities to peer firms that innovate in nearby technology space. We then build a dynamic formation model of knowledge network, where new citations form through both quality based preferential attachment, exact and mutated copying of parent patent’s citations. The model rationalizes the firm level empirical facts. After calibrated to the patent citation data, the model sheds lights on the causes of productivity show down: rising number of citation per patent, marginal cost of patent quality and research wage have driven up the cost to innovate since 1976. Effective R&D policies need to decrease these cost factors.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121549729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Asymmetric Cross-side Network Effects on Financial Platforms：Theory and Evidence from Marketplace Lending","authors":"L. Cong, Ke Tang, Danxia Xie, Qi Miao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3461893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3461893","url":null,"abstract":"Using data on 988 peer-to-peer lending platforms in China, we examine cross-side network effects (CNEs)---arguably the most important factor for multi-sided marketplaces---throughout platforms’ lifecycle in a dynamic industry characterized by entries, exits, and network externalities. We find that unlike borrowers’ symmetric CNEs, lenders’ CNEs are lower on declining, more established, or smaller platforms than on growing, new, or larger platforms. Borrowers’ CNEs are also larger than lenders’ CNEs, especially for declining or sub-scale platforms. We rationalize the asymmetries in a model of financial platforms incorporating endogenous failures and their empirically motivated distinguishing features: lenders’ portfolio diversification, failures’ differential impacts on agents, and borrowers’ stickiness. The model further predicts that lenders’ CNEs and platforms’ ranks predict the platforms’ survival likelihood, among others, which the data corroborate. Our findings provide novel economic insights on multi-sided platforms and inform FinTech practitioners and regulators.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116568985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disentangling the Impact of Platform Sponsor Scope on Platform Growth","authors":"R. K. Murthy, M. Lévesque, A. Madhok","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3758129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3758129","url":null,"abstract":"The scope of the activities performed by the platform sponsor vis-à-vis the complementors is one of the key decisions that platform sponsors must continually make. Yet, the implications of alternative scope decisions are not well understood. This article delves deeper into platform sponsors’ scope decisions to understand their implications on the subsequent growth of the ecosystem around the platform. Formally modeling the platform growth trajectory for platform ecosystems with different states of directional symmetricity of indirect network effects suggests that not all platforms grow at an increasing rate. Instead, the growth trajectory differs based on the directional symmetricity of indirect network effects. Importantly, across the different platform growth trajectories, we establish that the platform sponsor can augment the growth of the ecosystem by aligning its scope with the sources of indirect network effects.","PeriodicalId":107258,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Networks (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134194760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}