ERN: Taxation最新文献_第3页

Higher Taxes on Less Elastic Goods? Evidence from German Municipalities 对弹性较小的商品征收更高的税?来自德国市政当局的证据

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2018-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3251730

Sebastian Blesse, Philipp Doerrenberg, Anna Rauch

引用次数: 7

Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence from Changes in Municipal Income Tax Rates in Finland 应税所得弹性:来自芬兰市政所得税率变动的证据

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12236

Tuomas Matikka

引用次数: 25

Taxation and Transformation. The Use and Usefulness of Catholic Social Teaching, Tax and Tax Related Instruments to Advance Systemic Change - Short Version 税收和转型。天主教社会训导、税务及税务相关工具促进系统变革的用途及用处-简短版

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2018-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3277282

J. Alt

引用次数: 0

The Eﬀects of Official and Unoﬃcial Information on Tax Compliance 官方和非官方信息对税收合规的影响

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2018-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3166305

Filomena Garcia, Luca David Opromolla, A. Vezzulli, Rafael Marques

{"title":"The Eﬀects of Official and Unoﬃcial Information on Tax Compliance","authors":"Filomena Garcia, Luca David Opromolla, A. Vezzulli, Rafael Marques","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3166305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3166305","url":null,"abstract":"The administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instru-ments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the eﬀects of the dissemination of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where, for given levels of audit probabilities, ﬁnes and tax rates, subjects have to declare their income after receiving either a communication of the oﬃcial average tax evasion rate or a private message from a group of ran-domly matched peers about their tax behavior. We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion. The econometric model extends the Allingham–Sandmo–Yitzhaki tax evasion model to include self-consistency and endogenous social interactions among taxpayers. We ﬁnd four main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent. Second, the higher the oﬃcial past tax evasion rate the higher the degree of persistence: evaders are more likely to evade again, and compli-ant individuals are more likely to comply again. Third, when all peers communicate to have evaded (complied) in the past, both evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply). Fourth, while both treatments, and especially the unoﬃcial information treatment, are associated, in the context of our experiment, with a signiﬁcantly larger growth in evasion intensity, the aggregate eﬀect depends on the characteristics of the population. In countries with inherently low levels of tax evasion, oﬃcial information can have beneﬁcial eﬀects by consolidating the behavior of compliant individuals. However, in countries with inherently high levels of tax evasion, oﬃcial information can have detrimental eﬀects by intensifying the behavior of evaders. In both cases, the impact of oﬃcial information is magniﬁed in the presence of strong peer eﬀects.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125910730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 18

The Tenuous Case for an Annual Wealth Tax 每年征收财富税的脆弱理由

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2018-01-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3123835

Robin Boadway, P. Pestieau

引用次数: 24

Accounting for Differences in Income Inequality across Countries: Ireland and the United Kingdom 核算各国收入不平等的差异:爱尔兰和英国

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2018-01-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3105339

D. Sologon, Philippe Van Kerm, Jinjing Li, C. O’Donoghue

{"title":"Accounting for Differences in Income Inequality across Countries: Ireland and the United Kingdom","authors":"D. Sologon, Philippe Van Kerm, Jinjing Li, C. O’Donoghue","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3105339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3105339","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a framework for studying international differences in the distribution of household income. Integrating micro-econometric and micro-simulation approaches in a decomposition analysis it quantifies the role of tax-benefit systems, employment and occupational structures, labour prices and market returns, and demographic composition in accounting for differences in income inequality across countries. Building upon EUROMOD (the European tax-benefit calculator) and its harmonized datasets, the model is portable and can be implemented for any cross-country comparisons within the EU. An application to the UK and Ireland—two countries that have much in common while displaying different levels of inequality—shows that differences in tax-benefit rules between the two countries account for roughly half of the observed difference in disposable household income inequality. Demographic differences play negligible roles. The Irish tax-benefit system is more redistributive than UK’s due to a higher tax progressivity and higher average transfer rates. These are largely attributable to policy parameter differences, but also to differences in pre-tax, pre-transfer income distributions.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132061523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2017 Final Report 欧盟28国增值税差距研究与报告:2017年最终报告

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3064726

G. Poniatowski, M. Bonch-Osmolovskiy, Misha V. Belkindas

引用次数: 12

Tax Loss Offset Restrictions and Biased Perception of Risky Investments 税收损失抵销限制与风险投资的偏见认知

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2017-10-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3046543

A. Mehrmann, Caren Sureth-Sloane

{"title":"Tax Loss Offset Restrictions and Biased Perception of Risky Investments","authors":"A. Mehrmann, Caren Sureth-Sloane","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3046543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3046543","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how tax loss offset restrictions affect an investor's evaluation of risky investments under bounded rationality. We analytically identify behavioral tax effects for different levels of loss offset restrictions, tax rate and prospect theoretical biases (loss aversion, probability weighting and reference dependence) and find tax loss offset restrictions significantly bias investor perception, even more heavily than the tax rate. If loss offset restrictions are rather generous, investors are very loss averse or assign a huge weight to loss probabilities, taxation is likely to increase the preference value of risky investments (behavioral tax paradox). Surprisingly, the identified significant perception biases of tax loss offset restrictions occur under both high and low tax rates and thus are relatively insensitive to tax rate changes. Finally, we identify huge differences in behavioral tax effects across countries indicating that tax loss offset restrictions crucially determine the perceived tax quality of a country for risky investments. Our analysis is relevant for policy makers discussing future tax reforms as well as for investors assessing risky investment opportunities.","PeriodicalId":105680,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Taxation","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124149098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

The Taxman Calls. How Does Facebook Answer? Global Effects of Taxation on Online Advertising 收税员来电话了。Facebook如何回应?税收对网络广告的全球影响

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2017-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3049361

Ángel Cuevas, R. Cuevas, A. Lassmann, Federica Liberini, António Russo

引用次数: 0

Optimal Taxation Under Different Concepts of Justness 不同公平观下的最优税收

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2017-09-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3169875

Robin Jessen, M. Metzing, Davud Rostam‐Afschar

引用次数: 7