Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids最新文献

{"title":"Hidden Moving Target Defense in Smart Grids","authors":"Jue Tian, Rui Tan, X. Guan, Ting Liu","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055388","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research has proposed a moving target defense (MTD) approach that actively changes transmission line susceptance to preclude stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against the state estimation of a smart grid. However, existing studies were often conducted under a less adversarial setting, in that they ignore the possibility that an alert attacker can also try to detect the activation of MTD and then cancel any FDI attack until they learn the new system configuration after MTD. Indeed, in this paper, we show that this can be achieved easily by the attacker. To improve the stealthiness of MTD against the attacker, we propose a hidden MTD approach that maintains the power flows of the whole grid after MTD. We develop an algorithm to construct the hidden MTD and analyze its feasibility condition when only a subset of transmission lines can adjust susceptance. Simulations are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the hidden MTD against alert attackers under realistic settings.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114326702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Analysis of Time Delay Attacks against Power Grid Stability","authors":"J. Wang, Chunyi Peng","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055392","url":null,"abstract":"The modern power grid, as a critical national infrastructure, is operated as a cyber-physical system. While the Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control Systems (WAMPCS) in the power grid ensures stable dynamical responses by allowing real-time remote control and collecting measurement over across the power grid, they also expose the power grid to potential cyber-attacks. In this paper, we analyze the effects of Time Delay Attacks (TDAs), which disturb stability of the power grid by simply delaying the transfer of measurement and control demands over the grid's cyber infrastructure. Different from the existing work which simulates TDAs' impacts under specific scenarios, we come up with a generic analytical framework to derive the TDAs' effective conditions. In particular, we propose three concepts of TDA margins, TDA boundary, and TDA surface to define the insecure zones where TDAs are able to destabilize the grid. The proposed concepts and analytical results are exemplified in the context of Load Frequency Control (LFC), but can be generalized to other power control applications.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"13 10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114068857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Privacy Friendly Aggregation of Smart Meter Readings, Even When Meters Crash","authors":"J. Hoepman","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055389","url":null,"abstract":"A well studied privacy problem in the area of smart grids is the question of how to aggregate the sum of a set of smart meter readings in a privacy friendly manner, i.e., in such a way that individual meter readings are not revealed to the adversary. Much less well studied is how to deal with arbitrary meter crashes during such aggregation protocols: current privacy friendly aggregation protocols cannot deal with these type of failures. Such failures do happen in practice, though. We therefore propose two privacy friendly aggregation protocols that tolerate such crash failures, up to a predefined maximum number of smart meters. The basic protocol tolerates meter crashes at the start of each aggregation round only. The full, more complex, protocol tolerates meter crashes at arbitrary moments during an aggregation round. It runs in a constant number of phases, cleverly avoiding the otherwise applicable consensus protocol lower bound.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129484524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cyber-Attacks to Voltage Control Applications via Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control System","authors":"C. Moya, Jiankang Wang","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055396","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyze the effect of cyber-attacks on voltage control via the Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control System. To address this problem, we model wide area voltage control as a dynamical system under the presence of an adversary that aims to disrupt the network's voltage and steer the system towards voltage collapse. Under this framework, we derive stealthy attack templates that aim to reveal the attack locations and timing that will be most effective on the power grid. From the perspective of defending the grid, the attack templates reveal the critical locations for the optimal distribution of resources to mitigate potential cyber-attacks. Alternatively, we derive stealthy attack templates based on power flow equations and the static mechanism of voltage collapse. The effectiveness of our proposed attack templates are validated through numerical examples.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122768675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Integrated Multi-Domain Risk Assessment Using Automated Hypothesis Testing","authors":"O. Gehrke, K. Heussen, M. Korman","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055398","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present an approach for the integration of cybersecurity tools from multiple domains into an overall risk assessment framework which takes the complex interactions between domains in smart grid systems into account. The approach is based on generating hypotheses from a template, which are then analyzed for their probability and associated impact on the system. The feasibility of the proposed approach is discussed using a very simple example case to serve as a proof of concept. Furthermore, we introduce a generic software framework for the processing of hypothesis templates.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127247865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Analyzing the Effectiveness of Attack Countermeasures in a SCADA System","authors":"M. Korman, Margus Välja, Gunnar Björkman, M. Ekstedt, Alexandre Vernotte, Robert Lagerström","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055393","url":null,"abstract":"The SCADA infrastructure is a key component for power grid operations. Securing the SCADA infrastructure against cyber intrusions is thus vital for a well-functioning power grid. However, the task remains a particular challenge, not the least since not all available security mechanisms are easily deployable in these reliability-critical and complex, multi-vendor environments that host modern systems alongside legacy ones, to support a range of sensitive power grid operations. This paper examines how effective a few countermeasures are likely to be in SCADA environments, including those that are commonly considered out of bounds. The results show that granular network segmentation is a particularly effective countermeasure, followed by frequent patching of systems (which is unfortunately still difficult to date). The results also show that the enforcement of a password policy and restrictive network configuration including whitelisting of devices contributes to increased security, though best in combination with granular network segmentation.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124142765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Systematic Approach of Identifying Optimal Load Control Actions for Arresting Cascading Failures in Power Systems","authors":"A. Chhokra, Amogh Kulkarni, Saqib Hasan, A. Dubey, N. Mahadevan, G. Karsai","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055395","url":null,"abstract":"Cascading outages in power networks cause blackouts which lead to huge economic and social consequences. The traditional form of load shedding is avoidable in many cases by identifying optimal load control actions. However, if there is a change in the system topology (adding or removing loads, lines etc), the calculations have to be performed again. This paper addresses this problem by providing a workflow that 1) generates system models from IEEE CDF specifications, 2) identifies a collection of blackout causing contingencies, 3) dynamically sets up an optimization problem, and 4) generates a table of mitigation strategies in terms of minimal load curtailment. We demonstrate the applicability of our proposed methodology by finding load curtailment actions for N-k contingencies (k = 1, 2, 3) in IEEE 14 Bus system.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123968760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Study on Software Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses of Embedded Systems in Power Networks","authors":"Margus Välja, M. Korman, Robert Lagerström","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055397","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we conduct an empirical study with the purpose of identifying common software weaknesses of embedded devices used as part of industrial control systems in power grids. The data is gathered about the devices and software of 6 companies, ABB, General Electric, Schneider Electric, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Siemens and Wind River. The study uses data from the manufacturersfi online databases, NVD, CWE and ICS CERT. We identified that the most common problems that were reported are related to the improper input validation, cryptographic issues, and programming errors.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"2013 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120920804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mitigating Synchronized Hardware Trojan Attacks in Smart Grids","authors":"Chenglu Jin, Lingyu Ren, Xubin Liu, Peng Zhang, Marten van Dijk","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055394","url":null,"abstract":"A hardware Trojan is a malicious circuit inserted into a device by a malicious designer or manufacturer in the circuit design or fabrication phase. With the globalization of semiconductor industry, more and more chips and devices are designed, integrated and fabricated by untrusted manufacturers, who can potentially insert hardware Trojans for launching attacks after the devices are deployed. Moreover, the most damaging attack in a smart grid is a large scale electricity failure, which can cause very serious consequences that are worse than any disaster. Unfortunately, this attack can be implemented very easily by synchronized hardware Trojans acting as a collective offline time bomb; the Trojans do not need to interact with one another and can affect a large fraction of nodes in a power grid. More sophisticatedly, this attack can also be realized by online hardware Trojans which keep listening to the communication channel and wait for a trigger event to trigger their malicious payloads; here, a broadcast message triggers all the Trojans at the same time. In this paper, we address the offline synchronized hardware Trojan attack, as it does not require the adversary to penetrate the power grid network for sending triggers. We classify two types of offline synchronized hardware Trojan attacks as type A and B: type B requires communication between different nodes, and type A does not. The hardware Trojans needed for type B turn out to be much more complex (and therefore larger in area size) than those for type A. In order to prevent type A attacks we suggest to enforce each power grid node to work in an unique time domain which has a random time offset to Universal Coordinated Time (UTC). This isolation principle can mitigate type A offline synchronized hardware Trojan attacks in a smart grid, such that even if hardware Trojans are implanted in functional units, e.g. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), they can only cause a minimal damage, i.e. sporadic single node failures. The proposed solution only needs a trusted Global Positioning System (GPS) module which provides the correct UTC together with small additional interface circuitry. This means that our solution can be used to protect the current power grid infrastructure against type A offline attacks without replacing any untrusted functional unit, which may already have embedded hardware Trojans.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128673592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Attack Models for Advanced Persistent Threats in Smart Grid Wide Area Monitoring","authors":"Sarita Paudel, Paul Smith, T. Zseby","doi":"10.1145/3055386.3055390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3055386.3055390","url":null,"abstract":"Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMSs) provide an essential building block for Smart Grid supervision and control. Distributed Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) allow accurate clock-synchronized measurements of voltage and current phasors (amplitudes, phase angles) and frequencies. The sensor data from PMUs provide situational awareness in the grid, and are used as input for control decisions. A modification of sensor data can severely impact grid stability, overall power supply, and physical devices. Since power grids are critical infrastructures, WAMSs are tempting targets for all kinds of attackers, including well-organized and motivated adversaries such as terrorist groups or adversarial nation states. Such groups possess sufficient resources to launch sophisticated attacks. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of attack possibilities on WAMSs. We model the dependencies and building blocks of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) on WAMSs using attack trees. We consider the whole WAMS infrastructure, including aggregation and data collection points, such as Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs), classical IT components, and clock synchronization. Since Smart Grids are cyber-physical systems, we consider physical perturbations, in addition to cyber attacks in our models. The models provide valuable information about the chain of cyber or physical attack steps that can be combined to build a sophisticated attack for reaching a higher goal. They assist in the assessment of physical and cyber vulnerabilities, and provide strategic guidance for the deployment of suitable countermeasures.","PeriodicalId":104535,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130487423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}