{"title":"Beyond the Human? A Critique of Transhumanism","authors":"T. Fuchs","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"According to transhumanists, the human being in its current shape is fundamentally imperfect. Consequently, they propagate possibilities of enhancing and reshaping one’s body, culminating in the idea of virtual immortality, i.e., transferring one’s mind as software onto more durable substrates (“mind uploading”). Such ideas are based on a blatant mind-body dualism: the body is regarded as a material vehicle, which is at our free disposal; the mind is considered to be a substrate-independent information structure. In contrast, the chapter argues that humans are neither natural machines nor pure minds but living beings in the first place. The idea of mind uploading is thus based on an untenable neuro-reductionism, which wrongly assumes the brain to be the only substrate of the mind. Similarly, the ideas of optimizing the body overlook the necessary balance of functions that has evolved in human evolution.","PeriodicalId":104036,"journal":{"name":"In Defence of the Human Being","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124627217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Brain World or Life World? Critique of Neuroconstructivism","authors":"T. Fuchs","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"From a neuro-constructivistic point of view, the brain creates an internal simulation of the external world which appears as the phenomenal world in consciousness. This view presupposes in particular that the subjective body and the organic or objective body belong to two fundamentally different worlds, the mental and the physical. The spatiality of the subject-body must then be declared an illusion, for example by referring to dissociations of the subject- and object-body as in the rubber hand illusion or the phantom limb. However, this alleged virtuality of body experience can be refuted by the intersubjectivity of perception, which confirms the co-extensivity of subject-body and object-body. Subjectivity thus proves to be as embodied as it is spatially extended, that means, as bodily being-in-the-world.","PeriodicalId":104036,"journal":{"name":"In Defence of the Human Being","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114224189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Psychiatry between Psyche and Brain","authors":"T. Fuchs","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Since its development around 1800, psychiatry has been moving between the poles of the sciences and the humanities, being directed toward subjective experience on the one hand and toward the neural substrate on the other hand. Today, this dualism seems to be overcome by a naturalism which identifies subjective experience with neural processes—according to the slogan “mental disorders are brain diseases.” Psychiatry thus tends to isolate mental illnesses from the patients’ social relationships and to neglect subjectivity and intersubjectivity in their explanation. What should be searched for instead is a paradigm that can establish psychiatry as a relational medicine in an encompassing sense: as a science and practice of biological, psychological and social relations, and their disorders. Within such a paradigm, the brain may be grasped and researched as the central “relational organ” without reductionist implications.","PeriodicalId":104036,"journal":{"name":"In Defence of the Human Being","volume":"137 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127421168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Human and Artificial Intelligence: A Clarification","authors":"T. Fuchs","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics are increasingly calling into question the distinction between the simulation and reality of the human person. On the one hand, they suggest a computeromorphic understanding of human intelligence, and on the other, an anthropomorphic view of AI systems. In other words: we increasingly view ourselves as our machines, and conversely, our machines as ourselves. So, what is the difference between human and AI? And can AI achieve consciousness at some point? The chapter argues that an embodied view of consciousness and the person establishes a notion of intelligence that cannot be reduced to information processing.","PeriodicalId":104036,"journal":{"name":"In Defence of the Human Being","volume":"18 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131545648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Cyclical Time of the Body and the Linear Time of Modernity","authors":"T. Fuchs","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"While linear time results from the measurement of physical events, the temporality of life is characterized by cyclical processes, which also manifest themselves in bodily experience. This applies for the periodicity of heartbeat, respiration, sleep–wake cycle, or circadian hormone secretion, among others. Cyclical repetitions are also found in the recurring phases of need, drive, and satisfaction. Finally, the cyclical structure of bodily time manifests itself at an extended level in the form of body memory. However, this cyclical structure of lived time comes into tension with the orders of linear time which have been increasingly established in Western societies since the modern age. This tension creates both individual as well as societal conflicts and may also result in psychopathological phenomena such as depression and burn-out syndromes.","PeriodicalId":104036,"journal":{"name":"In Defence of the Human Being","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133688456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}