Brain World or Life World? Critique of Neuroconstructivism

T. Fuchs
{"title":"Brain World or Life World? Critique of Neuroconstructivism","authors":"T. Fuchs","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"From a neuro-constructivistic point of view, the brain creates an internal simulation of the external world which appears as the phenomenal world in consciousness. This view presupposes in particular that the subjective body and the organic or objective body belong to two fundamentally different worlds, the mental and the physical. The spatiality of the subject-body must then be declared an illusion, for example by referring to dissociations of the subject- and object-body as in the rubber hand illusion or the phantom limb. However, this alleged virtuality of body experience can be refuted by the intersubjectivity of perception, which confirms the co-extensivity of subject-body and object-body. Subjectivity thus proves to be as embodied as it is spatially extended, that means, as bodily being-in-the-world.","PeriodicalId":104036,"journal":{"name":"In Defence of the Human Being","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"In Defence of the Human Being","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

From a neuro-constructivistic point of view, the brain creates an internal simulation of the external world which appears as the phenomenal world in consciousness. This view presupposes in particular that the subjective body and the organic or objective body belong to two fundamentally different worlds, the mental and the physical. The spatiality of the subject-body must then be declared an illusion, for example by referring to dissociations of the subject- and object-body as in the rubber hand illusion or the phantom limb. However, this alleged virtuality of body experience can be refuted by the intersubjectivity of perception, which confirms the co-extensivity of subject-body and object-body. Subjectivity thus proves to be as embodied as it is spatially extended, that means, as bodily being-in-the-world.
大脑世界还是生命世界?神经建构主义批判
从神经建构主义的观点来看,大脑创造了一个外部世界的内部模拟,它在意识中表现为现象世界。这种观点特别预设了主观身体和有机或客观身体属于两个根本不同的世界,即精神世界和物质世界。因此,主体的空间性必须被宣布为一种幻觉,例如,参照橡胶手幻觉或幻肢幻觉中主体和客体的分离。然而,这种所谓的身体体验的虚拟性可以被感知的主体间性所驳斥,它证实了主体-身体和客体-身体的共广泛性。因此,主体性被证明是具体化的,因为它是空间扩展的,也就是说,作为世界中的肉体存在。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信