IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation最新文献_第8页

A Two-Timescale Operation Strategy for Battery Storage in Joint Frequency and Energy Markets 联合频率和能源市场中的电池储能双时标运行策略

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3324920

Qianli Ma;Wei Wei;Shengwei Mei

{"title":"A Two-Timescale Operation Strategy for Battery Storage in Joint Frequency and Energy Markets","authors":"Qianli Ma;Wei Wei;Shengwei Mei","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3324920","DOIUrl":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3324920","url":null,"abstract":"The growing penetration of renewable energy in modern power systems requires energy storage to take on more responsibilities in multiple regulation services. Battery energy storage system (BESS) possesses fast response capability and is suitable to shave peak demand and provide frequency support. This article studies coordinated bidding strategies of BESS in frequency regulation and energy markets. Challenge arises from the fact that frequency control and energy arbitrage actions are taken in different timescales, and the capacity used in either market affects the available capacity and revenue in the other one. This article proposes a two-timescale decision framework, offering the hourly base-power bid in the energy market and capacity bid in the frequency regulation market, as well as real-time responses to the automatic generation control (AGC) signal every few seconds. In the fine timescale, we employ a threshold policy to generate AGC response accounting for battery lifespan. In the coarse timescale, we establish a stochastic dynamic programming model and optimize the bidding policy without exact forecasts of market prices. To solve the stochastic dynamic programming model online, a simulation-based policy improvement method is developed to approximate the state-action value function using a heuristic base policy. The performance improvement property brought by simulation is theoretically proven. We carry out comprehensive case studies to validate the effectiveness of the proposed method and analyze the economic impact of electricity prices and battery \u0000<inline-formula><tex-math>$E/P$</tex-math></inline-formula>\u0000 ratio. Empirical tests show that with an \u0000<inline-formula><tex-math>$E/P$</tex-math></inline-formula>\u0000 ratio of 3\u0000<inline-formula><tex-math>$sim$</tex-math></inline-formula>\u00005, the BESS gains a higher net revenue across the lifespan.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"2 2","pages":"200-213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136373023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cost-Effective Community Battery Sizing and Operation Within a Local Market Framework 在当地市场框架内，经济高效地确定社区电池的规模和运行方式

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3324798

Nam Trong Dinh;Sahand Karimi-Arpanahi;S. Ali Pourmousavi;Mingyu Guo;Jon Anders Reichert Liisberg

{"title":"Cost-Effective Community Battery Sizing and Operation Within a Local Market Framework","authors":"Nam Trong Dinh;Sahand Karimi-Arpanahi;S. Ali Pourmousavi;Mingyu Guo;Jon Anders Reichert Liisberg","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3324798","DOIUrl":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3324798","url":null,"abstract":"Extreme peak power demand is a major factor behind high electricity prices, despite occurring only for a few hours annually. This peak demand drives the need for costly upgrades for the network asset, which is ultimately passed on to the end-users through higher electricity network tariffs. To alleviate this issue, we propose a solution for cost-effective peak demand reduction in a local neighbourhood using prosumer-centric flexibility and community battery storage (CBS). Accordingly, we present a CBS sizing framework for peak demand reduction considering receding horizon operation and a bilevel program in which a profit-making entity (leader) operates the CBS and dynamically sets mark-up prices. Through the dynamic mark-up and real-time wholesale market prices, the CBS operator can harness the demand-side flexibility provided by the load-shifting behaviour of the local prosumers (followers). To this end, we develop a realistic price-responsive model that adjusts prosumers' behaviour with respect to fluctuations of dynamic prices while considering prosumers' discomfort caused by load shifting. The simulation results based on real-world data show that adopting the proposed framework and the price-responsive model not only increases the CBS owner's profit but also reduces peak demand and prosumers' electricity bills by 38% and 24%, respectively.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"1 4","pages":"536-548"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136374260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Transmission Investment Coordination Using MILP Lagrange Dual Decomposition and Auxiliary Problem Principle 利用 MILP 拉格朗日二元分解和辅助问题原理进行输电投资协调

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-10-12 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3323944

Sambuddha Chakrabarti;Hosna Khajeh;Thomas R Nudell;Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh;Ross Baldick

{"title":"Transmission Investment Coordination Using MILP Lagrange Dual Decomposition and Auxiliary Problem Principle","authors":"Sambuddha Chakrabarti;Hosna Khajeh;Thomas R Nudell;Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh;Ross Baldick","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3323944","DOIUrl":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3323944","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers the investment coordination problem for the long term transmission capacity expansion in a situation where there are multiple regional Transmission Planners (TPs), each acting in order to maximize the utility in only its own region. In such a setting, any particular TP does not normally have any incentive to cooperate with the neighboring TP(s), although the optimal investment decision of each TP is contingent upon those of the neighboring TPs. A game-theoretic interaction among the TPs does not necessarily lead to this overall social optimum. We, therefore, introduce a social planner and call it the Transmission Planning Coordinator (TPC) whose goal is to attain the optimal possible social welfare for the bigger geographical region. In order to achieve this goal, this article introduces a new incentive mechanism, based on distributed optimization theory. This incentive mechanism can be viewed as a set of rules of the transmission expansion investment coordination game, set by the social planner TPC, such that, even if the individual TPs act selfishly, it will still lead to the TPC's goal of attaining overall social optimum. Finally, the effectiveness of our approach is demonstrated through several simulation studies.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"2 1","pages":"52-62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136303221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Financial Risk and Resource Adequacy in Markets With High Renewable Penetration 可再生能源渗透率高的市场中的财务风险和资源充足性

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3322531

Jacob Mays;Jesse D. Jenkins

{"title":"Financial Risk and Resource Adequacy in Markets With High Renewable Penetration","authors":"Jacob Mays;Jesse D. Jenkins","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3322531","DOIUrl":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3322531","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers the evolution of electricity market design as systems shift toward carbon-free technologies. Growth in wind and solar generation is likely to lead to increased price volatility on diurnal and seasonal timescales. In the standard risk-neutral optimization framework, volatility does not pose any theoretical issues for market design. Because revenue volatility has the potential to lead to a higher cost of capital for investments in competitive markets, however, many observers have questioned the viability of competitive models for resource adequacy as wind and solar grow in importance. To assess the role of risk management in overall market performance, we construct a stochastic equilibrium model incorporating financial entities as hedge providers for investors in generation capacity. Unlike in the standard optimization framework, the cost of capital in the equilibrium framework is endogenously determined by interannual revenue volatility and the risk measures used by market participants. Surprisingly, exploratory numerical tests suggest that overall investment risk may be lower in systems dominated by variable renewables due to reduced exposure to fuel price uncertainty. However, changes in investment risk are not uniform across resource types, and increased risk for peaking and backup resources contributes to lower reliability in the modeled future systems.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"1 4","pages":"523-535"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136007780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Manipulation-Proof Virtual Bidding Mechanism Design 防操纵虚拟竞价机制设计

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3321649

Chenbei Lu;Jinhao Liang;Nan Gu;Haoxiang Wang;Chenye Wu

{"title":"Manipulation-Proof Virtual Bidding Mechanism Design","authors":"Chenbei Lu;Jinhao Liang;Nan Gu;Haoxiang Wang;Chenye Wu","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3321649","DOIUrl":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3321649","url":null,"abstract":"The high penetration of renewable energy increases the price volatility between the day-ahead (DA) and real-time (RT) markets, with heightened power system operational risks. Virtual bidding, a rising financial instrument, allows financial entities without energy-generating capacity or demand to arbitrage between the DA and RT markets, which can in turn reduce the market spread between the two markets and thus contain system operation risks. However, in practice, incomplete information often affects the effectiveness of virtual bidding, which poses uncertainties to strategic bidding behaviors, and makes it more challenging to understand the market manipulation. To control such risks, in this paper, we first game theoretically characterize the Nash Equilibrium of virtual bidding with both complete and incomplete information, and evaluate the benefits of virtual bidding for both virtual bidders (VBs) and the system as a whole. Then, we design a joint tax-subsidy mechanism for VBs with truthfulness and individual rationality guarantees against the market manipulation. We also prove that the system average forecast is the key to influencing the virtual bidding equilibrium. Further, we design two information mechanisms to enable VB privacy protection and market risk control separately. Numerical studies based on ISO-NE electricity market data verify our theory.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"2 1","pages":"119-131"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135913862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

On the Primal UC Formulation Dependence of Convex Hull Pricing 论凸壳定价的顶点 UC 格式依赖性

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3319159

Feng Zhao;Dane Schiro;Jinye Zhao;Tongxin Zheng;Eugene Litvinov

引用次数: 0

Integrating Distributed Flexibility Into TSO-DSO Coordinated Electricity Markets 将分布式灵活性纳入 TSO-DSO 协调电力市场

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-09-27 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3319673

Georgios Tsaousoglou;Rune Junker;Mohsen Banaei;Seyed Shahabaldin Tohidi;Henrik Madsen

{"title":"Integrating Distributed Flexibility Into TSO-DSO Coordinated Electricity Markets","authors":"Georgios Tsaousoglou;Rune Junker;Mohsen Banaei;Seyed Shahabaldin Tohidi;Henrik Madsen","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3319673","DOIUrl":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3319673","url":null,"abstract":"The future of electricity markets is envisioned to be heavily based on renewable generation and distributed flexibility. Yet, integrating existing distributed flexibility into market decisions poses a major challenge, given the diversity of consumers' modeling frameworks and controllers. Moreover, in such a system, the market's decisions need to be predictive, adaptive, as well as TSO-DSO coordinated. In this article, we present an iterative market procedure through which, in contrast to traditional electricity markets based on one-off bids, flexible participants can indirectly implement their model by repeatedly responding to tentative pricing signals. This, combined with a scheduling/forecasting grey-box agent introduced on the consumer side, allows for the seamless integration of existing flexible loads' control schemes into a holistic electricity market. The proposed market-operation policy inherently coordinates Transmission and Distribution System Operators' decisions in the presence of uncertain distributed flexibility and renewables' generation. The results demonstrate promising convergence properties and short execution times, which is encouraging towards the scheme's practical applicability.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"2 2","pages":"214-225"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135793977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Physics-Informed Machine Learning for Electricity Markets: A NYISO Case Study 电力市场的物理信息机器学习：NYISO 案例研究

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-09-22 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3318197

Robert Ferrando;Laurent Pagnier;Robert Mieth;Zhirui Liang;Yury Dvorkin;Daniel Bienstock;Michael Chertkov

{"title":"Physics-Informed Machine Learning for Electricity Markets: A NYISO Case Study","authors":"Robert Ferrando;Laurent Pagnier;Robert Mieth;Zhirui Liang;Yury Dvorkin;Daniel Bienstock;Michael Chertkov","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3318197","DOIUrl":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3318197","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses the challenge of efficiently recovering exact solutions to the optimal power flow problem in real-time electricity markets. The proposed solution, named Physics-Informed Market-Aware Active Set learning OPF (PIMA-AS-OPF), leverages physical constraints and market properties to ensure physical and economic feasibility of market-clearing outcomes. Specifically, PIMA-AS-OPF employs the active set learning technique and expands its capabilities to account for curtailment in load or renewable power generation, which is a common challenge in real-world power systems. The core of PIMA-AS-OPF is a fully-connected neural network that takes the net load and the system topology as input. The outputs of this neural network include active constraints such as saturated generators and transmission lines, as well as non-zero load shedding and wind curtailments. These outputs allow for reducing the original market-clearing optimization to a system of linear equations, which can be solved efficiently and yield both the dispatch decisions and the locational marginal prices (LMPs). The dispatch decisions and LMPs are then tested for their feasibility with respect to the requirements for efficient market- clearing results. The accuracy and scalability of the proposed method is tested on a realistic 1814-bus NYISO system with current and future renewable energy penetration levels.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"2 1","pages":"40-51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135599227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Market Power Mitigation in Two-Stage Electricity Markets With Supply Function and Quantity Bidding 具有供应功能和数量竞价的两阶段电力市场中的市场力量缓解问题

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-09-22 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3318149

Rajni Kant Bansal;Yue Chen;Pengcheng You;Enrique Mallada

{"title":"Market Power Mitigation in Two-Stage Electricity Markets With Supply Function and Quantity Bidding","authors":"Rajni Kant Bansal;Yue Chen;Pengcheng You;Enrique Mallada","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3318149","DOIUrl":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3318149","url":null,"abstract":"Two-stage settlement electricity markets, which include day-ahead and real-time markets, often observe undesirable price manipulation due to the price difference across stages, inadequate competition, and unforeseen circumstances. To mitigate this, some Independent System Operators (ISOs) have proposed system-level market power mitigation (MPM) policies in addition to existing local policies. These system-level policies aim to substitute noncompetitive bids with a default bid based on estimated generator costs. However, without accounting for the conflicting interest of participants, they may lead to unintended consequences when implemented. In this article, we model the competition between generators (bidding supply functions) and loads (bidding quantity) in a two-stage market with a stage-wise MPM policy. An equilibrium analysis shows that a real-time MPM policy leads to equilibrium loss, meaning no stable market outcome (Nash equilibrium) exists. A day-ahead MPM policy leads to Stackelberg-Nash game, with loads acting as leaders and generators as followers. Despite estimation errors, the competitive equilibrium is efficient, while the Nash equilibrium is comparatively robust to price manipulations. Moreover, analysis of inelastic loads shows their tendency to shift allocation and manipulate prices in the market. Numerical studies illustrate the impact of cost estimation errors, heterogeneity in generation cost, and load size on market equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"1 4","pages":"512-522"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135599254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Rethinking the Price Formation Problem–Part 2: Rewarding Flexibility and Managing Price Risk 反思价格形成问题--第二部分：奖励灵活性和管理价格风险

IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3315953

Brent Eldridge;Bernard Knueven;Jacob Mays

{"title":"Rethinking the Price Formation Problem–Part 2: Rewarding Flexibility and Managing Price Risk","authors":"Brent Eldridge;Bernard Knueven;Jacob Mays","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3315953","DOIUrl":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3315953","url":null,"abstract":"Part 1 of this two-part article describes the impact that uncertainty has on the design and analysis of price formation policies in the non-convex auctions conducted by U.S. wholesale electricity market operators. Using first a toy model and then a large-scale test system, Part 2 demonstrates the difference in prices under the idealized benchmark of \u0000<italic>ex ante convex hull pricing</i>\u0000 defined in Part 1 versus existing methods, in particular documenting the potential for suppression of volatility and therefore under-compensation of flexibility by existing methods. The examples highlight that inefficient spot price formation can induce inefficient forward commitments of generators, necessitating out-of-market intervention to restore a reliable and efficient operating plan. Given the potential side effects of existing policies for investment and operation, we suggest two elements in a reoriented approach to the price formation problem: first ensuring that prices exhibit full-strength volatility, and second ensuring that risk-averse market participants have sufficient ability to manage this volatility.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"1 4","pages":"490-498"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135495867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0