{"title":"The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions","authors":"D. Tarullo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.351080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.351080","url":null,"abstract":"The increasingly international scope of some economic activities is correlated with closer integration of national and international legal arrangements. With the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), international scrutiny of national compliance with international trade obligations has become markedly more legalized. WTO panels review actions of WTO member states and issue decisions that are effectively binding upon the parties to the dispute. Among other things, these panels conduct direct reviews of some national administrative actions. This article examines the experience in WTO practice with a special standard of review - inserted at the behest of the United States and similar in wording to the Chevron standard used in U.S. administrative law - for panels to apply in assessing whether national anti-dumping measures conform to WTO obligations. I find that the special standard of review has had essentially no effect upon the review of national anti-dumping actions by the WTO. A canvass of the possible explanations for this outcome (e.g., hostility by WTO panelists to national trade restricting actions) is inconclusive, as is a review of the serious normative arguments for and against the WTO practice. I then add a geopolitical perspective to the analysis - specifically, the asymmetrically important position of the United States in the international trading system. I conclude that, as a dynamic matter, the WTO's disregard of the special standard of review will likely induce a response by the United States that produces \"deadweight\" losses to the trading system as a whole. Thus, regardless of one's view of anti-dumping laws, the WTO's disregard of the negotiated standard of review may be undesirable. This analysis reveals the limitations in transposing features of a national legal system to the very different institutional context of an international legal system and thus also suggests the potential for WTO governance problems well beyond review of anti-dumping laws.","PeriodicalId":83775,"journal":{"name":"Law and policy in international business","volume":"34 1","pages":"109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68600049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Law's Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in Japan","authors":"C. Milhaupt, Mark D. West","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.316120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.316120","url":null,"abstract":"In this Article, we present data on legal elites in Japan - legally trained university graduates poised to pursue successful careers either as fast-track bureaucrats or lawyers handling sophisticated business transactions. The data show a marked shift in employment patterns over the past decade: increasingly, Japan's most elite university graduates are forsaking the bureaucracy for law. We find that changes in Japan's underlying economic, political, and legal institutions are a primary cause of this shift. We argue that this trend is not a temporary phenomenon, but reflects a more fundamental transfer of authority in Japan from the bureaucracy to the legal system. The evidence sheds new light on two longstanding debates: the impact of law and lawyers on economic success, and the bureaucracy's role in the governance of the Japanese economy. The data we examine are hard to square with the widespread view of Japan as \"Exhibit A\" for the proposition that societies encourage economic growth by steering their most talented youth away from \"redistributive legal careers.\" Rather, the data indicate that in Japan (as elsewhere), talented college graduates pursue positions of power, prestige, and profit. While those positions were once located in the elite economic bureaucracy, they are now migrating to the legal system. Contrary to the evidence of stagnation in the economic and policy environments flowing out of Japan in recent years, close examination of the career choices of Japan's most highly regarded youth reveals a society in transition.","PeriodicalId":83775,"journal":{"name":"Law and policy in international business","volume":"34 1","pages":"451"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68567933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taming Unilateralism under the Multilateral Trading System: Unfinished Job in the WTO Panel Ruling on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974","authors":"Seung Wha Chang","doi":"10.30875/4baba117-en","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30875/4baba117-en","url":null,"abstract":"A recent WTO panel in United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (\"Section 301\") ruled that Section 301 as such is consistent with Article 23 of the WTO Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (\"DSU\"). Nevertheless, this panel ruling left many important unresolved issues regarding the WTO consistency of specific US actions under Section 301 procedures. This paper explores these issues. While criticizing the panel ruling, the author demonstrates why specific US actions taken in the Japan-Auto Parts and the EC-Banana disputes were inconsistent with US obligations under the WTO. Then, this paper concludes that the US claim that it had not once breached its WTO obligations in its application of Section 301 in individual cases is not warranted. Most significantly, this paper examines why and under what circumstances the mere threat of trade sanction under Section 301 procedures, i.e., the early and repeated publication of a retaliation list, could constitute a violation of the US most-favored-nation obligation under the GATT 1994. Finally, this paper closes with some policy suggestions that may help Section 301 coexist with the multilateral trading system.","PeriodicalId":83775,"journal":{"name":"Law and policy in international business","volume":"31 1","pages":"1151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69731484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}