国际争端解决的隐性成本:WTO对国内反倾销决定的审查

D. Tarullo
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引用次数: 30

摘要

一些经济活动日益国际化的范围是与国家和国际法律安排更加紧密地结合在一起的。随着世界贸易组织(WTO)的成立,对各国遵守国际贸易义务的国际审查已明显变得更加合法化。世贸组织专家组审查世贸组织成员国的行动,并发布对争端各方具有有效约束力的决定。除其他外,这些小组直接审查一些国家行政行动。本文以一种特殊的审查标准考察了WTO实践中的经验。该标准是应美国的要求插入的,措辞类似于美国行政法中使用的雪佛龙标准,供专家组在评估国家反倾销措施是否符合WTO义务时使用。我发现特殊审查标准对WTO对国家反倾销行动的审查基本上没有影响。对这一结果的可能解释(例如,世贸组织专家组成员对国家贸易限制行动的敌意)的调查是没有定论的,对支持和反对世贸组织做法的严肃规范论点的审查也是如此。然后,我在分析中加入了地缘政治的视角——具体来说,就是美国在国际贸易体系中不对称的重要地位。我的结论是,作为一个动态的问题,世贸组织对特殊审查标准的无视可能会引起美国的回应,给整个贸易体系带来“无谓”损失。因此,不管一个人对反倾销法的看法如何,WTO无视协商的审查标准可能是不可取的。这一分析揭示了将国家法律制度的特点转移到国际法律制度的非常不同的制度背景中的局限性,因此也表明WTO治理问题的可能性远远超出了反倾销法的审查。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions
The increasingly international scope of some economic activities is correlated with closer integration of national and international legal arrangements. With the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), international scrutiny of national compliance with international trade obligations has become markedly more legalized. WTO panels review actions of WTO member states and issue decisions that are effectively binding upon the parties to the dispute. Among other things, these panels conduct direct reviews of some national administrative actions. This article examines the experience in WTO practice with a special standard of review - inserted at the behest of the United States and similar in wording to the Chevron standard used in U.S. administrative law - for panels to apply in assessing whether national anti-dumping measures conform to WTO obligations. I find that the special standard of review has had essentially no effect upon the review of national anti-dumping actions by the WTO. A canvass of the possible explanations for this outcome (e.g., hostility by WTO panelists to national trade restricting actions) is inconclusive, as is a review of the serious normative arguments for and against the WTO practice. I then add a geopolitical perspective to the analysis - specifically, the asymmetrically important position of the United States in the international trading system. I conclude that, as a dynamic matter, the WTO's disregard of the special standard of review will likely induce a response by the United States that produces "deadweight" losses to the trading system as a whole. Thus, regardless of one's view of anti-dumping laws, the WTO's disregard of the negotiated standard of review may be undesirable. This analysis reveals the limitations in transposing features of a national legal system to the very different institutional context of an international legal system and thus also suggests the potential for WTO governance problems well beyond review of anti-dumping laws.
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