Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy最新文献

{"title":"Risk-Sharing: A Normative Framework for International Climate Negotiations","authors":"Idil Boran","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.322014.557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.322014.557","url":null,"abstract":"As countries are negotiating a new global climate agreement, this paper explores options for a mechanism on loss and damage. A highly intuitive formula is that of implementing a system of compensation based on historical accountability for past emissions. The paper highlights the shortcomings of this approach. It advances, instead, a risk-sharing approach within an adaptation framework. The central idea is to include – within the architecture of international cooperation – insurance-like policy mechanisms, extending safety nets to communities vulnerable to climate-related impacts. The merit of this approach is that it captures an important conception of justice, while responding to the challenges of multilateral decisionmaking. Its distinguishing feature is a convergence of considerations of justice with those of efficiency and durability.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"32 1","pages":"4-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66670609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Happy now?: Well-being and cultural policy","authors":"K. Oakley, D. O’Brien, David Lee","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.131","url":null,"abstract":"Although much of the debate in UK policy circles has been on the definition and measurement of well-being, there have been as yet relatively few attempts to apply a well-being lens to specific policy areas. One partial exception has been cultural policy. In 2010 the Culture and Sport Evidence Programme (CASE) reported on a three-year research project into the drivers and impacts of participation in sports and cultural activity. CASE was a major programme within the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), the UK's ministry of culture. A key strand of the programme was to understand and assess the benefits of cultural engagement. The project assessed in terms of subjective well-being the value to the individual of participation in sports and engagement in cultural activity (CASE 2010, 5). In a policy area often criticized for its lack of investment in research and evidence-gathering, the size of the programme alone--[pounds sterling]1.8m for an effort that brought together all the main cultural policy organizations in the UK--could be taken as a sign that the \"well-being agenda\" held out some promise for cultural policy-makers. Indeed, it could be argued that cultural activities, with their associations of conviviality, \"flow-like\" engagement (Csikszentmihalyi 1992), and attention to questions of both meaning and belonging, offer fertile ground for policy engagement with well-being. Yet despite the rather startling finding that a visit to the cinema once a week had an income compensation value of [pounds sterling]9,000 per household per year (CASE 2010), developing a well-being-inflected cultural policy is proving quite problematic. Although debates about culture and the good life are of ancient lineage, our concern is with the UK policy regime of the last fifteen years or so, first under the New Labour government (1997-2010) and later under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. This corresponds with the growth of well-being as a policy discourse, both in the UK and internationally. Given that, we use the term \"well-being\" as is commonly done in policy circles to refer to a combination of subjective well-being with more eudemonic measures, although we recognize that these definitions are both contested and confused. Although we understand \"culture\" in a broad sense to include the arts (visual and performing arts, music, literature, and so on), the media (film, TV, radio, videogames, and other social media), heritage (museums, built and natural heritage), and sport, the focus of this paper will be largely on \"cultural policy\" as it concerns the arts and heritage. The link between participation in sports and well-being is reasonably well-demonstrated (Scully et al. 1998; Chatzisarantis and Hagger 2007), whereas media use is more often associated with debates about its role as a source of ill-being and a variety of moral panics (Kraut et al. 1998). Media policy-makers may legitimately wish to stress the well-being benefits of media part","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"18-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Well-being and Prudential Value","authors":"Tim E. Taylor","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.130","url":null,"abstract":"When we talk about well-being we often also talk about what is \"good for\" a person. The fact that we use the term \"good\" suggests that there is a kind of value here. Philosophers tend to call this \"prudential value\" to distinguish it from value of other kinds, such as aesthetic value or moral value. Surprisingly little attention is given in the philosophical literature to the relationship between prudential value and well-being. Often, they are simply regarded as synonyms (in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for example [Crisp 2008]). In this paper I shall argue that it is useful to make a distinction between these two separate, but closely related, notions and that a recognition of this distinction, and an increased focus upon prudential value in certain circumstances, would be beneficial in the context of public policy. The Distinction When we say that a person has a high level of well-being, we tend to mean that his life is going well for him overall. In some cases a judgment about well-being may concern a person's whole life, but it is more usual to talk about somebody's well-being at a particular time. Sometimes we talk about specific kinds of well-being, such as psychological or social well-being. In these cases we are concerned with how well a person's life is going in a particular respect, rather than on the whole. Nevertheless, a judgment about someone's level of psychological or social well-being is still a judgment about how well his life is going overall in that respect. By contrast, when we talk about prudential value, we do not necessarily make any overall evaluation of a person's life. We may, of course, talk about the prudential value of a person's life itself--whether it is a good life for that person. But lives are by no means the only things that we evaluate in this way. We talk about all sorts of things, including objects, people, events, and states of affairs as being good or bad for people. When we talk about something's being good for a person, we mean that this thing makes, or tends to make, that person's life go better for her. But making such a judgment does not imply any judgment about how well her life is going overall. Indeed, the judgment that something is good for some person is entirely consistent with a judgment that the person's life is going badly overall. Thus, for example, when a condemned man eats his favorite meal on the eve of his execution, it is plausible that in some small way his enjoyment of the meal is good for him: it makes his life go a little bit better for him than it would have gone otherwise. Nevertheless, this is consistent with the fact that overall his life is going very badly indeed. We might say that the meal has positive prudential value for him, but that his level of well-being is very low. We can sum up the distinction by saying that well-being is what someone has if her life is going well for her; whereas something has prudential value for someone if it contributes to making her","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"10-17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Applicability of the Self-fulfillment Account of Welfare to Nonhuman Animals, Babies, and Mentally Disabled Humans","authors":"T. Vis̆ak, J. Balcombe","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.212","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we will argue that generality is a virtue of Haybron’s account of welfare. Indeed, reflecting on the applicability of his theory to nonhuman animals will give us a better understanding of its applicability to humans. We will first focus on self-fulfillment and suggest an interpretation of Haybron’s account according to which the self-fulfillment of an individual consists in the fulfillment of the aspects of the self that are applicable to that particular individual. This makes Haybron’s account of welfare applicable to all sentient beings. Then we will focus on sub-personal nature-fulfillment and argue that the same interpretation leads to the conclusion that Haybron’s account of welfare recognizes even nonsentient beings as welfare subjects. We suggest a way of avoiding this latter conclusion.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"27-34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On Capability and the Good Life: Theoretical Debates and their Practical Implications","authors":"M. Qizilbash","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.133","url":null,"abstract":"The capability approach was first developed by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture \"Equality of What?\" (Sen 1980). Canonical statements of the approach were published in the 1980s (for example, Sen 1985). Slightly modified statements were subsequently published in the early 1990s (for example, Sen 1993), with more \"mature\" versions published in Sen's Development as Freedom and The Idea of Justice (Sen 1999; 2009). Over the years, variations of the approach have emerged. In particular, Martha Nussbaum's version of the approach, which is distinguished by a different title--the \"capabilities approach\"--has emerged as a distinct view in moral and political theory. The capability approach is often seen as advancing a distinct view of human well-being. But at the same time it also supports Sen's claims that welfare is not the exclusive object of value in moral evaluation and that freedom has a value independent of welfare. The freedom to live a life we value and have reason to value--or the opportunity we have to lead a valuable or good life--is, very roughly, our capability. Those interested in alternative views of well-being or of the good life will ask: does this approach provide a distinctive account of what makes a life go well or better, or of human flourishing? If it does, does this view of the good life provide any new insights into public policies and about what governments and others should, or should not, promote? I argue in this paper that even if Sen does not advance a substantive view of the good life in developing his capability perspective, his theoretical commitments lead him to quite specific policy views. These strongly contrast with those adopted by one contemporary utilitarian: Richard Layard. Although Sen's views about policy typically overlap with those of others--like Nussbaum--who favor a version of the capability perspective, sometimes variations of the approach can diverge in their policy applications because of theoretical differences. The Capability Perspective The capability perspective emerged from an engagement with a variety of different theoretical approaches within philosophy and welfare economics. In both areas it started from a critical attitude to specific notions of welfare in utilitarian thinking, those that see welfare or \"utility\" in terms of the satisfaction of desires, pleasure, or happiness. In each case, the approach suggests that the metric of \"utility\" might be distorted in some way. The overworked indentured servant and the undernourished peasant may cut their desires, learn to find pleasure in small mercies, or learn to be happy with their lot. Nonetheless, they suffer from significant deprivations and may be short on opportunities to live lives that are valuable. This \"adaptation\" (or \"small mercies\") objection to \"utility\"-based analysis suggests that we should be concerned, in evaluating the quality of people's lives, with the opportunities they have and with what they are able to do or be. And it caut","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"32 1","pages":"35-42"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Morality of Peacekeeping Among Active Civilians","authors":"D. Lévine","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.459","url":null,"abstract":"Those who are economically well off may admit that global poverty is a great evil that demands significant action on their part but also believe that morality -- duty or obligation -- cannot reasonably require them to make great sacrifices. We may resolve this tension if we think less in terms of the duties of individuals to the word's poor and more in terms of collective action; that is, in terms of the institutions, policies, and practices that make it easier for the wealthy to help the poor and more likely that the poor will receive the help they need.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"2-10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ending Global Poverty: Gain Without Much Pain","authors":"J. Lichtenberg","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.452","url":null,"abstract":"Those who are economically well off may admit that global poverty is a great evil that demands significant action on their part but also believe that morality -- duty or obligation -- cannot reasonably require them to make great sacrifices. We may resolve this tension if we think less in terms of the duties of individuals to the word's poor and more in terms of collective action; that is, in terms of the institutions, policies, and practices that make it easier for the wealthy to help the poor and more likely that the poor will receive the help they need.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"11-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Markets, Free Trade, and Religion","authors":"R. Nelson","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.453","url":null,"abstract":"Economists in the United States are strongly divided between those who advocate free markets and those who defend politically inspired regulations and policies. Almost all economists, whatever their political views, however, have traditionally agreed that the extension of free market principles internationally is desirable, that is, global free trade. To understand why there is there much greater agreement among economists about free trade in the international arena, we have to explore the religious, social, and cultural assumptions that lead them to believe that whether or not free trade serves the interests of any one country at a particular time, it leads -- sometimes ruthlessly -- the betterment of humanity worldwide.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"19-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"ELSI and the Philosophy of Science","authors":"M. Sagoff","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.462","url":null,"abstract":"Clinical studies that run over the Internet, if they are not supported or regulated by a federal agency, are generally not covered by the Common Rule, which protects (among other things) the privacy and confidentiality of information obtained from the human subjects of research. Instead, Internet-leveraged clinical studies improvise a variety of their own protocols to protect research subjects from \"informational risk.\" These protocols generally put less emphasis on the analysis of big data and more emphasis on the history of particular cases. The protocols chosen to manage informational risk might then reflect and reinforce assumptions about the philosophy of science and about the progress of medicine.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"27-35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Well-being as a Primary Good: Towards Legitimate Well-being Policy","authors":"Sam Wren-Lewis","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.135","url":null,"abstract":"The use of well-being research in assessing and creating public policy is gaining popularity. The UK's Office of National Statistics has developed its National Well-being Index to do exactly that, and several other nations have followed suit. This sway in political will, however, can make the use of well-being research in public policy seem less controversial than it is. Much of the rhetoric around the move toward well-being measures in evaluating policy has centered either on the idea that well-being is what \"ultimately matters\" or that it is at least \"something we all care about.\" In this essay, I will argue that such claims are illegitimate from the perspective of political liberalism. The former kind of claim is illegitimate insofar as liberal societies should not base policy on comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines that many reasonable citizens may not accept. The latter kind of claim is illegitimate insofar as some people care significantly more than others about well-being or the ingredients of well-being. Thus, the use of well-being research to evaluate public policy cannot be justified on either of these grounds. Does this mean that there are no justifiable grounds for well-being-based policy? Not necessarily. In this essay, I explore the possibility that the psychological aspects of well-being can be viewed as a \"primary good.\" That is, the preservation and promotion of well-being can be justified as instrumentally valuable for most people. Well-being is instrumentally valuable for most people regardless of their particular intrinsic values. In John Rawls's terms, well-being can be viewed as an all-purpose good that people are assumed to want whatever their plans. The reason for this is that the psychological aspects of well-being, the kinds of things subjective well-being research typically measures, tend to be cognitively and motivationally necessary for agency. Without being able to appreciate one's life emotionally and cognitively, one cannot sufficiently pursue one's own conception of the good. Thus, well-being tends to be necessary for leading a good life regardless of one's conception of in what a good life consists. Even if it is the case, however, that well-being can be viewed as a primary good in this way, it is not necessarily the case that the state should promote it as a matter of justice. The state should promote only primary goods that share certain important features. First, a given primary good must be distributable and objectively comparable if the state is to promote it in a just manner. In addition, the state must be in the best position to promote a given primary good. That is, the primary good must require institutional support: public policies related to its existence and continuation. Moreover, the primary good must be non-fungible. That is, it must not be commonly obtainable through substitutes--things other than the goods and services provided by the state. I will argue that the psychologic","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"2-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}