North Carolina law review最新文献

{"title":"Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick","authors":"Marc S. Spindelman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3797699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3797699","url":null,"abstract":"This Article challenges the conventional thinking about the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. It argues that one need not read Hardwick to have “held” that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords no protection to private, consensual “homosexual sodomy.” Rather, through a fresh reading, the Article maintains that one can interpret Hardwick to have avoided a decision on the merits of the substantive due process claim presented in the case. \u0000 \u0000This alternative reading permits Hardwick to be regarded as having established a kind of prudential interpretive rule. If so, for reasons the Article discusses, lesbian and gay rights advocates might choose to defend a reinterpreted Hardwick as a matter of legal doctrine. Such a defense would provide courts with a basis for distinguishing between those constitutional claims that do, and those that do not, offend deeply held and widely shared social values. From pragmatic and strategic points of view, these are important distinctions that might otherwise be unavailable as a matter of constitutional principle alone. \u0000 \u0000To guide the judicial application of Hardwick, this Article proposes a modification to an increasingly popular way of thinking about lesbian and gay rights: the “like race” miscegenation (or Loving) analogy. Typically, the miscegenation analogy invokes Loving v. Virginia as a substantive reason for striking down laws that discriminate against lesbians and gay men. This Article argues that a reformulated, more historically accurate version of the analogy can provide courts with a source of judgment about how to apply Hardwick when understood as a prudential interpretive rule. It contends that rather than looking to Loving as the sole (or primary) source of judgment, courts could look for guidance to the process of constitutional evolution, as represented by some of the social and legal changes that took place in the time between the Court’s decision in Loving and its pragmatic non-decisions in an earlier miscegenation case, Naim v. Naim. Those social and legal changes, which reflect what the Article calls “the conditions of prudence,” can be abstracted and used, by analogy, to help a court to decide whether, in a particular case involving discrimination against lesbians and gay men, Hardwick counsels judicial action on the merits or, in contrast, judicial restraint.","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"79 1","pages":"359"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45500400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Replacement or Reduction of Gene-Edited Animals in Biomedical Research: A Comparative Ethics and Policy Analysis","authors":"M. Eggel, Rebecca L. Walker","doi":"10.5167/uzh-176866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-176866","url":null,"abstract":"Since William Bateson’s 1906 coinage of the term “genetics,” the rise of mice as a model organism for biomedical research has gone hand in hand with genomic developments. In today’s research environment, mice and rats make up the vast majority of all research subjects. While the advent of gene-editing tools such as CRISPR has made genetic manipulation of mice easier, these tools also signal a new trend toward an increased use of large animal models such as dogs, pigs, and nonhuman primates. Especially for neurological impairments, CRISPR gene editing offers the potential to generate large-animal models that better mimic human diseases. What are the ethical and regulatory implications of this trend? The professional and ethical framework for responsible conduct of animal research is widely recognized as the “three Rs”: Reduction, Refinement, and Replacement. This Article points to the tension between reduction (decreasing the overall numbers of animals used) and relative replacement (the use of mice and rats instead of species with more “complex” capacities) that is implied by such a tradeoff. The Article argues, however, that a comparative analysis of regulatory frameworks in the United States and in the European Union shows that neither offers any substantial guidance to moderate a trend toward greater use of large-animal models. Nevertheless, we raise several ethical questions associated with the trend toward using relatively fewer animals but replacing less cognitively developed animals with those with potentially greater morally relevant capacities and moral standing.","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"97 1","pages":"1241-1272"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70643954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CRISPR APPLICATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY.","authors":"Alexandra L Foulkes,&nbsp;Takahiro Soda,&nbsp;Martilias Farrell,&nbsp;Paola Giusti-Rodríguez,&nbsp;Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Gene-environment interactions play a key role in how psychiatric disorders manifest and develop. Psychiatric genetics researchers are making progress in identifying genomic correlates of many disorders. And recently, the field of genetics has given rise to a technology that many claim will revolutionize the biological sciences and propel the field into a transformative phase: the powerful gene-editing tool known as CRISPR-Cas9. This Article illustrates which psychiatric conditions are likely to make an attractive target for CRISPR as the technology evolves and CRISPR therapies becomes a viable tool to manage or prevent disorders in a clinical setting. We examine the potential scientific and clinical challenges of applying CRISPR in the mental health context, along with the regulatory, ethical, and legal issues that might arise as a consequence of these applications.</p>","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"97 5","pages":"1359-1398"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6927684/pdf/nihms-1024711.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37486347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Judicial Review in Troubled Times: Stabilizing Democracy in a Second Best World","authors":"S. Issacharoff","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3298966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3298966","url":null,"abstract":"Debates over the role of judicial review in a constitutional democracy gravitate to one of two poles. Either the debates are framed in terms of the power of courts countering the outputs of a well-ordered legislative process, or they are framed in terms of the dominant rights commands of minorities ever vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority. \u0000 \u0000This Article parts company with the customary debate in two ways. First, the inquiry focuses on the structures of democratic governance rather than the relation between a governing majority and the rights of disfavored individuals or minorities. Second, and contrary to the conditions assumed by critics of judicial review such as Jeremy Waldron and Richard Bellamy, the aim here is to look directly to the “contaminated” domain of our lived experience in the moment rather than an idealized vision of well-ordered parliamentary sovereignty. Especially in a time of populist challenges to the institutionalization of democratic politics, the role of constitutional courts as potential brakes on the politics of immediacy takes on greater and greater significance. \u0000 \u0000Relying on examples from jurisdictions around the world, this Article sets out three types of interventions ranging in terms of how problematic they are for democratic governance. First is the use of constitutional review to prevent entrenched officeholders from undermining their electoral accountability, as seen in places are far removed as Taiwan and North Carolina. The second is the role of court interventions to bolster what is termed the “soft power” of democracy in which institutional norms compel a politics of negotiation and compromise. Finally, there is the temptation for courts to substitute judicial authority for failing state competence of democracies in general, and of the legislative branches in particular. \u0000 \u0000In each case, judicial review is examined to determine to what extent the judiciary can serve as an institutional buffer in protecting democracy against systemic failure, sometimes on matters that may pertain to fundamental liberties, but more often on questions of the exercise of governmental authority. The question here is whether in times of challenge to democratic functioning the judiciary may play a stabilizing role in warding off temporary political expedients that threaten governmental integrity. The term “stabilization” invokes the role of a central banker charged with maintaining fiscal integrity in the face of inevitable partisan demands for unsustainable short-term returns. In turn, the inquiry is whether judicial interventions in defense of the structural integrity of democratic rule can be thought in similar terms of conservatorship by a semi-independent entity and, in turn, how this institutional role of the judiciary might be utilized in times of systemic stress.","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"98 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48354120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introducing the Totally Unnecessary Benefit LLC","authors":"M. Manesh","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3219956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3219956","url":null,"abstract":"Unlike statutes authorizing benefit corporations, which have been recently enacted in over 30 states to accommodate social enterprises, no one has articulated a legal justification for benefit LLCs. Indeed, no plausible legal justification can be articulated. The expansive flexibility of conventional LLC law is already perfectly amenable to social enterprises. Instead, the advent of the benefit LLC, embraced most prominently by Delaware in 2018, plainly reveals what was arguably already apparent in the context of its corporate predecessor: that the aim of benefit entity statutes is not law reform. Rather, it is about branding. \u0000 \u0000But the creation of this legislatively-endorsed brand should raise serious concerns. In the absence of meaningful accountability measures to ensure that businesses embracing the statutory “benefit” label are actually deserving of it, the state-sanctioned “benefit” designation may be exploited by entrepreneurs to mislead the public and compete unfairly with conventional for-profit businesses. Moreover, even if statutory benefit entities do live up to their “benefit” aspiration, they impose their own costs by adding needless complexity to the law and exacerbating the popular misperception that conventional for-profit businesses are purely profit-driven. It is hard to see why legislatures should employ state power for private gain in this way, especially where there already exist non-governmental certifications available to socially-minded, purpose-driven businesses seeking to distinguish themselves in the marketplace. Accordingly, this Article makes the case that statutory benefit entities—both corporations and especially LLCs—are unnecessary as a legal matter and unwise as a policy matter.","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"97 1","pages":"603"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46520641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A2J/A2K: ACCESS TO JUSTICE, ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE, AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES IN OPEN COURTS AND ARBITRATIONS","authors":"J. Resnik","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3124450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3124450","url":null,"abstract":"This article, for a symposium on Secrecy, explores a broad set of processes that makes dispute resolution inaccessible. My focus is on the problem of institutional privatization, as contrasted with questions of individuals’ personal privacy. The kind of secrecy I discuss here has several sources including the promotion of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) through in-chambers judicial management and settlement efforts; the design of some online dispute resolution (“ODR”) and court-annexed arbitration programs; mandates to outsource dispute resolution to private providers; bans on pursuing relief through class actions; and the costs to individuals of pursuing claims. \u0000 \u0000Rather than any “natural” states of open or closed dispute resolution, political and social movements shape laws endowing courts, ADR, ODR, and arbitration with their attributes. Today, we assume courts to be open and think of judicial management and of arbitration as closed. These assumptions are the product of rules, doctrine, and practices that are in motion. As I detail, much of what takes place in courts increasingly happens outside the public purview, and yet some judges do pre-trial work in open court, on the bench and on the record. Likewise, while privately provided arbitrations are generally cloistered, some jurisdictions permit public access to court-annexed arbitration. A distinction therefore needs to be drawn between what I call the doctrinal openness of courts, familiar because of layers of custom, practice, rules, and law formally committed to public access, and the functional privatization of court-based activities and of some forms of arbitration that make interactions and outcomes inaccessible. \u0000 \u0000I discuss how the closing off of ADR and ODR interacts with bans on class actions, confidentiality clauses, and a host of “legal financial obligations” (“LFOs”), all of which make dispute resolution inaccessible and aspects of it secret. I add to the documentation on the use of arbitration by mining publicly available databases that reflect how unusual single-file consumer claims are. To the extent ODR creates new routes to redress, the versions practiced in the United States have not built in third-party access to welcome observers or to enable assessment of its processes or outcomes. The pressures on courts to finance their own services are another way in which access is limited; a host of assessments deter litigants from using courts. \u0000 \u0000This article then turns to the need to reframe constitutional doctrine so as to constrain the functional privatization of dispute resolution. Current approaches rely on the tradition of access to trials as the benchmark. Given the rarity of trials, preserving public practices requires revising the legal inquiries to focus on the utilities of open dispute resolution as it now takes place, whether in person or through exchanges of materials online. I close with the reminder that making courts accessible is in the interests of indiv","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"96 1","pages":"605"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44132080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Police Body-Worn Cameras","authors":"Seth W. Stoughton","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3094334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3094334","url":null,"abstract":"Since the summer of 2014, community members, politicians, and police executives across the country have called for greater police accountability and improvements in police-community relations. Body-worn cameras are widely seen as serving both ends. Today, thousands of police agencies are exploring, adopting, and implementing body-cam programs. A survey by the Major Cities Chiefs Association and the Major County Sheriffs’ Association found that 95% of surveyed agencies had either implemented or were committed to implementing a BWC program. \u0000Body-worn cameras are here, and more are coming. Mary Fan, for example, has described a “camera cultural revolution” in which “the future will be recorded.” Legal scholars have largely responded to this burgeoning new technology by addressing it through the framework of traditional discussions about privacy, police accountability, or the rules of evidence. Relatively few articles have gone further by identifying the potential benefits of BWCs and critically examining whether the adoption of this technology by police agencies can truly do what the many proponents claim. This Article falls solidly into the latter camp. \u0000This Article is not intended to endorse or condemn police body-cams, but rather to identify and critically examine the potential benefits of the technology in light of its capabilities and limitations. For more than two years now, I have educated a variety of audiences about police BWCs, from state supreme court justices to practicing attorneys and from police executives to rank-and-file officers, and I have repeatedly been asked some variant of what appears to be a simple question: are body cameras a good idea? My response is no doubt familiar to law students across the country: it depends. Body-worn cameras are a tool. Tools should be used to advance normatively desirable goals when they are an efficient way of accomplishing or facilitating those goals. Body-cameras, like any tool, should not be used when the goal itself it inappropriate or when the tool is ill-suited for the job at hand. \u0000This Article explores the limits of BWCs as a tool. It does so by first reviewing the historical justifications for, implementation of, and lessons learned from an earlier iteration of police video recording technology: in-car cameras. It then offers a simplified way of conceptualizing the multitudinous advantages that BWC proponents have identified, putting them into three categories: symbolic benefits, behavioral benefits, and informational benefits. This classification is a necessary first-step in police agencies and communities articulating what they hope to achieve with a BWC program. Whether body-cams will advance the desired goals depends on the practical limitations of the technology and our ability to interpret the resulting video footage as well as the policies and procedures that govern implementation. The latter half of the paper is dedicated to a critical examination of the practical limitations a","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"96 1","pages":"1363"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.3094334","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44621138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Trademarks as Entrepreneurial Change Agents for Legal Reform","authors":"Deborah M. Gerhardt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2991596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2991596","url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes the idea of conceptualizing trademarks as a frontier for social entrepreneurship. By cultivating communities dedicated to core values, entrepreneurial trademark owners are uniquely positioned to prompt cultural and legal reform. Cyberspace has become a thicket of information so dense that it can be hard for any voice to be heard. This commercial clutter amid social unrest creates an opportunity for brands to be seen and heard by staking out moral high ground. Taking a stand on divisive socio-political issues requires an appetite for risk and narrative messaging. Instead of merely selling goods and services, entrepreneurial trademark owners forge meaningful relationships with consumers and invest their brands with new meaning. Like governments, trademarks symbolize the acceptance of some values and the rejection of others. When one side of a political conflict aligns with brand values, the issue provides a creative platform for courage and leadership. Entrepreneurial advertisers employ multiple methods for linking brands with core values. Sometimes brand owners intentionally comment on a social issue in an advertisement. Other brand owners do not have the luxury of choice if deciding between a conflict of values is thrust upon them. Another tactic brand owners may use is the boycott. Once the great collective weapon of consumers, it may be used to exert direct pressure on legislative action by withholding commerce from states whose values conflict with their mission. Whether or not trademark owners succeed in exerting political change, they are succeeding in creating brand communities through loyalty cemented with meaningful core values.","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"95 1","pages":"1519"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43406633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Mirage of Use Restrictions","authors":"Ric Simmons","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2937809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2937809","url":null,"abstract":"The Fourth Amendment strikes a balance between Americans’ privacy interests and the government’s need to investigate crime. It does so almost exclusively by placing restrictions on how the government collects information: if the government surveillance constitutes a “search,” the government must meet certain legal standards before it can engage in that surveillance. Over the past few decades, technological advances have increased exponentially the government’s ability to collect information, and many of these new surveillance methods do not fit into the traditional definitions of a Fourth Amendment search. In response, courts and commentators have searched for new doctrines to define and limit the government’s surveillance power. One of the more popular proposals that has been advanced is to force the government to adopt “use restrictions” — limitations on what the government can do with information that it collects or that is already in its possession. This new type of restriction represents a significant shift from the current paradigm of regulating government surveillance: a shift away from regulating how information is collected and towards regulating how the information is used. \u0000Use restrictions on surveillance data have been termed the “future of surveillance law.” They have been proposed in many different contexts, such as restricting how the government can process massive amounts of public data; limiting the use of information from DNA databases; regulating the information obtained through special needs searches; restricting the use of information that law enforcement obtains after conducting a search of a computer; or limiting the use of data from drones or police body cameras. \u0000This Article will review the many possible applications of use restrictions and discuss five potential doctrinal bases to justify them: (1) apply an “ongoing seizure” doctrine; (2) create a purpose test for the exclusionary rule; (3) re-define a “search” as including the processing of information, not just its collection; (4) make the purpose of the data collection a factor in determining whether collecting the data is a search; and (5) limit which government agencies are allowed access to the data that is collected. The Article concludes that these doctrinal bases are generally insufficient to justify imposing use restrictions. The Article argues that adopting use restrictions would be bad policy, since adopting type of restrictions would discourage the creation of tighter collection restrictions, give the government possession of vast amounts of our private data, and in some cases unduly hinder legitimate law enforcement functions. Therefore, the Article opposes the movement towards use restrictions and proposes that courts and legislatures maintain the focus of Fourth Amendment law on collection restrictions and move forward with use restrictions only in very limited circumstances.","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"96 1","pages":"133"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44114115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State","authors":"Catherine Y. Kim","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2872411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2872411","url":null,"abstract":"Immigration law has undergone a seismic shift. In the past, courts categorically denied review over decisions to exclude, deport, and detain noncitizens, reasoning that the political branches possess “plenary power” to decide such questions without judicial constraint. Today, by contrast, courts not only exercise review over such decisions, they frequently reverse them. This article develops a theoretical account of this shift rooted in non-delegation concerns. It challenges the prevailing scholarly narrative, which attributes the demise of plenary power to growing judicial respect for the rights and interests of aliens, contending that modern immigration jurisprudence is better understood as a response to concerns relating to the scope of delegated administrative discretion. Courts have not altered their assessment of the cognizability of noncitizens’ interests; what has changed is their assessment of whether the unreviewable power to regulate immigration is delegable to agency officials. A non-delegation theory of plenary power sheds new light on the scope and limits of the doctrine today. The denial of plenary authority to agency officials, who are responsible for the vast majority of immigration decisions, results in the effective demise of the doctrine in the broad run of cases. At the same time, it leaves intact the fundamental core of the doctrine, precluding judicial scrutiny over decisions rendered directly by Congress or the President, regardless of their impact on noncitizens’ rights.","PeriodicalId":82179,"journal":{"name":"North Carolina law review","volume":"96 1","pages":"77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2872411","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46267146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}