{"title":"A New Water Law Vista: Rooting the Public Trust Doctrine in the Courts","authors":"Joseph Regalia","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3246518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3246518","url":null,"abstract":"Courts largely view the public trust doctrine as limited by state legislative and executive policy. According to this widespread theory, states may be required to hold in trust a handful of historically-big waterbodies (referred to as “navigable” waters) for certain uses like commerce, but beyond that, states are free to dispose of water without considering the public’s interests.36 So there is no requirement that states consider, for example, the public’s interest in conserving Walker Lake, a lake much older that the state of Nevada itself. And not only can the public not meaningfully challenge a state’s legislative or executive decisions in state courts—but they can’t challenge the state’s abdication of the public trust in federal court, either. Because the scope of the trust is supposedly a state-law matter. \u0000 \u0000Courts and litigants have struggled to craft a theory that will allow the state’s trust duties to extend to more water and more uses, and perhaps most importantly, enforceable in both state and federal courts. I suggest such a theory here. \u0000 \u0000In short, this article explains why we should view the public trust doctrine as reflecting very basic principles of limited state authority over water. This limitation prevents states from seriously infringing on the public’s interest in all flowing water. In other words: when states (and occasionally the federal government) abdicate their public trust duties, they are permitting an infringement on the public’s fundamental right to water—a violation of due process and a violation of the states’ sovereign authority. \u0000 \u0000This theoretical framework allows federal courts to review a state’s decision to forego its trust duties, even when it needs to go beyond those historical, navigable waters. After all, viewed this way, enforcing the public trust is a remedy to protect the public’s interest in natural waters generally. Not only should litigants be able to argue for an expansion of trust duties in state courts under state constitutions, they should also be able to argue for this expansion in federal courts under the U.S. Constitution. \u0000 \u0000Interpreting which waters and uses are protected by the trust is, in effect, interpreting the extent of sovereign authority over water. That is a job uniquely for the judiciary. The court doors should be flung wide open in even the most restrictive of states, allowing citizens to challenge legislative and administrative decisions about water allocation. Courts will be empowered to expand the public trust even in the face of legislative and administrative obstinance.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"41 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78494114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Costs of Conscience","authors":"Micah Schwartzman, N. Tebbe, Richard C. Schragger","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/mkhjq","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/mkhjq","url":null,"abstract":"When the government enacts laws or regulations that accommodate religious believers, it may not impose significant costs on identifiable third parties. This is sometimes called the third-party harm doctrine. Critics of this doctrine have raised a diversity of objections to it. They have argued that it (1) lacks normative foundations, (2) is not grounded in constitutional sources, (3) assumes an incorrect baseline for determining when third parties are harmed, and (4) cannot be applied without eliminating all, or nearly all, religious accommodations. Critics have also argued (5) that the doctrine does not apply when the government provides legal exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, and (6) that religious freedom is like other fundamental rights that impose harms on others. We argue that none of these objections is persuasive. Responding to them provides an opportunity to develop the third-party harm doctrine in ways that illuminate the limits of religious liberty, freedom of conscience, and other constitutional rights.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"255 1","pages":"11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86712463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine","authors":"M. Mannheimer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3073293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3073293","url":null,"abstract":"In examining the threshold question for Fourth Amendment analysis – what constitutes a search? – both courts and commentators have generally premised their analysis on a sharp dichotomy between an approach based on trespass to real or personal property, on the one hand, and one grounded in non-property-based expectations of privacy, on the other. The trespass-based regime seemed to have given way in 1967 to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. But the resurgence of a trespass-based approach in recent Supreme Court cases has served to highlight the supposed distinction between the two methodologies. \u0000 \u0000When subjected to close scrutiny, the dichotomy between the two approaches becomes highly questionable. Whether analyzed in terms of trespass or reasonable expectations of privacy, the question in close cases concerning whether government conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment search comes down to the same essential touchstone: social norms governing privacy and seclusion. Those social norms inform both when a particular expectation of privacy should be deemed reasonable and when an incursion on property should be deemed a trespass. This social-norm-based analysis of whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred should not be surprising. The common law governing rights to security in one’s person and property stems from longstanding custom, which is inextricably linked with social norms: the practices of a people become their social norms, which harden into custom, and custom in turn evolves into enforceable rights and interests that sometimes, though not always, find expression in positive law. Thus, expectations of privacy and trespass constitute, not two distinct tests, but rather two points on the same evolutionary scale. Our notions of trespass have as their touchstone the very same social norms that form the backbone of the reasonable expectation of privacy test. \u0000 \u0000One can articulate a uniform meaning of “search,” irrespective of whether we are operating under a “trespass” or a “reasonable expectation of privacy” model. A Fourth Amendment search occurs when, for the purpose of gathering information, government agents act contrary to law, broadly conceived – that is, law in whatever stage of evolutionary development – providing us with security vis-a-vis private actors in our persons, houses, papers, and effects. A violation of positive law that fits this definition is sufficient but not necessary to constitute a Fourth Amendment search; a violation of social norms that fits this definition, even where the norms have not yet gelled into positive law, should also be considered a search. But because law, in all its manifestations, often differs by jurisdiction, the question whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred might be answered differently in different parts of the country, and perhaps even in different parts of the same State.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"99 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78485667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Removing Recalcitrant County Clerks in Kentucky","authors":"Shawnda Chapman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2748154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2748154","url":null,"abstract":"Events surrounding Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis last year showed that removing county clerks from office is not a simple task in Kentucky. At present, such removal is limited to the same means required to remove a state-wide executive officer, meaning the county clerk has the same tenure as the governor and attorney general. But historically, the county clerk was removable by other, lesser means, as were all other county officers. The present removal gap is a modern problem that appeared only in 1976 and, based on a review of the available historic materials, was the result of mere oversight when the Kentucky constitution was revised substantially to implement a new judicial branch. The gap should be filled, though it will likely require a constitutional amendment.Historically, Kentucky has had a two-tier removal process, with the upper tier applying to all officers, and resulting in removal from office and disqualification from future office; and the lower tier applying to non-executive officers and resulting only in removal. The upper tier consists of impeachment and conviction for certain serious crimes, such as bribery. The lower tier consists of several methods, with each applying to a given class of officers. Members of the legislature have always been removable by their respective houses. Judges have historically been removable by address of the legislature, and are now removable by a retirement and removal commission. County officers, other than the county clerk, may be removed for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance. And finally, court clerks may generally be removed by Kentucky’s highest court. County clerks were historically removable under this latter process. But in 1976, the judicial provisions in Kentucky’s constitution were repealed and replaced by a new system. The repeal included the removal mechanism for county clerks, but the new provisions said nothing about them, creating a gap in the traditional removal structure. A review of available historic materials from the period leading up to 1976 amendment — including correspondence, polls, and educational materials used by the group leading the charge in favor of the amendment, and contemporary news and other media accounts — reveals no public discussion of a removal mechanism for county clerks. This omission suggests that the removal gap was the result of oversight and thus was unintended.This oversight should be corrected. Various possible solutions exist, such as making various crimes result in removal from office, but such an approach is at best responsive and piecemeal. The county clerks could be placed back under the purview of Kentucky’s highest court, but that prospect has disadvantages. The best method would amend the constitution to put county clerks on the same footing as all other county officers, making them removable for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"300 1","pages":"3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77923164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Human Development as a Core Objective of Global Intellectual Property","authors":"J. J. OseiTutu","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2896342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2896342","url":null,"abstract":"Global intellectual property obligations shape domestic laws and policies. More than twenty years since the first multilateral trade-based intellectual property agreement, critics contend that global intellectual property law prioritizes intellectual property rights over other interests, and profits over people. Faced with international intellectual-property obligations, nations have been forced to justify laws and policies designed to promote human development as exceptions to intellectual property protection. This is the result of legal interpretations that treat the objectives of intellectual property protection and human development as inconsistent with one another. Drawing on the objectives of trade law and intellectual property law, this Article argues that human development is a central objective of trade-based intellectual property law and should be duly recognized as such. It is, therefore, unnecessary to protect human development as an “exception” to a norm of protection.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"105 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87345517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Family Formation and the Home","authors":"Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Shelly Kreiczer-Levy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2838217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2838217","url":null,"abstract":"Intergenerational families, voluntary kin groups, non-conjugal adult room-mates, and unmarried couples with or without children, all build domestic family lives together without formal and consistent legal recognition. The variety of families that provide benefits to dependents and mutual support to adults is constantly evolving; but, living together and creating a joint home has always been a central aspect of family life. As traditional family life tied to marriage and biology is continuously challenged, and alternative forms of family formation are developed, the significance of the role of the home plays in creating legally significant ties has been largely overlooked. While domesticity has been intermittently used as a tool in defining family, we will demonstrate that the ways in which home sharing creates family rights and obligations is riddled with inconsistencies and conflicts. On the one hand, certain welfare-based entitlements and zoning cases use flexible standards for determining family based on domesticity. However, on the other hand, even the rare recognition of private rights and obligations among those who cohabit occurs when sexuality or reproduction are also involved in a manner that more closely mimics traditional marriage. Generally, domesticity is assumed to include sexuality and the focus on family formation has centered on the sexuality involved. However, in this article we consider how joint lives that are based under a common roof whether or not they include sexual relations can include many of the supports and normative benefits of family life. We will demonstrate based on social science studies and taking into account both the benefits and risks of home sharing, how domesticity has its own normative benefits and ways of creating emotional and physical bonds apart from sex. Finally, this article will lay out different possibilities for how the law can recognize and support the role home sharing plays in creating familial lives that provide mutual support, stability and other important benefits over an extended and stable period of time. Keeping in mind both the desire to foster diversity and autonomy and protect those who are most vulnerable, this article considers options for legal recognition of the status of domesticity in family formation. These alternatives include consideration of how vulnerability could justify the imposition of obligations and rights upon sexual or non-sexual cohabitants and how registrations systems can provide solutions to those seeking legal recognition of the mutual support systems and family lives they create in a diverse manner by sharing a home with loved ones and/or long-term trusted friends.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"57 1","pages":"4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74353360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crowd Crush: How the Law Leaves American Crowds Unprotected","authors":"Tracy Hresko Pearl","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2569373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2569373","url":null,"abstract":"Crowd-related injuries and deaths are startlingly common both in the United States and worldwide. They occur in a wide range of situations and at a vast array of venues: at music concerts, sporting events, and retail holiday sales, and in and around airports, subway platforms, and parking lots, among other locations. These “crowd crush” incidents, however, are extremely underreported and rarely litigated, masking the seriousness of this issue and making it difficult for the few victims who pursue legal recourse to recover damages. Given that there is virtually no statutory law in the United States pertaining to crowd management and control, crowd crush cases are based entirely in common law, most often in the law of negligence. Unfortunately, courts have consistently made a number of analytical errors in these cases, creating a line of jurisprudence that is both scientifically and legally problematic and that reduces incentives for venue owners and event managers to take steps to reduce the likelihood of future crowd injuries. In this paper, I (a) identify the most significant of these errors, (b) explain why they contravene crowd science, and (c) make a series of recommendations designed to bring crowd crush jurisprudence in line with modern science and level the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants in these cases.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"40 1","pages":"4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87278809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Privacy and Health Information: The United States and the European Union","authors":"Leslie P. Francis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2590477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2590477","url":null,"abstract":"Many important public health, health research, and treatment goals can be furthered by the use of health information. Privacy protection, as the EU recognizes, is an important aspect for facilitating the use and transfer of this information. All too often, privacy is seen as a barrier to information use, but without adequate assurances that data will be safeguarded appropriately, there are risks that data will not be shared at all. 106 Providing such assurances is a primary impetus for the EU’s revision of its current data protection law.As the EU moves towards adopting and implementing its proposed regulatory changes, it will be important to monitor the impacts on public health and medical research both within and beyond the borders of its member states. For the US, one concern will be whether the EU’s increasingly stringent privacy protections will require revision of the safe harbor framework. There may also be growing divergence between the EU’s overarching approach to the protection of personal information and the US’s segmented approach that imposes very different restrictions on information within and outside of the HIPAA rules. Those interested in the responsible use of health information in the US might be well advised to watch how the EU’s proposed Regulation plays out in the treatment of health information, especially the implementation of the provisions of Articles 81 and 83 governing the use of information for public health, improvement of health care, and medical research.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"12 1","pages":"7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85242258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fictions of Omniscience","authors":"Karen Petroski","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2469863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2469863","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies of the legislative process have questioned the rationales for many principles of statutory interpretation. One of those traditional rationales is the so-called fiction of legislative omniscience, understood to underpin many judicial approaches to statutory decisions. This Article presents the first comprehensive analysis of judicial assertions about legislative awareness and proposes a new way to understand them. The proposed perspective compares fictions of legislative omniscience with similar but more widely accepted imputations of knowledge in other areas of law; it also draws on recent findings from other disciplines regarding how we use and respond to statements about fictional states of affairs. The comparisons indicate that judges’ imputations of unrealistic knowledge to legislatures are best seen not as unfair demands, but as important parts of the story judges typically tell about the law in our legal system, according to which the legislature and judiciary play complementary roles in pursuit of compatible goals. Rather than impairments of judicial legitimacy, these imputations are descriptions of the necessarily aspirational grounds of legal legitimacy.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"36 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85109591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Text Me: A Text-Based Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(E)","authors":"Jennifer L. Case","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2459126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2459126","url":null,"abstract":"A federal prisoner seeking to collaterally attack his convictions and sentences faces a complex journey. He must make it past temporal and procedural hurdles. He must also present his claim in the correct legal clothing - that is, he must decide whether his claim is a collateral attack on his sentence or a challenge to the conditions of his confinement. The former is presented to a federal court through a motion, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255; the latter is presented as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. There is one exception to this § 2255–§ 2241 distinction: Rarely, and only rarely, a prisoner can collaterally attack the imposition of his sentence in a § 2241 petition even though such a claim must typically be brought in a § 2255 motion. This article explores that exception. That is, this article examines the critical link that allows a prisoner bring an otherwise unauthorized § 2241 petition to collaterally attack the imposition of his sentence. That link is codified in § 2255, subsection (e). To understand the link between § 2255 and § 2241, it is critical to understand the textual contours and connections of § 2255(e). But, the circuit courts have struggled mightily to interpret that statutory provision. In their struggle, the courts have developed a deep and mature circuit split. Some circuits allow prisoners to avoid statutory restrictions on filing a § 2255 by permitting him to file his claim in a § 2241 petition. Other circuits disallow prisoners from doing the same.This variation among the circuit courts is well-documented. But, the courts’ failure to anchor their varied tests to the text of § 2255(e) is not. This article fills that gap. It examines the text of § 2255 and proposes a text-based reading of subsection (e). By providing a text-based approach to reading § 2255(e), the article hopes to help courts and litigants regain traction by offering a way to remain faithful to the congressionally-enacted words without producing court-created tests that are unmoored from the statute’s text.","PeriodicalId":81762,"journal":{"name":"Kentucky law journal (Lexington, Ky.)","volume":"29 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84370257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}