Journal of legislation最新文献

{"title":"The Perils & Promises of Artificial General Intelligence","authors":"Brian Haney","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3261254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3261254","url":null,"abstract":"Artificial General Intelligence (“AGI”) - an Artificial Intelligence (\"AI\") capable of achieving any goal - is the greatest existential threat humanity faces. Indeed, the questions surrounding the regulation of AGI are the most important the millennial generation will answer. The capabilities of current AI systems are evolving at accelerating rates. Yet, legislators and scholars have yet to address or identify critical issues relating to AI regulation. Instead, legislators and scholars have focused narrowly on short term AI policy. \u0000 \u0000This paper takes a contrarian approach to analyzing AI regulation with a specific emphasis on deep reinforcement learning systems, a relatively recent breakthrough in AI technology. Additionally, this paper identifies three important regulatory issues legislators and scholars need to address in the context of AI development. AI and legal scholars have made the demanding need for an AI regulatory system clear. However, those arguments focus on the regulation of current AI systems and generally ignore or dismiss the possibility of AGI. Further, previous scholarship has yet to grapple specifically with the regulation of deep reinforcement learning systems, which many AI scholars argue provides a direct path to AGI. Ultimately, legislators must consider and address the perils and promises of AGI when developing and evolving AI regulatory frameworks.","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"45 1","pages":"151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/ssrn.3261254","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45177395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Collusion, Obstruction of Justice and Impeachment","authors":"Ediberto Román, Melissa González, Dianet Torres","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3699020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3699020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"54 1","pages":"9-59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68626555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Structural Etiology of the U.S. Constitution","authors":"Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2735425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2735425","url":null,"abstract":"This paper attempts to interpret the problems and the eventual purpose of the United States government while simultaneously explaining its continued existence by analyzing the three part structure of the United States Federal government as outlined in the Constitution — and subsequently interpreted by all three parts of the government — through the lens of the Platonic paradigm of logos, thymos, and eros as explained in Plato’s dialogues. The major premise of the paper is Plato’s three-part soul. The minor premise is the three-part structure of the United States government. The syllogism is the analysis in the paper attempts to show how each part of the Platonic soul represents itself in the three parts of judiciary for logos, executive for thymos, and legislature for eros.","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68279716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Fourth Amendment Framework for the Free Exercise Clause","authors":"Adam Lamparello","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2602818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2602818","url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes a paradigm for resolving disputes under the free exercise clause that is analogous to the framework used by the court under the fourth amendment when balancing privacy rights against investigatory powers of law enforcement. In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court provides varying degrees of protection to privacy – and imposes different evidentiary requirements on law enforcement – depending on the context in which privacy is affected, the intrusiveness of a particular search, and the asserted governmental interests. For example, privacy receives the strongest protections in areas such as the home, thus requiring law enforcement to have probable cause and a warrant before conducting a search (unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies). In quasi-public spaces, such as a motor vehicle or a place of business, individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy that permits searches based on reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct. In public spaces, such as open fields or sidewalks, citizens have little, if any, expectation of privacy, and law enforcement typically needs no suspicion whatsoever to observe objects that are placed in public view. The Court should adopt a similar framework such that the strength of a free exercise claim could vary depending on where, when, and how it is exercised. Specifically, the validity of a law interfering with religious liberty would depend on whether it:• Affects religious practices or beliefs;• Prohibits or compels conduct;• Directly or indirectly targets religious practices or beliefs;• Applies in the public or private arena; and • Advances valid and secular governmental interests.The tiered framework used in the Fourth Amendment context to balance privacy rights against the needs of law enforcement should be adopted to determine the strength of a free exercise claim in light of countervailing governmental interests. This approach would result in protections for religious liberty that are categorical in some instances and context-specific in others.","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"42 1","pages":"131"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68218772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Overcoming Obstacles to Religious Exercise in K-12 Education","authors":"Lewis M. Wasserman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2319155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2319155","url":null,"abstract":"Judicial decisions rendered during the last half-century have overwhelmingly favored educational agencies over claims by parents for religious accommodations to public education requirements, no matter what constitutional or statutory rights were pressed at the tribunal, or when the conflict arose. These claim failures are especially striking in the wake of the Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (“RFRAs”) passed by Congress in 1993 and, to date, by eighteen state legislatures thereafter, since the RFRAs were intended to (1) insulate religious adherents from injuries inflicted by the United States Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith and (2) return Free Exercise protection to the level adherents enjoyed under the Court’s 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner, the high water mark for religious liberty in this country. By mining prior research, and by examining the outcomes of all United States Courts of Appeal decisions involving K-12 religious accommodation issued between 1963-and 2013, this article shows that RFRAs have failed to achieve their purpose because legislators: (1) incorporated legal standards which had previously failed to protect religious liberty; (2) passed religious liberty statutes of general application without specifically targeting education agencies; (3) did not consider specific activities which were more likely than others to result in conflict with persons wishing to exercise religious freedom; (4) did not distinguish state interests which merely served a governmental purpose, from those which were essential to fulfilling educational agencies’ core functions; and (5) focused on legal technicalities such as “substantial burdens” on religion and the “compelling state interest test,” which are largely bereft of meaning outside of particular agency interests.This article proposes solutions which address the principal religious conflict areas; specifically, the elements of a model statute directed at K-12 educational settings. Among the areas covered are: group meetings and religious exercise; curricular accommodations for objecting religionists; flag salutes and the Pledge of Allegiance; dress and grooming codes; class schedules and release-time programs; student health and safety; the rights of private and home-schooled students; and the rights of religiously committed public education employees over the education of their children.The proposal covers as well issues which are likely to arise in litigation, including: jurisdictional and notice of claim requirements, pleading, claims and defenses, statutes of limitations, and remedies available for violations of the Act, including fees and costs. This legislative proposal embodies principles which are intended to: (1) overcome, within Establishment Clause limits, the unfair burdens which religious believers have experienced; (2) allow educational agencies to perform their core pedagogical functions; (3) give express notice to educational agencies what the","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"53 1","pages":"96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68098642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Abolishing Implied Private Rights of Action Pursuant to Federal Statutes","authors":"Jonathan A. Marcantel","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2207656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2207656","url":null,"abstract":"The doctrine of implied rights of action has generated a wealth of scholarship in two general areas: First, scholars have attempted to generate normatively justifiable, generally applicable mechanisms to evaluate implied rights of action. Second, scholars have argued the doctrine should permit private rights of action in reference to specific statutory schemes. To date, however, no scholar has evaluated whether the doctrine is normatively justifiable in the first instance. This Article fills a portion of that gap with three primary arguments. First, this Article argues the Doctrine itself maintains, at most, nominal beneficial utility, as the Doctrine, as currently articulated, is only applicable in remote, isolated circumstances. Second, this Article assesses the costs of maintaining the doctrine using the metrics of both Administrative Justice Theory and Procedural Justice Theory and argues that continuing to maintain the doctrine both generates significant administrative waste and has the potential to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the judicial system. Finally, this Article assesses the impact that abolition of the doctrine would have on Corrective Justice Theory and argues that abolition would have a neutral impact. Ultimately, taking those three arguments together, this Article argues the doctrine is not normatively justifiable.","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"39 1","pages":"251"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67989696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Should We Ban or Welcome 'Spec' Home Buyers?","authors":"George Lefcoe","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1446778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1446778","url":null,"abstract":"This paper begins by recounting the extent to which speculating buyers contributed more than proportionately to housing price volatility and the rate of mortgage foreclosure. The second section turns to the way spec buyers deceived mortgage lenders by committing occupancy fraud, claiming falsely that they were buying as owner occupants so they could benefit from more favorable mortgage rates and terms. The third section starts by describing the mischief spec buyers caused home builders and condo developers by signaling phantom housing demand, and degrading ‘for sale’ housing tracts and condo developments by leaving newly bought homes vacant or filling them with short term rentals. The fourth section explores the rationale for a government imposed ban on home flipping. This would be a publicly imposed constraint on alienability.","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"36 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68182754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Legislatively Revising Kelo V. City of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, and Congressional Powers","authors":"Bernard W. Bell","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.800174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.800174","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores Congress' power to limit state and local authorities' use of eminent domain to further economic revitalization. More particularly, it examines whether Congress can constrain the discretion to invoke eminent domain which state and local officials appear entitled to under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London, U.S., 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). The question involves and exploration and assessment of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence regarding federalism and judicial supremacy. In providing that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, the Fifth Amendment implicitly precludes government officials from compelling citizens to relinquish their property for something other than a public use. However, the United States Supreme Court has long defined public use expansively, so expansively that the federal courts do not meaningfully review government officials' justifications for invoking eminent domain. In Kelo, the Court revisited its deferential approach. Kelo involved a claim that a municipality's attempt to take land by eminent domain and transfer it to a private entity, as a part of an economic revitalization plan, did not qualify as a taking for a public use, and thus was constitutionally prohibited. The Court ultimately reaffirmed its expansive definition of public use. The decision not only sparked public outrage and state legislative initiatives to restrict the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment, but attracted congressional attention. The House enacted a resolution disapproving the decision and an appropriations rider barring funding to enforce the ruling. At least three bills have been introduced in the House and Senate to withhold federal funds to economic revitalization projects sited in whole or in part on land acquired by local authorities using eminent domain. This paper concludes that Congress has power to constrain state and local use of eminent domain under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, and that Congress' power to proceed under the Spending Clause may not be as expansive as it appears. The Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to limit state and local authorities use of eminent domain to protect property owner's Fifth Amendment rights. Because the Court recognizes citizens rights to prevent the taking of their property for private use by another, but faces problems in enforcing that right, Congress may take some precisely-tailored actions that will give the right practical protection. Such measures might include: 1) altering the measure of just compensation due when property is taken for economic development, 2) specifying minimal procedures to assure that state and local officials make eminent domain decisions in a transparent and politically-accountable manner, 3) establishing rebuttable presumptions that in certain circumstances a taking is for a private, not a public,","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"32 1","pages":"165"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.800174","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67831433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does the Thirteenth Amendment provide a jurisdictional basis for a federal ban on cloning?","authors":"Sean Charles Vinck","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"30 1","pages":"183-91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"26571184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Oregon Death with Dignity Act: review and proposals for improvement.","authors":"R Cohen-Almagor, M G Hartman","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":81672,"journal":{"name":"Journal of legislation","volume":"27 2","pages":"269-98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25958359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}