Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania最新文献
{"title":"Evaluating Pension Insurance Pricing","authors":"D. Babbel","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2337147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2337147","url":null,"abstract":"The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)’s Pension Insurance Modeling System (PIMS) model has taken on the Herculean task of modeling in detail and under many scenarios the cash outflows associated with the pension obligations they have assumed. This paper’s comments are focused almost entirely upon PBGC’s termination liabilities, and address four pressing issues: (1) the need to discount the liability stream by current riskless interest rates instead of using corporate bond rates that reflect credit risk, call risk, and other risks, or using some ad hoc prescribed average of past rates; (2) the need to use a term structure of interest rates; (3) the need to employ more useful investment management benchmarks; and (4) how to implement a relevant and rigorous liability benchmark.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82378653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Entrepreneurial Exits and Innovation","authors":"Vikas A. Aggarwal, David H. Hsu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2306053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2306053","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how initial public offerings (IPOs) and acquisitions affect entrepreneurial innovation as measured by patent counts and forward patent citations. We construct a firm-year panel data set of all venture capital-backed biotechnology firms founded between 1980 and 2000, tracked yearly through 2006. We address the possibility of unobserved self-selection into exit mode by using coarsened exact matching, and in two additional ways: (1) comparing firms that filed for an IPO (or announced a merger) with those not completing the transaction for reasons unrelated to innovation, and (2) using an instrumental variables approach. We find that innovation quality is highest under private ownership and lowest under public ownership, with acquisition intermediate between the two. Together with a set of within-exit mode analyses, these results are consistent with the proposition that information confidentiality mechanisms shape innovation outcomes. The results are not explained by inventor-level turnover following exit events or by firms' preexit window dressing behavior. This paper was accepted by Lee Fleming, entrepreneurship and innovation.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88133627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Advance Selling Desirable with Competition?","authors":"Gérard P. Cachon, P. Feldman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2275357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2275357","url":null,"abstract":"It has been shown that a monopolist can use advance selling to increase profits. This paper documents that this may not hold when firms face competition. With advance selling a firm offers its service in an advance period, before consumers know their valuations for the firms' services, or later on in a spot period, when consumers know their valuations. We identify two ways in which competition limits the effectiveness of advance selling. First, while a monopolist can sell to homogeneous consumers at a high price, if consumers are equally uncertain as to which firm they prefer, their choice is based primarily on which firm has the lower price, and the resulting price competition lowers advance prices and profits. Second, competition in the spot period is likely to lower spot period prices, thereby forcing the firms to lower their advance period prices, which again is not favorable to profits. We show that with competition the firms may be better off if they sell only in the spot period. However, the firms may nevertheless find themselves in an equilibrium with advance selling. In this sense, advance selling is better described as a competitive necessity than as an advantageous tool to raise profits.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83264109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic Pricing Through Data Sampling","authors":"Maxime C. Cohen, R. Lobel, G. Perakis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2376667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376667","url":null,"abstract":"We study a dynamic pricing problem, where a firm offers a product to be sold over a fixed time horizon. The firm has a given initial inventory level, but there is uncertainty about the demand for the product in each time period. The objective of the firm is to determine a dynamic pricing strategy that maximizes revenue over the entire selling season. We develop a tractable optimization model that directly uses demand data, therefore creating a practical decision tool. We show numerically that regret-based objectives can perform well when compared with average revenue maximization. This modeling approach could be particularly important for risk-averse managers with limited access to historical data or information about the true demand distribution. Finally, we provide theoretical performance guarantees for this sampling-based solution.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"433 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78214364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Speculation and Hedging in Segmented Markets","authors":"Itay Goldstein, Yan Li, Liyan Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1712472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1712472","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a model in which traders have different trading opportunities and learn information from prices. The difference in trading opportunities implies that different traders may have different trading motives when trading in the same market—some trade for speculation and others for hedging—and thus they may respond to the same information in opposite directions. This implies that adding more informed traders may reduce price informativeness and therefore provides a source for learning complementarities leading to multiple equilibria and price jumps. Our model is relevant to various realistic settings and helps to understand a variety of modern financial markets.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84251537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hierarchical Cheap Talk","authors":"A. Ambrus, Eduardo M. Azevedo, Yuichiro Kamada","doi":"10.3982/TE1038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1038","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic, and might want to influence the action taken by the final receiver. The set of pure strategy equilibrium outcomes is simple to characterize, monotonic in each intermediator's bias, does not depend on the order of intermediators, and intermediation in these equilibria cannot improve information transmission. However, none of these conclusions hold for mixed equilibria. We provide a partial characterization of mixed equilibria, and offer an economically relevant sufficient condition for every equilibrium to be outcome-equivalent to a pure equilibrium and hence the simple characterization and comparative statics results to hold for the set of all equilibria.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88803951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Complementary Assets as Pipes and Prisms: Innovation Incentives and Trajectory Choices","authors":"Brian Wu, Zhixi Wan, Daniel A. Levinthal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1777241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1777241","url":null,"abstract":"The issue of the failure of incumbent firms in the face of radical technical change has been a central question in the technology strategy domain for some time. We add to prior contributions by highlighting the role a firm's existing set of complementary assets have in influencing its investment in alternative technological trajectories. We develop an analytical model that considers firm heterogeneity with respect to both technological trajectories and complementary assets. Complementary assets play a dual role in incumbents' investment behavior toward radical technological change: they are not only resources (pipes) that can buffer firms from technology change, but also prisms through which firms view those changes, influencing both the magnitude of resources that should be invested and the trajectory to which these resources should be directed.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80019361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws","authors":"Philip M. Nichols","doi":"10.1111/J.1744-1714.2012.01134.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1744-1714.2012.01134.X","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses a gap in the common understanding of corruption. The rules regarding corruption at both the macro- and the micro-level are well known, as are the consequences at the macro-level. The consequences at the micro-level, however, particularly for business firms, are not well understood. With respect to rules, at both the macro-and micro-levels the rules are very clear: do not pay bribes. At the macro-level the consequences are well known: corruption has devastating effects on societies and economies. Although not often referred to in most corruption literature, the consequences at the micro-level can be discussed. This article begins with the direct and indirect costs imposed on firms that pay bribes. Firms that pay bribes spend more time and money dealing with governments, and bear the costs of distortions of internal resources. The article then examines the negative effects of corruption on existing relationships within the firm and potential relationships with parties outside of the firm. Finally, the article examines potential criminal and civil liability that a firm exposes itself to when it pays bribes. The totality of these costs and liabilities strongly suggest that the consequences for any given firm of paying a bribe would burden rather than benefit the firm.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79280435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making 1 1=1: The Central Role of Identity in Merger Math","authors":"H. Bouchikhi, J. Kimberly","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312378","url":null,"abstract":"When trying to pull off a successful deal many senior executives focus their attention on economic synergies (1+1>2) and ignore that psychological synergies (1+1=1) are required to reap the financial benefits of mergers and acquisitions. The authors discuss common mistakes firms make in the management of identity issues and offer four approaches that managers can follow to achieve identity integration.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"101 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82419749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vincent Glode, Burton Hollifield, Marcin T. Kacperczyk, Shimon Kogan
{"title":"Time-Varying Predictability in Mutual Fund Returns","authors":"Vincent Glode, Burton Hollifield, Marcin T. Kacperczyk, Shimon Kogan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1364351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364351","url":null,"abstract":"We provide novel evidence that mutual fund returns are predictable after periods of high market returns but not after periods of low market returns. The asymmetric conditional predictability in relative performance cannot be fully explained by time-varying differences in transaction costs, in style exposures, or in survival probabilities of funds. Performance predictability is more pronounced for funds catering to retail investors than for funds catering to institutional investors, suggesting that unsophisticated investors make systematic mistakes in their capital allocation decisions.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76406431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}