Developments in health economics and public policy最新文献_第8页

Welfare economics and cost-utility analysis. 福利经济学与成本效用分析。

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_7

J R Butler

引用次数: 4

Cost-effectiveness analysis of strategies for screening prostatic cancer. 前列腺癌筛查策略的成本-效果分析。

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_5

R Launois

引用次数: 10

How can we prevent cream skimming in a competitive health insurance market? The great challenge for the 90's. 在竞争激烈的健康保险市场中，我们如何防止奶油撇脂?90年代的巨大挑战。

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_2

W P Van de Ven, R C Van Vliet

引用次数: 105

A pooled cross-section analysis of the health care expenditures of the OECD countries. 经合组织国家卫生保健支出的汇总横截面分析。

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_14

U G Gerdtham, J Søgaard, B Jönsson, F Andersson

{"title":"A pooled cross-section analysis of the health care expenditures of the OECD countries.","authors":"U G Gerdtham, J Søgaard, B Jönsson, F Andersson","doi":"10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_14","url":null,"abstract":"This paper has two purposes. The first, empirical purpose is to estimate and evaluate the effects of aggregate income, institutional and socio-demographic factors on health care expenditures in the OECD countries. The second purpose is methodological, and comprises assessment of temporal instability, the choice of functional form, and misspecification of the estimated relationships. Data compiled over three years (1974, 1980 and 1987) from 19 OECD countries are used in a pooled cross-section regression analysis. Like previous studies, this one concludes that aggregate income measured by Gross Domestic Product per capita is the statistically most important factor in cross-national variation in health care expenditures, and that the aggregate income elasticity exceeds one. However, the data analyzed in this study also show some evidence that public financing of health care services is associated with lower expenditures per capita, and that countries with fee for service as the dominant form of remuneration have higher expenditures. The examined relationships appear to be temporally stable over the three years except for upward shifts, and there is no indication of statistical misspecification. This does not necessarily imply a correct specification, and we do note the presence of measurement errors in some of the variables. Moreover, the selected log-linear functional form appears to be non-optimal according to a likelihood criterion, and is rejected against a quadratic form. Based on the analyses from this study the results do not appear to be sensitive to use of the quadratic form specification.","PeriodicalId":79866,"journal":{"name":"Developments in health economics and public policy","volume":"1 ","pages":"287-310"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"21044637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 93

Pricing and imperfections in the medical care marketplace. 医疗保健市场的定价和不完善。

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_1

J P Newhouse

{"title":"Pricing and imperfections in the medical care marketplace.","authors":"J P Newhouse","doi":"10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_1","url":null,"abstract":"To summarize: Some economic literature treats price determination in the medical marketplace as if it were similar to that of a standard marketplace. It seems more realistic to treat it as an outcome of one or more administered price systems. Such systems, may be formula-based, as is common in the United States (for example, the Prospective Payment System), or not (for example, a negotiated budget). In either case, however, the actual price is likely to deviate from the ideal price in part for lack of information. Plausible deviations can explain some observed phenomena. The inability to attain the ideal price, together with heterogeneity of patients, may also explain why in practice we observe several different bases of provider payment; for example, fee-for-service, capitation, and salary. All of these may be attempts to arrive at second best prices. Ignoring any welfare loss from raising revenue and assuming those with the largest marginal social valuation for the service are served first, errors in price setting lead to a welfare loss that is approximately proportional to the square of the deviation from the ideal price. If price setting is unbiased (i.e., errors have a mean of zero), the welfare loss is approximately proportional to the variance of the error in setting price. If price setting is biased, welfare loss is approximately proportional to the variance plus the square of the bias. Taking account of welfare loss from raising revenue may make monopsonistic pricing optimal. If one uses multiple bases of payment, for example both fee-for-service and capitation, one can average the errors that arise in each basis. This creates a gain from using a mixed system, in addition to those gains cited by other analysts, who focus on the method of reimbursement assuming what, in the present context, could be termed error-free price effects. The gains from averaging errors would appear available in any administered price system and are compatible with a wide variety of models of provider behavior.","PeriodicalId":79866,"journal":{"name":"Developments in health economics and public policy","volume":"1 ","pages":"3-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"21022853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 21

Consumer information, price, and nonprice competition among hospitals. 医院之间的消费者信息、价格和非价格竞争。

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_11

H E Frech, J M Woolley

{"title":"Consumer information, price, and nonprice competition among hospitals.","authors":"H E Frech, J M Woolley","doi":"10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_11","url":null,"abstract":"The results of the empirical analysis in this paper indicate that broadly defined hospital quality declines in more concentrated markets. The direction of the effect of concentration on hospital charges is smaller and the direction is less clear. Prices are little, if any, lower in more concentrated markets. Hospital price-cost margins are higher in more concentrated markets. Higher concentration discourages price competition. The data do not support the increasing monopoly theory. Further, since hospital price-cost margins do not appear to remain constant, we must reject the redundant resources theory as well, though its stress on nonprice competition rings true. The empirical results are consistent with the traditional antitrust theory. In addition, consumer information plays a surprisingly important role. Consumer information is important in explaining hospital prices, and less important in hospital quality. Consumers are not passive; they do play a role in hospital choice. It is likely that more recent innovations in health insurance will increase consumer awareness. With an increase in consumer copayments, and more active insurer contracting, it is likely that future hospital competition is more likely to stress price, and future antitrust activity could lead to price reductions in addition to declining hospital price-cost margins.","PeriodicalId":79866,"journal":{"name":"Developments in health economics and public policy","volume":"1 ","pages":"217-41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"21024238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Is there a Sisyphus syndrome in health care? 在医疗保健中有西西弗斯综合症吗?

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_15

P Zweifel, M Ferrari

引用次数: 49

Health economics worldwide. 全球卫生经济学。

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1

R. Ohsfeldt, P. Zweifel, H. Frech

引用次数: 84

Deaths from gastro-intestinal cancer in Mexico: probable cause for water sampling. 墨西哥人死于胃肠道癌症:水取样的可能原因。

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_16

E Lopez, L Phillips, M Silos

引用次数: 3

Priorities among waiting list patients. 等候名单病人的优先次序。

Developments in health economics and public policy Pub Date : 1992-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2392-1_10

T Iversen, E Nord

引用次数: 3