竞争法律与政策评论最新文献

{"title":"Wu, Tim. The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age","authors":"Jyotsna Yadav","doi":"10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.18","url":null,"abstract":"No Abstract.","PeriodicalId":68002,"journal":{"name":"竞争法律与政策评论","volume":"127 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82488623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Message from Hon'ble Minister of Finance and Corporate Affairs, Government of India","authors":"Nirmala Sitharaman","doi":"10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.6","url":null,"abstract":"No Abstract.","PeriodicalId":68002,"journal":{"name":"竞争法律与政策评论","volume":"18 1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84947539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competition Law and Employment","authors":"Rajat Moudgil, Suhaib Bandey","doi":"10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.2","url":null,"abstract":"No Abstract.","PeriodicalId":68002,"journal":{"name":"竞争法律与政策评论","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83978089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Attempt to Monopolisation and Digital Markets: Enforcement Gap","authors":"Savitri Kore, Jyotsna Yadav","doi":"10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.12","url":null,"abstract":"Rapid technological development, particularly in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector, has led to a significant change in the industrial structure as well. Regulatory bodies world over are struggling to adjust to these changing scenarios. There is a widespread discussion regarding the need to regulate technology-driven markets such as e-commerce, telecommunication, etc. The practices used by some business giants are going against the neoclassical economic theory that profit maximisation is the goal of every firm. Firms are opting growth over profit. A large number of investigations were opened in India against business giants. Some of them were able to find contraventions of the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act). However, a large number of investigations were closed due to the lack of cognizance of collective dominance in law or inability to prove dominance in the traditional economic sense. It can be seen from the current jurisprudence of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) that there are constraints in handling competition issues in technology-driven industries mainly on account of the extant legal framework which does not recognise the need of assessing an appreciable adverse effect on competition where the dominance of the firm is not apparent. Although, the Act takes into account attempt to cartelisation as a contravention of the Act, it does not envisage an attempt to monopolise as a contravention of the Act. The past and current jurisprudence of the CCI indicates that CCI’s view is also undergoing radical change. This paper discusses the concept of “attempt to monopolise” as given in the Sherman Act and its applicability in the Indian context. The paper reviews the American antitrust literature existing on this subject and analyses the key factors which constitute antitrust violations under the clause “attempt to monopolise”. While the majority view emphasises on proving dangerous probability of success while determining an attempt to monopolise, as per the minority view, “attempt” connotes conduct and not a state of being. Unlawful intent can be inferred from the conduct as a proof of an “attempt”. The law does not require completion of a crime, it requires conduct. Thus, an attempt to monopolise is a conduct offence. This paper argues that borrowing the attempt to monopolise concept from the Sherman Act, 1890 will be helpful for the CCI in handling antitrust cases in technology-driven industries such as e-commerce, telecommunications, transport, etc. \u0000It will go a long way in achieving competitive markets, increased consumer choice and welfare in the long-run.","PeriodicalId":68002,"journal":{"name":"竞争法律与政策评论","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78977042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Stucke, Maurice E., and Ezrachi, A. Competition Overdose: How Free Market Mythology transformed us from Citizen Kings to Market Servants.","authors":"Yogesh Dubey","doi":"10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.15","url":null,"abstract":"No Abstract.","PeriodicalId":68002,"journal":{"name":"竞争法律与政策评论","volume":"140 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76068488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Big Data Mergers: Bridging the Gap for an Effective Merger Control Framework","authors":"Kalpana Tyagi","doi":"10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.4","url":null,"abstract":"The emergence of multi-sided platforms, connected devices and Internet of Things (IoT) has turned us into a valuable information asset, whereby data about our tastes and preferences as a consumer can be ‘commoditised’. Even though ‘data’ is the key to competition, and thereby ensures competitiveness across markets – as diverse from retail to healthcare, from taxi rides to air travel, thanks to the uberisation of the economy – this valuable reservoir of information is controlled by a handful of Information Technology (IT) firms. Remarkably noteworthy is the fact that a significant proportion of the growth of these IT companies is not organic; instead, most of their valuable innovations have been acquired inorganically through acquisitions! Against this dynamic backdrop, this paper addresses the following research questions. First, what are the potential suitable tests for the notification of a transaction, and what factors must be taken into consideration for the selection of a particular test over others? Second, how can competition authorities innovate as regards the ‘theory of harm’? In other words, what should be the design and construct of a theory that can effectively capture the novel concerns in big data mergers? Here, the discussion is not just limited to ‘privacy’ as a dimension of competition, but also other areas of concern – such as non-horizontal effects in big data mergers. Finally, the paper very briefly discusses key factors to be taken into consideration for designing effective remedies.","PeriodicalId":68002,"journal":{"name":"竞争法律与政策评论","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80093027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Two Sides to the Story: An Economic Critique of Ohio vs. Amex","authors":"Ramji Tamarappoo, Harishankar Jagadeesh","doi":"10.54425/ccijoclp.v2.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v2.39","url":null,"abstract":"The attractiveness of a platform to one side depends on the number of users on the other side. Platforms use pricing strategies — i.e., they offer lower/zero prices to one side and charge users on the other side — to attract users on one side. Successful platforms tend to grow because of network effects. While traditional antitrust would have viewed conduct by “dominant” entities stringently, recent antitrust enforcement has considered the economics behind such platforms and netted the harm to one side against the benefits to the other side when evaluating conduct. We explore whether this stylised view of the economics of platform markets has come at the expense of effects-based analysis of alleged anti-competitive conduct. Specifically, we analyse the Amex vs. Ohio case which dealt with whether anti-steering provisions instituted by credit card companies are anti-competitive. The US Supreme Court evaluated the anti-steering provisions in the context of a two-sided platform and ruled that Amex charged merchants higher fees to provide a more robust rewards program to its cardholders and “evidence of price increases on one side of a two-sided platform cannot be construed as an anticompetitive exercise of market power.” Effects-based analysis of Amex’s conduct would reveal that its outcome is the stifling of competition in terms of fees charged between credit card networks for usage by merchants. We contend that the US Supreme Court’s decision was akin to a template-based application of economic theory.","PeriodicalId":68002,"journal":{"name":"竞争法律与政策评论","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86689090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}