2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)最新文献

{"title":"Journey to the Center of the Cookie Ecosystem: Unraveling Actors' Roles and Relationships","authors":"Iskander Sánchez-Rola, Matteo Dell'Amico, D. Balzarotti, Pierre-Antoine Vervier, Leyla Bilge","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.9796062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.9796062","url":null,"abstract":"Web pages have been steadily increasing in complexity over time, including code snippets from several distinct origins and organizations. While this may be a known phenomenon, its implications on the panorama of cookie tracking received little attention until now. Our study focuses on filling this gap, through the analysis of crawl results that are both large-scale and fine-grained, encompassing the whole set of events that lead to the creation and sharing of around 138 million cookies from crawling more than 6 million webpages. Our analysis lets us paint a highly detailed picture of the cookie ecosystem, discovering an intricate network of connections between players that reciprocally exchange information and include each other's content in web pages whose owners may not even be aware. We discover that, in most webpages, tracking cookies are set and shared by organizations at the end of complex chains that involve several middlemen. We also study the impact of cookie ghostwriting, i.e., a common practice where an entity creates cookies in the name of another party, or the webpage. We attribute and define a set of roles in the cookie ecosystem, related to cookie creation and sharing. We see that organizations can and do follow different patterns, including behaviors that previous studies could not uncover: for example, many cookie ghostwriters send cookies they create to themselves, which makes them able to perform cross-site tracking even for users that deleted third-party cookies in their browsers. While some organizations concentrate the flow of information on themselves, others behave as dispatchers, allowing other organizations to perform tracking on the pages that include their content.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"223 1","pages":"1990-2004"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85556746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CanDID: Can-Do Decentralized Identity with Legacy Compatibility, Sybil-Resistance, and Accountability","authors":"Deepak Maram, Harjasleen Malvai, Fan Zhang, Nerla Jean-Louis, Alexander Frolov, T. Kell, Tyrone Lobban, Christine Moy, A. Juels, Andrew K. Miller, ‡UIUC, §J, P. Morgan","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00038","url":null,"abstract":"We present CanDID, a platform for practical, user-friendly realization of decentralized identity, the idea of empowering end users with management of their own credentials.While decentralized identity promises to give users greater control over their private data, it burdens users with management of private keys, creating a significant risk of key loss. Existing and proposed approaches also presume the spontaneous availability of a credential-issuance ecosystem, creating a bootstrapping problem. They also omit essential functionality, like resistance to Sybil attacks and the ability to detect misbehaving or sanctioned users while preserving user privacy.CanDID addresses these challenges by issuing credentials in a user-friendly way that draws securely and privately on data from existing, unmodified web service providers. Such legacy compatibility similarly enables CanDID users to leverage their existing online accounts for recovery of lost keys. Using a decentralized committee of nodes, CanDID provides strong confidentiality for user’s keys, real-world identities, and data, yet prevents users from spawning multiple identities and allows identification (and blacklisting) of sanctioned users.We present the CanDID architecture and report on experiments demonstrating its practical performance.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"257 1","pages":"1348-1366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79554038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Co-Inflow: Coarse-grained Information Flow Control for Java-like Languages","authors":"Jian Xiang, Stephen Chong","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00002","url":null,"abstract":"Coarse-grained dynamic information-flow control (IFC) is a good match for imperative object-oriented programming languages such as Java. Java language abstractions align well with coarse-grained IFC concepts, and so Java can be cleanly extended with coarse-grained dynamic IFC without requiring significantly different design patterns or excessive security annotations, and without excessive performance overhead.We present Co-Inflow: an extension of Java with coarse-grained dynamic IFC. By careful design choices and defaults, a programmer typically needs to add very few annotations to a Java program to convert it to a Co-Inflow program with relatively good precision. Additional annotations can improve precision. We achieve this tradeoff between precision and annotation burden by instantiating and specializing recent advances in coarse-grained IFC for a Java-like setting, and by using opaque labeled values: a restriction of labeled values that the Co-Inflow runtime automatically and securely creates and uses.We have captured the essence of Co-Inflow in a middle-weight imperative calculus, and proven that it provides a termination- insensitive non-interference security guarantee. We have a prototype implementation of Co-Inflow and use it to evaluate the precision, usability, and potential performance of Co-Inflow.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"23 1","pages":"18-35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78135623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A2L: Anonymous Atomic Locks for Scalability in Payment Channel Hubs","authors":"Erkan Tairi, Pedro A. Moreno-Sánchez, Matteo Maffei","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00111","url":null,"abstract":"Payment channel hubs (PCHs) constitute a promising solution to the inherent scalability problem of blockchain technologies, allowing for off-chain payments between sender and receiver through an intermediary, called the tumbler. While state-of-the-art PCHs provide security and privacy guarantees against a malicious tumbler, they do so by relying on the scripting-based functionality available only at few cryptocurrencies, and they thus fall short of fundamental properties such as backwards compatibility and efficiency.In this work, we present the first PCH protocol to achieve all aforementioned properties. Our PCH builds upon A2L, a novel cryptographic primitive that realizes a three-party protocol for conditional transactions, where the tumbler pays the receiver only if the latter solves a cryptographic challenge with the help of the sender, which implies the sender has paid the tumbler. We prove the security and privacy guarantees of A2L (which carry over to our PCH construction) in the Universal Composability framework and present a provably secure instantiation based on adaptor signatures and randomizable puzzles. We implemented A2L and compared it to TumbleBit, the state-of-the-art Bitcoin-compatible PCH. Asymptotically, A2L has a communication complexity that is constant, as opposed to linear in the security parameter like in TumbleBit. In practice, A2L requires ~33x less bandwidth than TumleBit, while retaining the computational cost (or providing 2x speedup with a preprocessing technique). This demonstrates that A2L (and thus our PCH construction) is ready to be deployed today.In theory, we demonstrate for the first time that it is possible to design a secure and privacy-preserving PCH while requiring only digital signatures and timelock functionality from the underlying scripting language. In practice, this result makes our PCH backwards compatible with virtually all cryptocurrencies available today, even those offering a highly restricted form of scripting language such as Ripple or Stellar. The practical appealing of our construction has resulted in a proof-of-concept implementation in the COMIT Network, a blockchain technology focused on cross-currency payments.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"25 1","pages":"1834-1851"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72641766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"OSPREY: Recovery of Variable and Data Structure via Probabilistic Analysis for Stripped Binary","authors":"Zhuo Zhang, Yapeng Ye, Wei You, Guanhong Tao, Wen-Chuan Lee, Yonghwi Kwon, Yousra Aafer, X. Zhang","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00051","url":null,"abstract":"Recovering variables and data structure information from stripped binary is a prominent challenge in binary program analysis. While various state-of-the-art techniques are effective in specific settings, such effectiveness may not generalize. This is mainly because the problem is inherently uncertain due to the information loss in compilation. Most existing techniques are deterministic and lack a systematic way of handling such uncertainty. We propose a novel probabilistic technique for variable and structure recovery. Random variables are introduced to denote the likelihood of an abstract memory location having various types and structural properties such as being a field of some data structure. These random variables are connected through probabilistic constraints derived through program analysis. Solving these constraints produces the posterior probabilities of the random variables, which essentially denote the recovery results. Our experiments show that our technique substantially outperforms a number of state-of-the-art systems, including IDA, Ghidra, Angr, and Howard. Our case studies demonstrate the recovered information improves binary code hardening and binary decompilation.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"15 1","pages":"813-832"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75477393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"StochFuzz: Sound and Cost-effective Fuzzing of Stripped Binaries by Incremental and Stochastic Rewriting","authors":"Zhuo Zhang, Wei You, Guanhong Tao, Yousra Aafer, Xuwei Liu, X. Zhang","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00109","url":null,"abstract":"Fuzzing stripped binaries poses many hard challenges as fuzzers require instrumenting binaries to collect runtime feedback for guiding input mutation. However, due to the lack of symbol information, correct instrumentation is difficult on stripped binaries. Existing techniques either rely on hardware and expensive dynamic binary translation engines such as QEMU, or make impractical assumptions such as binaries do not have inlined data. We observe that fuzzing is a highly repetitive procedure providing a large number of trial-and-error opportunities. As such, we propose a novel incremental and stochastic rewriting technique StochFuzz that piggy-backs on the fuzzing procedure. It generates many different versions of rewritten binaries whose validity can be approved/disapproved by numerous fuzzing runs. Probabilistic analysis is used to aggregate evidence collected through the sample runs and improve rewriting. The process eventually converges on a correctly rewritten binary. We evaluate StochFuzz on two sets of real-world programs and compare with five other baselines. The results show that StochFuzz outperforms state-of-the-art binary-only fuzzers (e.g., e9patch, ddisasm, and RetroWrite) in terms of soundness and cost-effectiveness and achieves performance comparable to source-based fuzzers. StochFuzz is publicly available [1].","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"6 1","pages":"659-676"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87408085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"SoK: Security and Privacy in the Age of Commercial Drones","authors":"Ben Nassi, Ron Bitton, R. Masuoka, A. Shabtai, Y. Elovici","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00005","url":null,"abstract":"As the number of drones increases and the era in which they begin to fill the skies approaches, an important question needs to be answered: From a security and privacy perspective, are society and drones really prepared to handle the challenges that a large volume of flights will create? In this paper, we investigate security and privacy in the age of commercial drones. First, we focus on the research question: Are drones and their ecosystems protected against attacks performed by malicious entities? We list a drone’s targets, present a methodology for reviewing attack and countermeasure methods, perform a comprehensive review, analyze scientific gaps, present conclusions, and discuss future research directions. Then, we focus on the research question: Is society protected against attacks conducted using drones? We list targets within society, profile the adversaries, review threats, present a methodology for reviewing countermeasures, perform a comprehensive review, analyze scientific gaps, present conclusions, and discuss future research directions. Finally, we focus on the primary research question: From the security and privacy perspective, are society and drones prepared to take their relationship one step further? Our analysis reveals that the technological means required to protect drones and society from one another has not yet been developed, and there is a tradeoff between the security and privacy of drones and that of society. That is, the level of security and privacy cannot be optimized concurrently for both entities, because the security and privacy of drones cannot be optimized without decreasing the security and privacy of society, and vice versa.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"C-30 1","pages":"1434-1451"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84441815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Provable Security of Ed25519: Theory and Practice","authors":"Jacqueline Brendel, C. Cremers, Dennis Jackson, Mang Zhao","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00042","url":null,"abstract":"A standard requirement for a signature scheme is that it is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA), alongside other properties of interest such as strong unforgeability (SUF-CMA), and resilience against key substitution attacks.Remarkably, no detailed proofs have ever been given for these security properties for EdDSA, and in particular its Ed25519 instantiations. Ed25519 is one of the most efficient and widely used signature schemes, and different instantiations of Ed25519 are used in protocols such as TLS 1.3, SSH, Tor, ZCash, and WhatsApp/Signal. The differences between these instantiations are subtle, and only supported by informal arguments, with many works assuming results can be directly transferred from Schnorr signatures. Similarly, several proofs of protocol security simply assume that Ed25519 satisfies properties such as EUF-CMA or SUF-CMA.In this work we provide the first detailed analysis and security proofs of Ed25519 signature schemes. While the design of the schemes follows the well-established Fiat-Shamir paradigm, which should guarantee existential unforgeability, there are many side cases and encoding details that complicate the proofs, and all other security properties needed to be proven independently.Our work provides scientific rationale for choosing among several Ed25519 variants and understanding their properties, fills a much needed proof gap in modern protocol proofs that use these signatures, and supports further standardisation efforts.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"19 1","pages":"1659-1676"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83960589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wolverine: Fast, Scalable, and Communication-Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Boolean and Arithmetic Circuits","authors":"Chenkai Weng, Kang Yang, Jonathan Katz, X. Wang","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00056","url":null,"abstract":"Efficient zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs for arbitrary boolean or arithmetic circuits have recently attracted much attention. Existing solutions suffer from either significant prover overhead (i.e., high memory usage) or relatively high communication complexity (at least κ bits per gate, for computational security parameter κ). In this paper, we propose a new protocol for constant-round interactive ZK proofs that simultaneously allows for an efficient prover with asymptotically optimal memory usage and significantly lower communication compared to protocols with similar memory efficiency. Specifically:•The prover in our ZK protocol has linear running time and, perhaps more importantly, memory usage linear in the memory needed to evaluate the circuit non-cryptographically. This allows our proof system to scale easily to very large circuits.•for statistical security parameter ρ = 40, our ZK protocol communicates roughly 9 bits/gate for boolean circuits and 2–4 field elements/gate for arithmetic circuits over large fields.Using 5 threads, 400 MB of memory, and a 200 Mbps network to evaluate a circuit with hundreds of billions of gates, our implementation (ρ = 40, κ = 128) runs at a rate of 0.45 μs/gate in the boolean case, and 1.6 μs/gate for an arithmetic circuit over a 61-bit field.We also present an improved subfield Vector Oblivious Linear Evaluation (sVOLE) protocol with malicious security that is of independent interest.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"8 11 1","pages":"1074-1091"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88307049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CrossTalk: Speculative Data Leaks Across Cores Are Real","authors":"Hany Ragab, Alyssa Milburn, Kaveh Razavi, H. Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00020","url":null,"abstract":"Recent transient execution attacks have demonstrated that attackers may leak sensitive information across security boundaries on a shared CPU core. Up until now, it seemed possible to prevent this by isolating potential victims and attackers on separate cores. In this paper, we show that the situation is more serious, as transient execution attacks can leak data across different cores on many modern Intel CPUs.We do so by investigating the behavior of x86 instructions, and in particular, we focus on complex microcoded instructions which perform offcore requests. Combined with transient execution vulnerabilities such as Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS), these operations can reveal internal CPU state. Using performance counters, we build a profiler, CROSSTALK, to examine the number and nature of such operations for many x86 instructions, and find that some instructions read data from a staging buffer which is shared between all CPU cores.To demonstrate the security impact of this behavior, we present the first cross-core attack using transient execution, showing that even the seemingly-innocuous CPUID instruction can be used by attackers to sample the entire staging buffer containing sensitive data – most importantly, output from the hardware random number generator (RNG) – across cores. We show that this can be exploited in practice to attack SGX enclaves running on a completely different core, where an attacker can control leakage using practical performance degradation attacks, and demonstrate that we can successfully determine enclave private keys. Since existing mitigations which rely on spatial or temporal partitioning are largely ineffective to prevent our proposed attack, we also discuss potential new mitigation techniques.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"9 1","pages":"1852-1867"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88988556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}