2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)最新文献

{"title":"Comparing the Usability of Cryptographic APIs","authors":"Y. Acar, M. Backes, S. Fahl, S. Garfinkel, Doowon Kim, Michelle L. Mazurek, Christian Stransky","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.52","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.52","url":null,"abstract":"Potentially dangerous cryptography errors are well-documented in many applications. Conventional wisdom suggests that many of these errors are caused by cryptographic Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that are too complicated, have insecure defaults, or are poorly documented. To address this problem, researchers have created several cryptographic libraries that they claim are more usable, however, none of these libraries have been empirically evaluated for their ability to promote more secure development. This paper is the first to examine both how and why the design and resulting usability of different cryptographic libraries affects the security of code written with them, with the goal of understanding how to build effective future libraries. We conducted a controlled experiment in which 256 Python developers recruited from GitHub attempt common tasks involving symmetric and asymmetric cryptography using one of five different APIs. We examine their resulting code for functional correctness and security, and compare their results to their self-reported sentiment about their assigned library. Our results suggest that while APIs designed for simplicity can provide security benefits – reducing the decision space, as expected, prevents choice of insecure parameters – simplicity is not enough. Poor documentation, missing code examples, and a lack of auxiliary features such as secure key storage, caused even participants assigned to simplified libraries to struggle with both basic functional correctness and security. Surprisingly, the availability of comprehensive documentation and easy-to-use code examples seems to compensate for more complicated APIs in terms of functionally correct results and participant reactions, however, this did not extend to security results. We find it particularly concerning that for about 20% of functionally correct tasks, across libraries, participants believed their code was secure when it was not. Our results suggest that while new cryptographic libraries that want to promote effective security should offer a simple, convenient interface, this is not enough: they should also, and perhaps more importantly, ensure support for a broad range of common tasks and provide accessible documentation with secure, easy-to-use code examples.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"136 1","pages":"154-171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77456930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Securing Augmented Reality Output","authors":"Kiron Lebeck, Kimberly Ruth, Tadayoshi Kohno, Franziska Roesner","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.13","url":null,"abstract":"Augmented reality (AR) technologies, such as Microsoft's HoloLens head-mounted display and AR-enabled car windshields, are rapidly emerging. AR applications provide users with immersive virtual experiences by capturing input from a user's surroundings and overlaying virtual output on the user's perception of the real world. These applications enable users to interact with and perceive virtual content in fundamentally new ways. However, the immersive nature of AR applications raises serious security and privacy concerns. Prior work has focused primarily on input privacy risks stemming from applications with unrestricted access to sensor data. However, the risks associated with malicious or buggy AR output remain largely unexplored. For example, an AR windshield application could intentionally or accidentally obscure oncoming vehicles or safety-critical output of other AR applications. In this work, we address the fundamental challenge of securing AR output in the face of malicious or buggy applications. We design, prototype, and evaluate Arya, an AR platform that controls application output according to policies specified in a constrained yet expressive policy framework. In doing so, we identify and overcome numerous challenges in securing AR output.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"17 1","pages":"320-337"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81100742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Finding and Preventing Bugs in JavaScript Bindings","authors":"Fraser Brown, Shravan Narayan, R. Wahby, D. Engler, Ranjit Jhala, D. Stefan","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.68","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.68","url":null,"abstract":"JavaScript, like many high-level languages, relies on runtime systemswritten in low-level C and C++. For example, the Node.js runtime systemgives JavaScript code access to the underlying filesystem, networking, and I/O by implementing utility functions in C++. Since C++'s typesystem, memory model, and execution model differ significantly fromJavaScript's, JavaScript code must call these runtime functions viaintermediate binding layer code that translates type, state, and failure between the two languages. Unfortunately, binding code isboth hard to avoid and hard to get right. This paper describes several types of exploitable errors that bindingcode creates, and develops both a suite of easily-to-build static checkersto detect such errors and a backwards-compatible, low-overhead API toprevent them. We show that binding flaws are a serious security problem byusing our checkers to craft 81 proof-of-concept exploits forsecurity flaws in the binding layers of the Node.js and Chrome, runtimesystems that support hundreds of millions of users. As one practical measure of binding bug severity, we were awarded $6,000 in bounties for just two Chrome bug reports.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"24 1","pages":"559-578"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86599731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Implementing and Proving the TLS 1.3 Record Layer","authors":"K. Bhargavan, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, C. Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, J. Pan, Jonathan Protzenko, Aseem Rastogi, N. Swamy, Santiago Zanella Béguelin, J. Zinzindohoué","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.58","url":null,"abstract":"The record layer is the main bridge between TLS applications and internal sub-protocols. Its core functionality is an elaborate form of authenticated encryption: streams of messages for each sub-protocol (handshake, alert, and application data) are fragmented, multiplexed, and encrypted with optional padding to hide their lengths. Conversely, the sub-protocols may provide fresh keys or signal stream termination to the record layer. Compared to prior versions, TLS 1.3 discards obsolete schemes in favor of a common construction for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), instantiated with algorithms such as AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305. It differs from TLS 1.2 in its use of padding, associated data and nonces. It also encrypts the content-type used to multiplex between sub-protocols. New protocol features such as early application data (0-RTT and 0.5-RTT) and late handshake messages require additional keys and a more general model of stateful encryption. We build and verify a reference implementation of the TLS record layer and its cryptographic algorithms in F*, a dependently typed language where security and functional guarantees can be specified as pre-and post-conditions. We reduce the high-level security of the record layer to cryptographic assumptions on its ciphers. Each step in the reduction is verified by typing an F* module, for each step that involves a cryptographic assumption, this module precisely captures the corresponding game. We first verify the functional correctness and injectivity properties of our implementations of one-time MAC algorithms (Poly1305 and GHASH) and provide a generic proof of their security given these two properties. We show the security of a generic AEAD construction built from any secure one-time MAC and PRF. We extend AEAD, first to stream encryption, then to length-hiding, multiplexed encryption. Finally, we build a security model of the record layer against an adversary that controls the TLS sub-protocols. We compute concrete security bounds for the AES_128_GCM, AES_256_GCM, and CHACHA20_POLY1305 ciphersuites, and derive recommended limits on sent data before re-keying. We plug our implementation of the record layer into the miTLS library, confirm that they interoperate with Chrome and Firefox, and report initial performance results. Combining our functional correctness, security, and experimental results, we conclude that the new TLS record layer (as described in RFCs and cryptographic standards) is provably secure, and we provide its first verified implementation.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"49 1","pages":"463-482"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84836657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate","authors":"K. Bhargavan, B. Blanchet, Nadim Kobeissi","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.26","url":null,"abstract":"TLS 1.3 is the next version of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Its clean-slate design is a reaction both to the increasing demand for low-latency HTTPS connections and to a series of recent high-profile attacks on TLS. The hope is that a fresh protocol with modern cryptography will prevent legacy problems, the danger is that it will expose new kinds of attacks, or reintroduce old flaws that were fixed in previous versions of TLS. After 18 drafts, the protocol is nearing completion, and the working group has appealed to researchers to analyze the protocol before publication. This paper responds by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the TLS 1.3 Draft-18 protocol. We seek to answer three questions that have not been fully addressed in previous work on TLS 1.3: (1) Does TLS 1.3 prevent well-known attacks on TLS 1.2, such as Logjam or the Triple Handshake, even if it is run in parallel with TLS 1.2? (2) Can we mechanically verify the computational security of TLS 1.3 under standard (strong) assumptions on its cryptographic primitives? (3) How can we extend the guarantees of the TLS 1.3 protocol to the details of its implementations?To answer these questions, we propose a methodology for developing verified symbolic and computational models of TLS 1.3 hand-in-hand with a high-assurance reference implementation of the protocol. We present symbolic ProVerif models for various intermediate versions of TLS 1.3 and evaluate them against a rich class of attacks to reconstruct both known and previously unpublished vulnerabilities that influenced the current design of the protocol. We present a computational CryptoVerif model for TLS 1.3 Draft-18 and prove its security. We present RefTLS, an interoperable implementation of TLS 1.0-1.3 and automatically analyze its protocol core by extracting a ProVerif model from its typed JavaScript code.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"83 1","pages":"483-502"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90890348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Password Reset MitM Attack","authors":"Nethanel Gelernter, Senia Kalma, Bar Magnezi, Hen Porcilan","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.9","url":null,"abstract":"We present the password reset MitM (PRMitM) attack and show how it can be used to take over user accounts. The PRMitM attack exploits the similarity of the registration and password reset processes to launch a man in the middle (MitM) attack at the application level. The attacker initiates a password reset process with a website and forwards every challenge to the victim who either wishes to register in the attacking site or to access a particular resource on it. The attack has several variants, including exploitation of a password reset process that relies on the victim's mobile phone, using either SMS or phone call. We evaluated the PRMitM attacks on Google and Facebook users in several experiments, and found that their password reset process is vulnerable to the PRMitM attack. Other websites and some popular mobile applications are vulnerable as well. Although solutions seem trivial in some cases, our experiments show that the straightforward solutions are not as effective as expected. We designed and evaluated two secure password reset processes and evaluated them on users of Google and Facebook. Our results indicate a significant improvement in the security. Since millions of accounts are currently vulnerable to the PRMitM attack, we also present a list of recommendations for implementing and auditing the password reset process.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"61 1","pages":"251-267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78133031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How They Did It: An Analysis of Emission Defeat Devices in Modern Automobiles","authors":"Moritz Contag, Vector Guo Li, Andre Pawlowski, Felix Domke, Kirill Levchenko, Thorsten Holz, S. Savage","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.66","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.66","url":null,"abstract":"Modern vehicles are required to comply with a range of environmental regulations limiting the level of emissions for various greenhouse gases, toxins and particulate matter. To ensure compliance, regulators test vehicles in controlled settings and empirically measure their emissions at the tailpipe. However, the black box nature of this testing and the standardization of its forms have created an opportunity for evasion. Using modern electronic engine controllers, manufacturers can programmatically infer when a car is undergoing an emission test and alter the behavior of the vehicle to comply with emission standards, while exceeding them during normal driving in favor of improved performance. While the use of such a defeat device by Volkswagen has brought the issue of emissions cheating to the public's attention, there have been few details about the precise nature of the defeat device, how it came to be, and its effect on vehicle behavior. In this paper, we present our analysis of two families of software defeat devices for diesel engines: one used by the Volkswagen Group to pass emissions tests in the US and Europe, and a second that we have found in Fiat Chrysler Automobiles. To carry out this analysis, we developed new static analysis firmware forensics techniques necessary to automatically identify known defeat devices and confirm their function. We tested about 900 firmware images and were able to detect a potential defeat device in more than 400 firmware images spanning eight years. We describe the precise conditions used by the firmware to detect a test cycle and how it affects engine behavior. This work frames the technical challenges faced by regulators going forward and highlights the important research agenda in providing focused software assurance in the presence of adversarial manufacturers.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"40 1","pages":"231-250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78448502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cryptographic Function Detection in Obfuscated Binaries via Bit-Precise Symbolic Loop Mapping","authors":"Dongpeng Xu, Jiang Ming, Dinghao Wu","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.56","url":null,"abstract":"Cryptographic functions have been commonly abused by malware developers to hide malicious behaviors, disguise destructive payloads, and bypass network-based firewalls. Now-infamous crypto-ransomware even encrypts victim's computer documents until a ransom is paid. Therefore, detecting cryptographic functions in binary code is an appealing approach to complement existing malware defense and forensics. However, pervasive control and data obfuscation schemes make cryptographic function identification a challenging work. Existing detection methods are either brittle to work on obfuscated binaries or ad hoc in that they can only identify specific cryptographic functions. In this paper, we propose a novel technique called bit-precise symbolic loop mapping to identify cryptographic functions in obfuscated binary code. Our trace-based approach captures the semantics of possible cryptographic algorithms with bit-precise symbolic execution in a loop. Then we perform guided fuzzing to efficiently match boolean formulas with known reference implementations. We have developed a prototype called CryptoHunt and evaluated it with a set of obfuscated synthetic examples, well-known cryptographic libraries, and malware. Compared with the existing tools, CryptoHunt is a general approach to detecting commonly used cryptographic functions such as TEA, AES, RC4, MD5, and RSA under different control and data obfuscation scheme combinations.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"111 1","pages":"921-937"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83904925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How to Learn Klingon without a Dictionary: Detection and Measurement of Black Keywords Used by the Underground Economy","authors":"Hao Yang, Xiulin Ma, Kun Du, Zhou Li, Haixin Duan, XiaoDong Su, Guang Liu, Zhifeng Geng, Jianping Wu","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.11","url":null,"abstract":"Online underground economy is an important channel that connects the merchants of illegal products and their buyers, which is also constantly monitored by legal authorities. As one common way for evasion, the merchants and buyers together create a vocabulary of jargons (called \"black keywords\" in this paper) to disguise the transaction (e.g., \"smack\" is one street name for \"heroin\" [1]). Black keywords are often \"unfriendly\" to the outsiders, which are created by either distorting the original meaning of common words or tweaking other black keywords. Understanding black keywords is of great importance to track and disrupt the underground economy, but it is also prohibitively difficult: the investigators have to infiltrate the inner circle of criminals to learn their meanings, a task both risky and time-consuming. In this paper, we make the first attempt towards capturing and understanding the ever-changing black keywords. We investigated the underground business promoted through blackhat SEO (search engine optimization) and demonstrate that the black keywords targeted by the SEOers can be discovered through a fully automated approach. Our insights are two-fold: first, the pages indexed under black keywords are more likely to contain malicious or fraudulent content (e.g., SEO pages) and alarmed by off-the-shelf detectors, second, people tend to query multiple similar black keywords to find the merchandise. Therefore, we could infer whether a search keyword is \"black\" by inspecting the associated search results and then use the related search queries to extend our findings. To this end, we built a system called KDES (Keywords Detection and Expansion System), and applied it to the search results of Baidu, China's top search engine. So far, we have already identified 478,879 black keywords which were clustered under 1,522 core words based on text similarity. We further extracted the information like emails, mobile phone numbers and instant messenger IDs from the pages and domains relevant to the underground business. Such information helps us gain better understanding about the underground economy of China in particular. In addition, our work could help search engine vendors purify the search results and disrupt the channel of the underground market. Our co-authors from Baidu compared our results with their blacklist, found many of them (e.g., long-tail and obfuscated keywords) were not in it, and then added them to Baidu's internal blacklist.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"14 1","pages":"751-769"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82279652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"IKP: Turning a PKI Around with Decentralized Automated Incentives","authors":"S. Matsumoto, Raphael M. Reischuk","doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.57","url":null,"abstract":"Despite a great deal of work to improve the TLS PKI, CA misbehavior continues to occur, resulting in unauthorized certificates that can be used to mount man-in-the-middle attacks against HTTPS sites. CAs lack the incentives to invest in higher security, and the manual effort required to report a rogue certificate deters many from contributing to the security of the TLS PKI. In this paper, we present IKP, a platform that automates responses to unauthorized certificates and provides incentives for CAs to behave correctly and for others to report potentially unauthorized certificates. Domains in IKP specify criteria for their certificates, and CAs specify reactions such as financial penalties that execute in case of unauthorized certificate issuance. By leveraging smart contracts and blockchain-based consensus, we can decentralize IKP while still providing automated incentives. We describe a theoretical model for payment flows and implement IKP in Ethereum to show that decentralizing and automating PKIs with financial incentives is both economically sound and technically viable.","PeriodicalId":6502,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"10 1","pages":"410-426"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81496049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}