2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)最新文献

Seeing-is-believing: using camera phones for human-verifiable authentication 眼见为实:使用照相手机进行人类可验证的身份验证

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1504/IJSN.2009.023425

Jonathan M. McCune, A. Perrig, M. Reiter

引用次数: 559

Worm origin identification using random moonwalks 利用随机月球漫步识别蠕虫起源

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.23

Yinglian Xie, V. Sekar, D. Maltz, M. Reiter, Hui Zhang

引用次数: 120

BIND: a fine-grained attestation service for secure distributed systems BIND:用于安全分布式系统的细粒度认证服务

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.4

E. Shi, A. Perrig, L. V. Doorn

{"title":"BIND: a fine-grained attestation service for secure distributed systems","authors":"E. Shi, A. Perrig, L. V. Doorn","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.4","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we propose BIND (binding instructions and data), a fine-grained attestation service for securing distributed systems. Code attestation has recently received considerable attention in trusted computing. However, current code attestation technology is relatively immature. First, due to the great variability in software versions and configurations, verification of the hash is difficult. Second, the time-of-use and time-of-attestation discrepancy remains to be addressed, since the code may be correct at the time of the attestation, but it may be compromised by the time of use. The goal of BIND is to address these issues and make code attestation more usable in securing distributed systems. BIND offers the following properties: (1) BIND performs fine-grained attestation. Instead of attesting to the entire memory content, BIND attests only to the piece of code we are concerned about. This greatly simplifies verification. (2) BIND narrows the gap between time-of-attestation and time-of-use. BIND measures a piece of code immediately before it is executed and uses a sandboxing mechanism to protect the execution of the attested code. (3) BIND ties the code attestation with the data that the code produces, such that we can pinpoint what code has been run to generate that data. In addition, by incorporating the verification of input data integrity into the attestation, BIND offers transitive integrity verification, i.e., through one signature, we can vouch for the entire chain of processes that have performed transformations over a piece of data. BIND offers a general solution toward establishing a trusted environment for distributed system designers.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76145772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 278

Efficient intrusion detection using automaton inlining 使用自动内联的高效入侵检测

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.1

R. Gopalakrishna, E. Spafford, J. Vitek

{"title":"Efficient intrusion detection using automaton inlining","authors":"R. Gopalakrishna, E. Spafford, J. Vitek","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.1","url":null,"abstract":"Host-based intrusion detection systems attempt to identify attacks by discovering program behaviors that deviate from expected patterns. While the idea of performing behavior validation on-the-fly and terminating errant tasks as soon as a violation is detected is appealing, existing systems exhibit serious shortcomings in terms of accuracy and/or efficiency. To gain acceptance, a number of technical advances are needed. In this paper we focus on automated, conservative, intrusion detection techniques, i.e. techniques which do not require human intervention and do not suffer from false positives. We present a static analysis algorithm for constructing a flow- and context-sensitive model of a program that allows for efficient online validation. Context-sensitivity is essential to reduce the number of impossible control-flow paths accepted by the intrusion detection system because such paths provide opportunities for attackers to evade detection. An important consideration for on-the-fly intrusion detection is to reduce the performance overhead caused by monitoring. Compared to the existing approaches, our inlined automaton model (IAM) presents a good tradeoff between accuracy and performance. On a 32K line program, the monitoring overhead is negligible. While the space requirements of a naive IAM implementation can be quite high, compaction techniques can be employed to substantially reduce that footprint.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81363945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 75

Towards constant bandwidth overhead integrity checking of untrusted data 对不可信数据进行恒定带宽开销的完整性检查

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.24

Dwaine E. Clarke

引用次数: 35

On safety in discretionary access control 论自由访问控制中的安全性

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.14

Ninghui Li, Mahesh V. Tripunitara

引用次数: 47

Language-based generation and evaluation of NIDS signatures 基于语言的入侵入侵特征生成与评估

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.10

Shai Rubin, S. Jha, B. Miller

引用次数: 40

Detection of denial-of-message attacks on sensor network broadcasts 传感器网络广播中拒绝报文攻击的检测

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.7

Jonathan M. McCune, E. Shi, A. Perrig, M. Reiter

{"title":"Detection of denial-of-message attacks on sensor network broadcasts","authors":"Jonathan M. McCune, E. Shi, A. Perrig, M. Reiter","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.7","url":null,"abstract":"So far sensor network broadcast protocols assume a trustworthy environment. However in safety and mission-critical sensor networks this assumption may not be valid and some sensor nodes might be adversarial. In these environments, malicious sensor nodes can deprive other nodes from receiving a broadcast message. We call this attack a denial-of-message attack (DoM). In this paper we model and analyze this attack, and present countermeasures. We present SIS, a secure implicit sampling scheme that permits a broadcasting base station to probabilistically detect the failure of nodes to receive its broadcast, even if these failures result from an attacker motivated to induce these failures undetectably. SIS works by eliciting authenticated acknowledgments from a subset of nodes per broadcast, where the subset is unpredictable to the attacker and tunable so as to mitigate acknowledgment implosion on the base station. We use a game-theoretic approach to evaluate this scheme in the face of an optimal attacker that attempts to maximize the number of nodes it denies the broadcast while remaining undetected by the base station, and show that SIS significantly constrains such an attacker even in sensor networks exhibiting high intrinsic loss rates. We also discuss extensions that permit more targeted detection capabilities.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83234979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 163

Leap-frog packet linking and diverse key distributions for improved integrity in network broadcasts 跨越式数据包链接和不同的密钥分布，以提高网络广播的完整性

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.11

M. Goodrich

{"title":"Leap-frog packet linking and diverse key distributions for improved integrity in network broadcasts","authors":"M. Goodrich","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.11","url":null,"abstract":"We present two new approaches to improving the integrity of network broadcasts and multicasts with low storage and computation overhead. The first approach is a leapfrog linking protocol for securing the integrity of packets as they traverse a network during a broadcast, such as in the setup phase for link-state routing. This technique allows each router to gain confidence about the integrity of a packet before passing it on to the next router; hence, allows many integrity violations to be stopped immediately in their tracks. The second approach is a novel key predistribution scheme that we use in conjunction with a small number of hashed message authentication codes (HMAC), which allows end-to-end integrity checking as well as improved hop-by-hop integrity checking. Our schemes are suited to environments, such as in ad hoc and overlay networks, where routers can share only a small number of symmetric keys. Moreover, our protocols do not use encryption (which, of course, can be added as an optional security enhancement). Instead, security is based strictly on the use of one-way hash functions; hence, our algorithms are considerably faster than those based on traditional public-key signature schemes. This improvement in speed comes with only modest reductions in the security for broadcasting, as our schemes can tolerate small numbers of malicious routers, provided they do not form significant cooperating coalitions.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89121522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 20

Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor Tor的低成本流量分析

2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05) Pub Date : 2005-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/SP.2005.12

S. Murdoch, G. Danezis

{"title":"Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor","authors":"S. Murdoch, G. Danezis","doi":"10.1109/SP.2005.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2005.12","url":null,"abstract":"Tor is the second generation onion router supporting the anonymous transport of TCP streams over the Internet. Its low latency makes it very suitable for common tasks, such as Web browsing, but insecure against traffic-analysis attacks by a global passive adversary. We present new traffic-analysis techniques that allow adversaries with only a partial view of the network to infer which nodes are being used to relay the anonymous streams and therefore greatly reduce the anonymity provided by Tor. Furthermore, we show that otherwise unrelated streams can be linked back to the same initiator Our attack is feasible for the adversary anticipated by the Tor designers. Our theoretical attacks are backed up by experiments performed on the deployed, albeit experimental, Tor network. Our techniques should also be applicable to any low latency anonymous network. These attacks highlight the relationship between the field of traffic-analysis and more traditional computer security issues, such as covert channel analysis. Our research also highlights that the inability to directly observe network links does not prevent an attacker from performing traffic-analysis: the adversary can use the anonymising network as an oracle to infer the traffic load on remote nodes in order to perform traffic-analysis.","PeriodicalId":6366,"journal":{"name":"2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'05)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89273800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 649