ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security最新文献_第8页

Assessing Cyber Risk in Cyber-Physical Systems Using the ATT&CK Framework 使用ATT&CK框架评估网络物理系统中的网络风险

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-21 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3571733

Ahmed Amro, Vasileios Gkioulos, Sokratis Katsikas

{"title":"Assessing Cyber Risk in Cyber-Physical Systems Using the ATT&CK Framework","authors":"Ahmed Amro, Vasileios Gkioulos, Sokratis Katsikas","doi":"https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3571733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3571733","url":null,"abstract":"Autonomous transport receives increasing attention, with research and development activities already providing prototype implementations. In this article we focus on Autonomous Passenger Ships (APS), which are being considered as a solution for passenger transport across urban waterways. The ambition of the authors has been to examine the safety and security implications of such a Cyber Physical System (CPS), particularly focusing on threats that endanger the passengers and the operational environment of the APS. Accordingly, the article presentsa new risk assessment approach based on a Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) that is enriched with selected semantics and components of the MITRE ATT&ACK framework, in order to utilize the encoded common knowledge and facilitate the expression of attacks. Then, the proposed approach is demonstrated through conducting a risk assessment for a communication architecture tailored to the requirements of APSs that were proposed in earlier work. Moreover, we propose a group of graph theory-based metrics for estimating the impact of the identified risks. The use of this method has resulted in the identification of risks and their corresponding countermeasures, in addition to identifying risks with limited existing mitigation mechanisms. The benefits of the proposed approach are the comprehensive, atomic, and descriptive nature of the identified threats, which reduce the need for expert judgment, and the granular impact estimation metrics that reduce the impact of bias. All these features are provided in a semi-automated approach the reduce the required effort and collectively are argued to enrich the design-level risk assessment processes with an updatable industry threat model standard, namely ATT&ACK.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Assessing Cyber Risk in Cyber-Physical Systems Using the ATT&CK Framework 使用ATT&CK框架评估网络物理系统中的网络风险

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-21 DOI: 10.1145/3571733

Ahmed Amro, V. Gkioulos, S. Katsikas

{"title":"Assessing Cyber Risk in Cyber-Physical Systems Using the ATT&CK Framework","authors":"Ahmed Amro, V. Gkioulos, S. Katsikas","doi":"10.1145/3571733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3571733","url":null,"abstract":"Autonomous transport is receiving increasing attention, with research and development activities already providing prototype implementations. In this article we focus on Autonomous Passenger Ships (APS), which are being considered as a solution for passenger transport across urban waterways. The ambition of the authors has been to examine the safety and security implications of such a Cyber Physical System (CPS), particularly focusing on threats that endanger the passengers and the operational environment of the APS. Accordingly, the article presents a new risk assessment approach based on a Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) that is enriched with selected semantics and components of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, in order to utilize the encoded common knowledge and facilitate the expression of attacks. Then, the proposed approach is demonstrated through conducting a risk assessment for a communication architecture tailored to the requirements of APSs that were proposed in earlier work. Moreover, we propose a group of graph theory-based metrics for estimating the impact of the identified risks. The use of this method has resulted in the identification of risks and their corresponding countermeasures, in addition to identifying risks with limited existing mitigation mechanisms. The benefits of the proposed approach are the comprehensive, atomic, and descriptive nature of the identified threats, which reduce the need for expert judgment, and the granular impact estimation metrics that reduce the impact of bias. All these features are provided in a semi-automated approach to reduce the required effort and collectively are argued to enrich the design-level risk assessment processes with an updatable industry threat model standard, namely ATT&CK.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":"26 1","pages":"1 - 33"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46585752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Revisiting the Security of Biometric Authentication Systems Against Statistical Attacks 重新审视生物识别认证系统对抗统计攻击的安全性

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-19 DOI: 10.1145/3571743

Sohail Habib, Hassan Khan, A. Hamilton-Wright, U. Hengartner

{"title":"Revisiting the Security of Biometric Authentication Systems Against Statistical Attacks","authors":"Sohail Habib, Hassan Khan, A. Hamilton-Wright, U. Hengartner","doi":"10.1145/3571743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3571743","url":null,"abstract":"The uniqueness of behavioral biometrics (e.g., voice or keystroke patterns) has been challenged by recent works. Statistical attacks have been proposed that infer general population statistics and target behavioral biometrics against a particular victim. We show that despite their success, these approaches require several attempts for successful attacks against different biometrics due to the different nature of overlap in users’ behavior for these biometrics. Furthermore, no mechanism has been proposed to date that detects statistical attacks. In this work, we propose a new hypervolumes-based statistical attack and show that unlike existing methods, it (1) is successful against a variety of biometrics, (2) is successful against more users, and (3) requires fewest attempts for successful attacks. More specifically, across five diverse biometrics, for the first attempt, on average our attack is 18 percentage points more successful than the second best (37% vs. 19%). Similarly, for the fifth attack attempt, on average our attack is 18 percentage points more successful than the second best (67% vs. 49%). We propose and evaluate a mechanism that can detect the more devastating statistical attacks. False rejects in biometric systems are common, and by distinguishing statistical attacks from false rejects, our defense improves usability and security. The evaluation of the proposed detection mechanism shows its ability to detect on average 94% of the tested statistical attacks with an average probability of 3% to detect false rejects as a statistical attack. Given the serious threat posed by statistical attacks to biometrics that are used today (e.g., voice), our work highlights the need for defending against these attacks.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":" ","pages":"1 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48034529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Revisiting the Security of Biometric Authentication Systems Against Statistical Attacks 重新审视生物识别认证系统对抗统计攻击的安全性

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-19 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3571743

Sohail Habib, Hassan Khan, Andrew Hamilton-Wright, Urs Hengartner

{"title":"Revisiting the Security of Biometric Authentication Systems Against Statistical Attacks","authors":"Sohail Habib, Hassan Khan, Andrew Hamilton-Wright, Urs Hengartner","doi":"https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3571743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3571743","url":null,"abstract":"The uniqueness of behavioural biometrics (e.g., voice or keystroke patterns) has been challenged by recent works. Statistical attacks have been proposed that infer general population statistics and target behavioural biometrics against a particular victim. We show that despite their success, these approaches require several attempts for successful attacks against different biometrics due to the different nature of overlap in users’ behaviour for these biometrics. Furthermore, no mechanism has been proposed to date that detects statistical attacks. In this work, we propose a new hypervolumes-based statistical attack and show that unlike existing methods it: 1) is successful against a variety of biometrics; 2) is successful against more users; and 3) requires fewest attempts for successful attacks. More specifically, across five diverse biometrics, for the first attempt, on average our attack is 18 percentage points more successful than the second best (37% vs. 19%). Similarly, for the fifth attack attempt, on average our attack is 18 percentage points more successful than the second best (67% vs. 49%). We propose and evaluate a mechanism that can detect the more devastating statistical attacks. False rejects in biometric systems are common and by distinguishing statistical attacks from false rejects, our defence improves usability and security. The evaluation of the proposed detection mechanism shows its ability to detect on average 94% of the tested statistical attacks with an average probability of 3% to detect false rejects as a statistical attack. Given the serious threat posed by statistical attacks to biometrics that are used today (e.g., voice), our work highlights the need for defending against these attacks.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Assessment Framework for the Identification and Evaluation of Main Features for Distributed Usage Control Solutions 用于识别和评估分布式使用控制解决方案主要特性的评估框架

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-11 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3561511

Gonzalo Gil, Aitor Arnaiz, Mariví Higuero, Francisco Javier Diez

{"title":"Assessment Framework for the Identification and Evaluation of Main Features for Distributed Usage Control Solutions","authors":"Gonzalo Gil, Aitor Arnaiz, Mariví Higuero, Francisco Javier Diez","doi":"https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3561511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3561511","url":null,"abstract":"Data exchange between organizations is becoming an increasingly significant issue due to the great opportunities it presents. However, there is great reluctance to share if data sovereignty is not provided. Providing it calls for not only access control but also usage control implemented in distributed systems. Access control is a research field where there has been a great deal of work, but usage control, especially implemented in distributed systems as Distributed Usage Control (DUC), is a very new field of research that presents great challenges. Moreover, little is known about what challenges must really be faced and how they must be addressed. This is evidenced by the fact that existing research has focused non-specifically on different features of DUC, which are not formalized. Therefore, the path for the development of DUC solutions is unclear and it is difficult to analyze the scope of data sovereignty attained by the wide range of DUC solutions. In this context, this article is based on an initial in-depth analysis of DUC related work. In it, the challenges posed by DUC in terms of data sovereignty and the features that must be provided to address them are identified and analyzed for the first time. Based on these features, an initial DUC framework is proposed to assess in a practical and unified way the extent to which DUC solutions provide data sovereignty. Finally, the assessment framework is applied to compare the scopes of the most widespread DUC solutions and identify their limitations.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Secure and Reliable Network Updates 安全可靠的网络更新

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-09 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3556542

James Lembke, Srivatsan Ravi, Pierre-Louis Roman, Patrick Eugster

{"title":"Secure and Reliable Network Updates","authors":"James Lembke, Srivatsan Ravi, Pierre-Louis Roman, Patrick Eugster","doi":"https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3556542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3556542","url":null,"abstract":"Software-defined wide area networking (SD-WAN) enables dynamic network policy control over a large distributed network via network updates. To be practical, network updates must be consistent (i.e., free of transient errors caused by updates to multiple switches), secure (i.e., only be executed when sent from valid controllers), and reliable (i.e., function despite the presence of faulty or malicious members in the control plane), while imposing only minimal overhead on controllers and switches.We present SERENE: a protocol for <underline>se</underline>cure and <underline>re</underline>liable <underline>ne</underline>twork updates for SD-WAN environments. In short: Consistency is provided through the combination of an update scheduler and a distributed transactional protocol. Security is preserved by authenticating network events and updates, the latter with an adaptive threshold cryptographic scheme. Reliability is provided by replicating the control plane and making it resilient to a dynamic adversary by using a distributed ledger as a controller failure detector. We ensure practicality by providing a mechanism for scalability through the definition of independent network domains and exploiting the parallelism of network updates both within and across domains. We formally define SERENE’s protocol and prove its safety with regards to event-linearizability. Extensive experiments show that SERENE imposes minimal switch burden and scales to large networks running multiple network applications all requiring concurrent network updates, imposing at worst a 16% overhead on short-lived flow completion and negligible overhead on anticipated normal workloads.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Industrial Control Systems Security via Runtime Enforcement 通过运行时强制实现工业控制系统的安全性

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-09 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546579

Ruggero Lanotte, Massimo Merro, Andrei Munteanu

{"title":"Industrial Control Systems Security via Runtime Enforcement","authors":"Ruggero Lanotte, Massimo Merro, Andrei Munteanu","doi":"https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546579","url":null,"abstract":"With the advent of Industry 4.0, industrial facilities and critical infrastructures are transforming into an ecosystem of heterogeneous physical and cyber components, such as programmable logic controllers, increasingly interconnected and therefore exposed to cyber-physical attacks, i.e., security breaches in cyberspace that may adversely affect the physical processes underlying industrial control systems.In this article, we propose a formal approach based on runtime enforcement to ensure specification compliance in networks of controllers, possibly compromised by colluding malware that may locally tamper with actuator commands, sensor readings, and inter-controller communications. Our approach relies on an ad-hoc sub-class of Ligatti et al.’s edit automata to enforce controllers represented in Hennessy and Regan’s Timed Process Language. We define a synthesis algorithm that, given an alphabet 𝒫 of observable actions and a timed correctness property e, returns a monitor that enforces the property e during the execution of any (potentially corrupted) controller with alphabet 𝒫, and complying with the property e. Our monitors do mitigation by correcting and suppressing incorrect actions of corrupted controllers and by generating actions in full autonomy when the controller under scrutiny is not able to do so in a correct manner. Besides classical requirements, such as transparency and soundness, the proposed enforcement enjoys deadlock- and diverge-freedom of monitored controllers, together with scalability when dealing with networks of controllers. Finally, we test the proposed enforcement mechanism on a non-trivial case study, taken from the context of industrial water treatment systems, in which the controllers are injected with different malware with different malicious goals.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Automated Security Assessments of Amazon Web Service Environments Amazon Web服务环境的自动安全评估

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-09 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3570903

Viktor Engström, Pontus Johnson, Robert Lagerström, Erik Ringdahl, Max Wällstedt

{"title":"Automated Security Assessments of Amazon Web Service Environments","authors":"Viktor Engström, Pontus Johnson, Robert Lagerström, Erik Ringdahl, Max Wällstedt","doi":"https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3570903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3570903","url":null,"abstract":"Migrating enterprises and business capabilities to cloud platforms like Amazon Web Services (AWS) has become increasingly common. However, securing cloud operations, especially at large scales, can quickly become intractable. Customer-side issues such as service misconfigurations, data breaches, and insecure changes are prevalent. Furthermore, cloud-specific tactics and techniques paired with application vulnerabilities create a large and complex search space. Various solutions and modeling languages for cloud security assessments exist. However, no single one appeared sufficiently cloud-centered and holistic. Many also did not account for tactical security dimensions. This paper, therefore, presents a domain-specific modeling language for AWS environments. When used to model AWS environments, manually or automatically, the language automatically constructs and traverses attack graphs to assess security. Assessments, therefore, require minimal security expertise from the user. The modeling language was primarily tested on four third-party AWS environments through securiCAD Vanguard, a commercial tool built around the AWS modeling language. The language was validated further by measuring performance on models provided by anonymous end users and a comparison with a similar open source assessment tool. As of March 2020, the modeling language could represent essential AWS structures, cloud tactics, and threats. However, the tests highlighted certain shortcomings. Data collection steps, such as planted credentials, and some missing tactics were obvious. Nevertheless, the issues covered by the DSL were already reminiscent of common issues with real-world precedents. Future additions to attacker tactics and addressing data collection should yield considerable improvements.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":"191 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Pump Up Password Security! Evaluating and Enhancing Risk-Based Authentication on a Real-World Large-Scale Online Service 提高密码安全性!真实世界大规模在线服务中基于风险的认证评估与增强

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546069

Stephan Wiefling, Paul René Jørgensen, Sigurd Thunem, Luigi Lo Iacono

{"title":"Pump Up Password Security! Evaluating and Enhancing Risk-Based Authentication on a Real-World Large-Scale Online Service","authors":"Stephan Wiefling, Paul René Jørgensen, Sigurd Thunem, Luigi Lo Iacono","doi":"https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546069","url":null,"abstract":"Risk-based authentication (RBA) aims to protect users against attacks involving stolen passwords. RBA monitors features during login, and requests re-authentication when feature values widely differ from those previously observed. It is recommended by various national security organizations, and users perceive it more usable than and equally secure to equivalent two-factor authentication. Despite that, RBA is still used by very few online services. Reasons for this include a lack of validated open resources on RBA properties, implementation, and configuration. This effectively hinders the RBA research, development, and adoption progress.To close this gap, we provide the first long-term RBA analysis on a real-world large-scale online service. We collected feature data of 3.3 million users and 31.3 million login attempts over more than 1 year. Based on the data, we provide (i) studies on RBA’s real-world characteristics plus its configurations and enhancements to balance usability, security, and privacy; (ii) a machine learning–based RBA parameter optimization method to support administrators finding an optimal configuration for their own use case scenario; (iii) an evaluation of the round-trip time feature’s potential to replace the IP address for enhanced user privacy; and (iv) a synthesized RBA dataset to reproduce this research and to foster future RBA research. Our results provide insights on selecting an optimized RBA configuration so that users profit from RBA after just a few logins. The open dataset enables researchers to study, test, and improve RBA for widespread deployment in the wild.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Contact Discovery in Mobile Messengers: Low-cost Attacks, Quantitative Analyses, and Efficient Mitigations 移动信使中的联系人发现:低成本攻击、定量分析和有效缓解

IF 2.3 4区计算机科学

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security Pub Date : 2022-11-07 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546191

Christoph Hagen, Christian Weinert, Christoph Sendner, Alexandra Dmitrienko, Thomas Schneider

{"title":"Contact Discovery in Mobile Messengers: Low-cost Attacks, Quantitative Analyses, and Efficient Mitigations","authors":"Christoph Hagen, Christian Weinert, Christoph Sendner, Alexandra Dmitrienko, Thomas Schneider","doi":"https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3546191","url":null,"abstract":"Contact discovery allows users of mobile messengers to conveniently connect with people in their address book. In this work, we demonstrate that severe privacy issues exist in currently deployed contact discovery methods and propose suitable mitigations.Our study of three popular messengers (WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram) shows that large-scale crawling attacks are (still) possible. Using an accurate database of mobile phone number prefixes and very few resources, we queried 10 % of US mobile phone numbers for WhatsApp and 100 % for Signal. For Telegram, we find that its API exposes a wide range of sensitive information, even about numbers not registered with the service. We present interesting (cross-messenger) usage statistics, which also reveal that very few users change the default privacy settings.Furthermore, we demonstrate that currently deployed hashing-based contact discovery protocols are severely broken by comparing three methods for efficient hash reversal. Most notably, we show that with the password cracking tool “JTR,” we can iterate through the entire worldwide mobile phone number space in < 150 s on a consumer-grade GPU. We also propose a significantly improved rainbow table construction for non-uniformly distributed input domains that is of independent interest.Regarding mitigations, we most notably propose two novel rate-limiting schemes: our incremental contact discovery for services without server-side contact storage strictly improves over Signal’s current approach while being compatible with private set intersection, whereas our differential scheme allows even stricter rate limits at the overhead for service providers to store a small constant-size state that does not reveal any contact information.","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":"90 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0