Studia Neoaristotelica最新文献_第3页

A Logic of Creating 创造的逻辑

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Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/STUDNEOAR20201726

W. Redmond

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Late Scholastic Analyses of Inductive Reasoning 归纳推理的后期学术分析

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Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2020-08-28 DOI: 10.5840/studneoar20201712

Miroslav Hanke

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Scotist Metaphysics in Mid-Sixteenth Century Padua Giacomino Malafossa from Barge’s A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics 十六世纪中期的苏格兰形而上学——巴杰的《形而上学问题》

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Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2020-08-28 DOI: 10.5840/studneoar20201713

Claus A. Andersen

{"title":"Scotist Metaphysics in Mid-Sixteenth Century Padua Giacomino Malafossa from Barge’s A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics","authors":"Claus A. Andersen","doi":"10.5840/studneoar20201713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20201713","url":null,"abstract":"For more than four decades around the middle of the sixteenth century, Giacomino Malafossa from Barge († 1563) held the Scotist chair of metaphysics at the University of Padua. In his A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics, in Which Is Included the Question, Whether Metaphysics Is a Science, he developed a remarkable stance on the subject matter of metaphysics. Metaphysics has two objects: being qua being and God. However, only when it deals with the latter object can it be said to be a science in a strict sense. The reason is that the strict Aristotelian notion of science presupposes that the object of any science has demonstrable properties, which is the case with God, but not with being as being. Although being qua being does have certain properties, namely the transcendentals, these cannot be truly demonstrated. Malafossa’s Quaestio bears witness both to the clash between Averroism and Scotism at the Italian Renaissance universities and to the complexity of the Scotist tradition itself. This introductory article highlights Malafossa’s sources and traces the critical reception of his views among later Scotist authors.","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":"17 1","pages":"69-107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47705566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Confusion or Precision? 困惑还是精确?

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Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/STUDNEOAR20201725

L. Novak

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A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics in Which Is Included the Question Whether Metaphysics Is a Science 关于形而上学主体的问题，其中包含了形而上学是否科学的问题

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Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/studneoar20201714

Giacomino Malafossa from Barge

{"title":"A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics in Which Is Included the Question Whether Metaphysics Is a Science","authors":"Giacomino Malafossa from Barge","doi":"10.5840/studneoar20201714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20201714","url":null,"abstract":"Giacomino Malafossa’s A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics, in Which Is Included the Question Whether Metaphysics Is a Science, from 1551 (first printed 1553) consists of two parts. In the first part, the author discusses various positions regarding the subject matter of metaphysics. In particular, he debates which conditions any scientific object must fulfill, the most important one being that an object of a science virtually contains all of its truths. Since being as being virtually contains whatever is considered in metaphysics, this is the adequate object of metaphysics. In the second part, the author addresses the problem that the transcendental properties of being are not truly demonstrable. This endangers the status of metaphysics as a science in the strict Aristotelian sense. The author discusses various Scotist solutions to this problem. His own solution is that metaphysics indeed is a science in the strict sense, but only when it considers God, not when it considers being as being, thus unwittingly challenging Duns Scotus’s own idea that metaphysics is a “transcending science” because of its consideration of being and its transcendental properties. Malafossa’s Quaestio is an important example of the metaphysical discourse at the University of Padua in the sixteenth century.","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":"17 1","pages":"109-143"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71297856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Wolterstorff on Reid’s Notion of Common Sense Wolterstorff论Reid的常识概念

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Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/STUDNEOAR20201727

Petr Glombíček

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A Rose by Any Other Name… 另一个名字的玫瑰……

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Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/STUDNEOAR20201728

Paolo Biondi

{"title":"A Rose by Any Other Name…","authors":"Paolo Biondi","doi":"10.5840/STUDNEOAR20201728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/STUDNEOAR20201728","url":null,"abstract":"The question of how, according to Aristotle, the principles of science are acquired remains contested among scholars. An aspect of this broader topic concerns the role of induction, and whether it is able to provide us with knowledge of natural necessity without the assistance of intuition (nous). In a recent publication in this journal, David Botting argues in favour of the enumerative/empiricist interpretation of induction and criticizes the intuitive/rationalist interpretation of it, a version of which was defended in one of my publications. He thinks that Aristotle is like Hume: both understand the cognitive process of induction similarly; and, both are equally skeptical about acquiring knowledge of natural necessity through induction. My reply argues that reading Aristotle’s induction in Humean terms is problematic in several respects. I argue, in addition, that natural necessity can be known through induction if nous is involved. My explanation of how this is possible relies on thinking of the act of noēsis in terms of an act of recognition. Botting claims, furthermore, that Aristotle only differs from Hume in that the former does have a non-inductive and non-intuitive method by which natural necessity may become known, and which Botting calls “the constructive proof of necessity”. My reply examines this method, showing how certain steps in it rely on cognitive acts that are really acts of intuition merely expressed in Humean terms. Despite the criticisms, I end with suggestions for how Botting’s account might offer original paths of research to Aristotle scholars seeking to answer the question of the acquisition of principles of science, particularly in the early stages of this process.","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71298097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Analogy of Disjunction 析取的类比

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Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/studneoar20201711

Domenic D'ettore

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Dvojí pohled na Tomášův traktát o Trojici 托马斯三位一体论的双重视角

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Studia Neoaristotelica Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI: 10.5840/studneoar201916513

Prokop Sousedík