American Business Law Journal最新文献_第3页

Privacy Self-Management: A Strategy to Protect Worker Privacy from Excessive Employer Surveillance in Light of Scant Legal Protections 隐私自我管理:在缺乏法律保护的情况下保护工人隐私免受雇主过度监视的策略

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-11-21 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12236

Robert Sprague

引用次数: 0

Climate Change and a Just Transition to the Future of Work 气候变化和向未来工作的公正过渡

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-11-21 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12235

Stephen Kim Park, Norman D. Bishara

{"title":"Climate Change and a Just Transition to the Future of Work","authors":"Stephen Kim Park, Norman D. Bishara","doi":"10.1111/ablj.12235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12235","url":null,"abstract":"Rapidly growing concerns about the adverse effects of climate change are prompting a re-thinking of how companies view their strategies and operations and spurring legal and regulatory responses around the world. The overarching objective of these efforts is to facilitate and accelerate the transition to a more sustainable economy. The green transition will have substantial distributional and structural implications for workers and the workplace across companies and economic sectors. Indeed, the future of work will be significantly shaped by climate change. However, relatively scant scholarly attention has been devoted to the forward-looking legal implications of climate change for work. Similarly, legal scholars writing on climate change have largely neglected the laws governing employment. This article seeks to help fill that gap. How can companies, workers, and society respond to the green transition in a manner that enables better jobs, a safe and stable workplace, and more resilient companies? To answer this question, this article draws on the theory of just transition, which is rooted in environmental justice and labor rights. We offer an interpretation and application of just transition that expands its scope to serve as a blueprint for ethical business conduct and legal reform to improve the world of work and the lives of workers.","PeriodicalId":54186,"journal":{"name":"American Business Law Journal","volume":"60 4","pages":"701-748"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138432413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Patent Examiner Sweepstakes 专利审查员

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12233

W. Michael Schuster

{"title":"The Patent Examiner Sweepstakes","authors":"W. Michael Schuster","doi":"10.1111/ablj.12233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12233","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents evidence that patent value varies with random examiner assignment at the U.S. Patent Office. Prior work analyzed firm growth as a function of review by “easy” examiners who grant patents at a high rate. The current research looks past whether a patent is granted and instead focuses on how assignment to an “easy” or “hard” examiner influences the attributes of resultant patents. Focusing on their propensities to reject applications on novelty or obviousness grounds, analysis finds that patents issued by lenient examiners tend to be broader in scope, are more valuable to their owners, and elicit a larger stock market response when granted. Further analysis quantifies the level of variation (“noise”) among examiners. This inquiry finds that the noise level in issuing novelty rejections decreases with examiner experience, while variation among examiners issuing obviousness rejections actually increases with experience. A third line of investigation presents evidence that “stricter” examiners disproportionately reach the correct examination relative to more lenient counterparts. This conclusion is supported by “twin application” analysis comparing outcomes of related U.S. and European applications. Consistent with the literature using this method, the European Patent Office's outcome is considered the “gold standard” for examination, and thus, its decision to grant or deny is assumed correct.","PeriodicalId":54186,"journal":{"name":"American Business Law Journal","volume":"60 3","pages":"599-650"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ablj.12233","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50137443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Control Expropriation Via Rights Offers 通过提供权利控制征用

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12232

Leeor Ofer

{"title":"Control Expropriation Via Rights Offers","authors":"Leeor Ofer","doi":"10.1111/ablj.12232","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ablj.12232","url":null,"abstract":"Rights offers are a relatively common capital-raising method. In a rights offer, the company's existing shareholders are given the opportunity to purchase newly-issued shares in proportion to the amount of shares they already own for a specific subscription price per share. Because all shareholders can participate in the issuance under the same terms, rights offers are often regarded as fair to all shareholders. However, this article demonstrates that rights offers do not always place shareholders on equal footing. In particular, this article shows that dominant, non-controlling shareholders (“insiders”) can utilize a rights offer to expropriate control. By setting a deliberately high subscription price, insiders can deter other shareholders from buying into the offer. Insiders can then purchase a disproportionate amount of shares via the rights offer, thereby securing absolute control. Once in control, insiders will be in a position to extract value from the firm, and will be immune to future control challenges. These expected benefits of control make the high subscription price worth paying from insiders' perspective, so that the rights offer is effectively underpriced for insiders but overpriced for other shareholders. When a rights offer acts as a change-of-control tool, it should be governed by Delaware takeover law. Courts should closely scrutinize such issuances, and require boards to maximize the premium insiders pay for control. This article further suggests that stock exchanges adopt a mandatory price-adjusting mechanism for rights offers, which will guarantee that the subscription price is lower than or equal to the underlying share's trading price.","PeriodicalId":54186,"journal":{"name":"American Business Law Journal","volume":"60 3","pages":"651-696"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45878634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Brute Force (Anti) Federalism 残酷力量（反）联邦制

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12231

Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, John T. Holden, Corey Ciocchetti

引用次数: 0

When Federal Law Goes Unnoticed: Assessing the CISG's Applicability Across U.S. Courts Based on an Empirical Research of Decisions from 1988 to 2020 当联邦法律被忽视时：基于1988年至2020年判决的实证研究评估《销售公约》在美国法院的适用性

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12230

Carolina Arlota, Brian McCall

{"title":"When Federal Law Goes Unnoticed: Assessing the CISG's Applicability Across U.S. Courts Based on an Empirical Research of Decisions from 1988 to 2020","authors":"Carolina Arlota, Brian McCall","doi":"10.1111/ablj.12230","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ablj.12230","url":null,"abstract":"The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) has reached the level of acceptance that it can be recognized as the face of international sales law. Over a century ago, the late Roscoe Pound drew attention to the dichotomy between the law as written and the law as experienced in practice. The law of the CISG “on the books” is the law of the United States. With the growth of international trade, one might expect its importance to grow in the realm of law “in action.” This article explores the CISG in action in U.S. courts during its almost four decades of being the law on the books in the United States. To this end, the authors built an original dataset based on their Westlaw search of all decisions mentioning the CISG across all U.S. federal and state courts from 1988 (when the CISG entered into force) through 2019. The dataset provides unprecedented insights into: (1) how parties raise the issue of the applicability of the CISG, (2) how courts have ruled on the Convention's applicability, and (3) the provisions of the Convention that appear most frequently in these disputes. This article empirically assesses, through logistic regressions, which factors are statistically significant for predicting if a court will apply (or decline to apply) the Convention to a disputed transaction. Finally, the article highlights many ways in which the law in action may not be as robust or comprehensive as it appears on the books.","PeriodicalId":54186,"journal":{"name":"American Business Law Journal","volume":"60 3","pages":"541-598"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43064269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Arbitration Effect 仲裁效力

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-06-06 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12222

Farshad Ghodoosi, Monica M. Sharif

{"title":"Arbitration Effect","authors":"Farshad Ghodoosi, Monica M. Sharif","doi":"10.1111/ablj.12222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12222","url":null,"abstract":"Arbitration is changing the United States justice system. Critics argue that arbitration leads to claim suppression. Proponents argue that, compared with courts, arbitration is cheaper and less formal. These claims have not been empirically tested. In particular, whether and how arbitration impacts individuals’ decision to sue remains an open inquiry. This article for the first time shows, in a series of experiments, the impact of arbitration agreements on individuals' decisions to sue. This article calls it the “arbitration effect.” First, we test whether the arbitration effect exists; that is, if arbitration agreements negatively impact individuals' decision to sue. Second, we experimentally test individuals' decisions to opt out of arbitration agreements. Lastly, we assess whether any type of information can “cure” the arbitration effect. The results establish that individuals are less likely to sue in arbitration as opposed to court, hence the arbitration effect. Such an effect, however, does not exist at the contracting stage, meaning that individuals do not shun arbitration when given the option. Further, none of the fundamental attributes of arbitration, as touted by the U.S. Supreme Court, nor win-rates and class actions mitigate the arbitration effect. Equally, informational nudges do not reduce the effect, and individuals do not ascribe negative attributes to firms forcing mandatory arbitration. For decades, courts and lawmakers grappled with issues related to arbitration. The article provides much-needed data on arbitration. Findings cast serious doubts on the ongoing efforts—market-based, judicial, or regulatory—aiming to change the arbitration course.","PeriodicalId":54186,"journal":{"name":"American Business Law Journal","volume":"60 2","pages":"235-287"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50134330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Stepping Up to the Plate: Minor Leaguers Attempt to Remedy their Unconscionable Plight 迈向本垒板:小联盟球员试图弥补他们不合理的困境

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-06-06 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12223

Lucas W. Loafman, John T. Holden

{"title":"Stepping Up to the Plate: Minor Leaguers Attempt to Remedy their Unconscionable Plight","authors":"Lucas W. Loafman, John T. Holden","doi":"10.1111/ablj.12223","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ablj.12223","url":null,"abstract":"Professional baseball players are often thought of as making multi-million-dollar salaries, but most professional baseball players have recently made under $15,000 a year. Minor league players toiled under an onerous system resulting from baseball's judicially created antitrust exemption and lobbying efforts that exempted them from minimum wage and overtime. These factors allowed teams to impose a uniform player contract (UPC) on players with numerous unconscionable provisions for years. However, a late-night Tweet in August of 2022 sent shockwaves through the sports and labor world, announcing that the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) was sending out authorization cards to represent minor league players. After years of fighting to maintain the authority to impose conditions on minor league players, through lobbying and litigation, Major League Baseball (MLB) turned over a new leaf and recognized the unionization of minor league players under the MLBPA less than three weeks later. In light of this long sought-after recognition, this article takes a novel approach. First, it provides historical context for baseball's unique ability to impose working conditions on minor leaguers without significant concern for legal ramifications. Second, it provides an overview of the doctrine of contractual unconscionability and analyzes the prior UPC as an unconscionable agreement. Finally, it details the historic unionization process and makes detailed recommendations to ameliorate the unconscionable conditions minor league players have faced when they negotiate with MLB owners to draft their initial collective bargaining agreement.","PeriodicalId":54186,"journal":{"name":"American Business Law Journal","volume":"60 2","pages":"289-367"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44402859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

“In One Direction Only”: Chains of Reasoning and Tail Events in CAFA Amount-in-Controversy Claims “只在一个方向上”:CAFA金额争议索赔中的推理链和尾部事件

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-06-06 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12224

Jeff Lingwall, Nicole Wood

引用次数: 0

Resolution of Small and Medium-Sized Deposit-Taking Institutions: Back to Basics? 中小存款机构的解决方案:回归基础?

IF 1.2 3区社会学

American Business Law Journal Pub Date : 2023-06-06 DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12225

Maziar Peihani

{"title":"Resolution of Small and Medium-Sized Deposit-Taking Institutions: Back to Basics?","authors":"Maziar Peihani","doi":"10.1111/ablj.12225","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ablj.12225","url":null,"abstract":"Following the 2008 Great Financial Crisis, financial policy makers have refocused their attention on bank resolution, prompting the creation of new resolution tools and regime reforms. As a result, the focus has mainly been on large, systemically important banks. Less attention has been paid to a broader range of financial institutions, namely small and medium deposit-taking institutions. That tendency limits the applicability of these tools, which are imperfectly adapted to the unique issues faced by these smaller institutions. This article will assess both the successful applications and the limitations of resolution tools to small and medium deposit-taking institution failures, focusing on three tools in particular: the bail-in, the bridge bank, and purchase and assumption. In doing so, the benefits and challenges of each of these tools will be examined through the lens of recent resolution examples in the United States, Canada, and the European Union. This article also argues for the availability of public funds to achieve a successful resolution, taking the view that moral hazard concerns are overstated and that rigid bans of public funds are counterproductive to the goals of resolution. Lastly, this article seeks to develop a broad understanding of the systemic importance that accounts for the essential role of small and medium deposit-taking institutions in their communities.","PeriodicalId":54186,"journal":{"name":"American Business Law Journal","volume":"60 2","pages":"419-475"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ablj.12225","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47995430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0