Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice最新文献

Contentious public finance: how entanglement shapes the costs of resisting elitist budgetary preferences 有争议的公共财政：纠葛如何影响抵制精英预算偏好的成本

IF 0.5

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000009

Mikayla Novak

{"title":"Contentious public finance: how entanglement shapes the costs of resisting elitist budgetary preferences","authors":"Mikayla Novak","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2024d000000009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2024d000000009","url":null,"abstract":"Entangled political economy views societal phenomena as featuring substantial interaction between economic and political entities, but questions have been raised about the conceptual properties of entanglement. The political economist Randall Holcombe has raised questions concerning the economic influences affecting uneven patterns of entanglement between entities. Drawing upon his own transaction costs-based framework of political stratification, Holcombe suggests that political elites incur relatively low transaction costs associated with bargaining over policies, whereas non-elites incur relatively high costs. This suggests that elites actively participate in policy design and implementation and can outmaneuver the non-elite public to externalize the costs of political decisions, yielding noticeable clustering effects within entangled network structures. This article seeks to build upon Holcombe’s insights, as well as the transaction cost politics of Charlotte Twight, illustrating how groups engaging in political processes attempt to manipulate transaction costs to secure favorable outcomes. Transaction cost manipulation by elites to secure advantages is commonly studied, but less so is how non-elitists succeed in adjusting the transaction costs of political exchanges to help prevent fiscal exploitation by elitists. The public finance case of Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights is used to illustrate how dynamic entanglements between elites and non-elites delivered institutional change better aligning with non-elite fiscal preferences.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141814629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Social versus individual work preferences: implications for optimal linear income taxation 社会与个人工作偏好：对最优线性收入税的影响

IF 0.3

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-04-12 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000008

Zhiyong An, David Coady

引用次数: 0

Introduction: special issue on the political economy of the War in Ukraine 导言：乌克兰战争的政治经济学特刊

IF 0.3

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000006

Tymofii Brik, Tymofiy Mylovanov, J. Murtazashvili, I. Murtazashvili

引用次数: 0

Introduction: special issue on the political economy of the War in Ukraine 导言：乌克兰战争的政治经济学特刊

IF 0.3

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000006

Tymofii Brik, Tymofiy Mylovanov, J. Murtazashvili, I. Murtazashvili

引用次数: 0

The political economy of public procurement in Ukraine 乌克兰公共采购的政治经济学

IF 0.3

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000005

Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, I. Murtazashvili

引用次数: 1

The political economy of public procurement in Ukraine 乌克兰公共采购的政治经济学

IF 0.3

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2024d000000005

Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, I. Murtazashvili

引用次数: 1

Polycentric governance in practice: the case of Ukraine’s decentralised crisis response during the Russo-Ukrainian war 实践中的多中心治理:以俄乌战争期间乌克兰的分散危机应对为例

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000002

Oleksandra Keudel, Oksana Huss

引用次数: 0

Strategic changes in the public sphere: modern prerequisites for effective management 公共领域的战略变革:有效管理的现代先决条件

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000004

Tetiana Kozachenko, Nataliia Aliushyna, Olena Boiko, Viacheslav Grabovskiy, Nataliia Statsenko

{"title":"Strategic changes in the public sphere: modern prerequisites for effective management","authors":"Tetiana Kozachenko, Nataliia Aliushyna, Olena Boiko, Viacheslav Grabovskiy, Nataliia Statsenko","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000004","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study is to investigate transformation processes in the field of public administration in Ukraine and the possibility of implementing change management. This article uses a case-study methodology, with both primary source statistics and archival materials, to evaluate the extent of decentralisation reforms in Ukraine. We demonstrate that reforms have been partial, which we attribute to an inefficient and opaque system that frustrates reform efforts. The main gaps of the Ukrainian authorities are observed in the inability to effectively influence the distribution of resources, in particular, to ensure the functioning of newly created territorial units. The article provides evidence that the existing problems that are the result of inefficient public administration in Ukraine, regarding poverty, inflation, the growing gap between rural and urban population, and the growth of unemployment, can be solved by implementing change management. The decentralisation reforms initiated in Ukraine have often been extolled in various quarters for their potential to enhance administrative and governance efficiency. Nevertheless, a comprehensive and empirical assessment detailing the full extent and depth of these reforms remains conspicuously absent. Such a gap in the literature underscores the need for a rigorous examination to ascertain the real magnitude of changes and their tangible impacts on the ground. The novelty of the study consists in the focus on the approach of the three-dimensional design of public administration proposed by Ukrainian researchers in the context of ‘management–administration–management’.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136079220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Lack of consensus, dispersion of political power and public debt: evidence from a sample of developed countries 缺乏共识、政治权力分散和公共债务:来自发达国家样本的证据

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000003

Mohamed Mansour, Eric Kamwa

引用次数: 0

Public debt financing through political processes: a review essay of Olivier Blanchard’s Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates 政治过程中的公共债务融资:对奥利维尔·布兰查德《低利率下的财政政策》的评论文章

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1332/25156918y2023d000000001

Jonathan W. Plante

{"title":"Public debt financing through political processes: a review essay of Olivier Blanchard’s Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates","authors":"Jonathan W. Plante","doi":"10.1332/25156918y2023d000000001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2023d000000001","url":null,"abstract":"In his recent book Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates , Olivier Blanchard argues that when interest rates are low, policymakers can use public debt finance to increase the welfare of a nation. I argue that Blanchard’s model suffers from the “organismic theory of the State” and, as such, reaches dubious conclusions. At its core, an organismic model presumes that politicians can and do make transfers that maximize the welfare of all individuals. While this is, of course, plausible, an individualistic view states that whether government transfers increase welfare for all individuals depends on the political decision-making process of time and place. While some political processes redistribute funds equally, others redistribute unequally—that is, they increase welfare for some but decrease the welfare of others. Blanchard’s organismic model takes this fact for granted. I use the individualistic view to argue that even if interest rates are low, if a political process is one that redistributes unequally, transfers under public debt financing can result in or exacerbate income inequality. To illustrate this point, I show that in the US, increases in public debt financing have increased welfare for some individuals—the low- and upper-income quintiles—but have decreased it for others—the middle-income quintiles.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135482955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0