Journal of Law Finance and Accounting最新文献

Shadow Trading and Corporate Investments 影子交易和企业投资

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000063

Yoonsik Lee, Lawrence S. Liu, A. Romano

引用次数: 0

Do Heads Roll?: An EmpiricalAnalysis of CEO Turnover and PayWhen the Corporation is FederallyProsecuted 人头翻滚吗？：公司合并时CEO流动与薪酬的实证分析

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2019-12-13 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000036

Brandon L. Garrett, Nan Li, Shivaram Rajgopal

引用次数: 1

Does Parenting Matter? U.S. Parents,Non-U.S. Parents, and Global FirmTaxes 父母教养重要吗?美国的父母,美国。父母和全球公司税

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2019-12-13 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000038

Eric J. Allen, S. Morse

引用次数: 2

Good Buffer, Bad Buffer: Smoothingin Banks’ Loan Loss Provisions and theResponse to Credit Supply Shocks 好的缓冲，坏的缓冲：银行贷款损失准备金的平滑与信贷供应冲击的应对

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2019-12-13 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000037

Sudarshan Jayaraman, B. Schonberger, Joanna S. Wu

引用次数: 4

Tax Enforcement and IncomeDiversion: Evidence after Putin’selection in 2000 税收执法与收入:2000年普京当选后的证据

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2019-10-08 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000033

J. Gómez, M. Mironov

引用次数: 1

Information Transfers and InsiderTrading in Stock Substitutes: Evidencefrom Economically Linked Firms in theSupply Chain 股票替代品的信息传递与内幕交易:来自供应链中经济关联企业的证据

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2019-10-08 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000035

Jengfang Chen, Woody M. Liao, Guan-Syun Wu, Yanjie Yang

引用次数: 1

Debt Contract Terms and CreditorControl 债务合同条款与债权人控制

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2019-10-07 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000032

Adam B. Badawi

{"title":"Debt Contract Terms and Creditor\u0000Control","authors":"Adam B. Badawi","doi":"10.1561/108.00000032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000032","url":null,"abstract":"The law and finance literature characterizes debt covenants as a means to manage agency conflicts between creditors and shareholders. While both banks and bondholders make use of these covenants, they do so in quite different ways. Banks typically monitor their debtors closely and rely on financial maintenance covenants to protect their interests. When these covenants get triggered, banks can use the leverage of accelerating the loan to achieve their governance goals. This ability to monitor and renegotiate suggests that tailoring precise ex ante contract restrictions is not of paramount importance because a bank and a debtor can negotiate around those restrictions based on ex post contract conditions. Bondholders, in contrast, face substantial barriers to monitoring and renegotiating with their debtors because these bondholders tend to be large groups of passive investors who face substantial collective action problems. As a consequence, ex ante restrictive terms in the contract are likely to be the primary means through which bondholders can address potential conflicts with shareholders. These differences in contracting technologies suggest that the restrictions in bond contracts are more likely to respond to changes in background legal rules. This paper tests this theory by treating two Delaware decisions that limited the default duties that the directors of Delaware corporations owe to creditors as a shock to the contracting conditions for Delaware firms. Difference-in-difference and triple difference tests suggest that restrictive terms in bond contracts for Delaware firms increased in reaction to this change, while there was not a detectable shift in the strictness of loan agreements.","PeriodicalId":51955,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Finance and Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/108.00000032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42661061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Short Memories? The Impact of SEC Enforcement on Insider Leakage 短期记忆?证券交易委员会执法对内幕泄露的影响

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000048

Sid Ghoshal, Martin Bengtzen, S. Roberts

引用次数: 0

The Mitigating Effect of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on the Voluntary Adoption of Clawback Policies 审计委员会财务专门知识对自愿采用追回政策的缓解作用

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2018-05-31 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000024

Yan Zhang, Nan Zhou

{"title":"The Mitigating Effect of Audit\u0000 Committee Financial Expertise\u0000 on the Voluntary Adoption\u0000 of Clawback Policies","authors":"Yan Zhang, Nan Zhou","doi":"10.1561/108.00000024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000024","url":null,"abstract":"Clawback policies are compensation recovery policies that provide companies with the ability to recoup incentive-based compensation in the event of a financial fraud. We investigate whether the mandatory clawback provision in the Dodd-Frank Act is necessary or whether existing provisions under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) are sufficient in inducing problematic firms to voluntarily adopt clawbacks. Specifically, we examine the relation between financial expertise on audit committees and voluntary adoption of clawback policies in the pre-Dodd-Frank period, separating audit committee financial expertise into accounting- and non-accounting financial expertise and classifying clawbacks into fraud-based- and non-fraud based clawbacks. While firms with restatement history are more likely to adopt fraud-based clawbacks due to SOX Section 304, the financial expertise on audit committees has a mitigating effect on the voluntary adoption of clawback policies. Greater accounting financial expertise is more likely to result in voluntary adoption of fraud-based clawbacks for firms without prior restatements. On the contrary, accounting and non-financial expertise are less likely to result in the voluntary adoption of fraud-based clawbacks for firms with prior restatements. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, this suggests that accounting experts are more in favor of adopting fraud-based clawbacks when they are not associated with any previous accounting scandals, whereas both accounting experts and non-financial experts are against adopting fraud-based clawbacks when they could be implicated by prior financial frauds. Since non-fraud based clawbacks do not serve as signals, neither accounting- nor non-accounting financial expertise is related to the adoption of non-fraud based clawbacks. Our results suggest that the mandatory clawback requirement in Dodd-Frank can eliminate the mitigating effect of audit committee financial expertise on the voluntary adoption of clawback policies.","PeriodicalId":51955,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law Finance and Accounting","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2018-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1561/108.00000024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43116936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Corporate Governance and Ownership: Evidence from a Non-Mandatory Regulation 公司治理与所有权：来自非强制性法规的证据

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Journal of Law Finance and Accounting Pub Date : 2018-05-31 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000023

Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno

引用次数: 2