MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-08-12DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0053
Ben Schermbrucker
{"title":"Selfhood Beyond Death","authors":"Ben Schermbrucker","doi":"10.1515/mp-2023-0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2023-0053","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is a strong secular consensus that death terminates subjective consciousness. In this paper I show that this consensus can be meaningfully doubted for entirely secular reasons. After formulating the strongest possible argument which supports this consensus, I argue that it inconsistently excludes Constitutive Russellian Panpsychism (CRP) from consideration. CRP, I maintain, is fully consistent with the possibility of post-thanatological consciousness. To flesh out this account, I develop an account of the Panpsychist Self (PS) that can be axiomatically derived from CRP. I then show that the PS has the right metaphysical structure to ensure that the persistence of consciousness beyond brain death aligns with the persistence of our individual selves.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141919319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-08-12DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0053
Ben Schermbrucker
{"title":"Selfhood Beyond Death","authors":"Ben Schermbrucker","doi":"10.1515/mp-2023-0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2023-0053","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is a strong secular consensus that death terminates subjective consciousness. In this paper I show that this consensus can be meaningfully doubted for entirely secular reasons. After formulating the strongest possible argument which supports this consensus, I argue that it inconsistently excludes Constitutive Russellian Panpsychism (CRP) from consideration. CRP, I maintain, is fully consistent with the possibility of post-thanatological consciousness. To flesh out this account, I develop an account of the Panpsychist Self (PS) that can be axiomatically derived from CRP. I then show that the PS has the right metaphysical structure to ensure that the persistence of consciousness beyond brain death aligns with the persistence of our individual selves.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"10 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141919715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-07-22DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0049
Francesco Maria Ferrari
{"title":"The Nominalist Limit of Kim’s Ontological Physicalism","authors":"Francesco Maria Ferrari","doi":"10.1515/mp-2023-0049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2023-0049","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Kim’s Ontological Physicalism (OP) presents itself as a naturalistic and monistic metaphysical framework, aligned with the causal closure of the universe and rejecting causally efficacious “exotic” properties. The foundational ontology is, in turn, monistic and materialistic, positing that the universe is composed solely of material particulars: bits of matter. In this work, we identify a notable tension between OP’s intended model and the one OP specifies. Initially, we show how the theory inevitably becomes entangled with higher-order entities, not just particulars. Kim introduces the Supervenience Argument (SA) to counteract the possibility of higher-order entities being causally efficacious. While SA proves to be a plausible strategy, it is ultimately inadequate: not only SA is a petitio principii against emergence, but it is also unsound and invalid. Therefore, we propose a formal strategy to restore its ontological effectiveness. Unfortunately, at a closer look, even this strategy falls short as it unwarrantedly assumes the logicality and invariance of those equivalence relations (such as identity, similarity, and congruence) which are crucial for specifying the theory’s model as composed of particulars.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"30 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141816964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-07-17DOI: 10.1515/mp-2024-0012
Tomasz Bigaj
{"title":"On Individualistic Facts and Haecceitism","authors":"Tomasz Bigaj","doi":"10.1515/mp-2024-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2024-0012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The debate between individualism and generalism (qualitativism) concerns the status of individualistic facts and their relations with qualitative facts. It is argued that a proper definition of individualistic facts should be a modal one, and moreover that it requires the assumption of haecceitism for its adequacy, contrary to the common belief. Consequently, the positions of individualism and generalism are dependent upon the more fundamental stances of haecceitism and anti-haecceitism in the metaphysics of modality de re.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"18 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141639911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-07-16DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0054
Eric Gilbertson
{"title":"On the Reality and Evidential Status of Temporal Passage Phenomenology","authors":"Eric Gilbertson","doi":"10.1515/mp-2023-0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2023-0054","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Although many B-theorists do not think that our perceptual experience provides evidence that time passes, they accept that we at least seem to be aware of time’s passage. Consequently, they accept the burden of explaining away the appearance of passage. This paper discuss three arguments aiming to discharge this burden. The first two arguments allow that there is a distinctive phenomenology of passage, whereas the third argues that the belief in passage phenomenology is the result of a cognitive error. None of the arguments succeeds. The first two rest on assumptions that the A-theorist has reasons to reject, in light of facts about the nature of conscious experience – facts concerning both its basis in physical and functional processes, and facts concerning its representation of duration. The third argument fails to provide a compelling account of the source of our belief in passage phenomenology.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"7 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141642232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-07-11DOI: 10.1515/mp-2024-0016
Joshua R. Sijuwade
{"title":"Elucidating Divine Atemporality","authors":"Joshua R. Sijuwade","doi":"10.1515/mp-2024-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2024-0016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article aims to provide a philosophical elucidation of the concept of divine atemporality (i.e. divine timelessness and immutability), found within the theological trajectory of Classical Theism, and a philosophical model – termed Aspectival Pluralism – that demonstrates its compatibility with the further notion of Divine Preservation. To achieve this end, an original interpretation of the concept is formulated within the Aspectival Account and the thesis of Theistic Ontological Pluralism, as extended by the temporal ontology of Priority Presentism, introduced by Sam Baron, and the Exdurantist view of persistence, introduced by Theodore Sider, which will ultimately enable the notion to be elucidated in a clear and consistent manner and help to answer an important conceptual question concerning it.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"132 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141656647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-03-08DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0041
Benjamin Eisner
{"title":"The Metaphysical Foundations of the Principle of Indifference","authors":"Benjamin Eisner","doi":"10.1515/mp-2023-0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2023-0041","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The arguments in favor of the Principle of Indifference fail to explain its fruitfulness in science. Using the recent metaphysical concept of Grounding, I devise an explanation that can justify a weak version of the principle and discuss an instance of its application in Quantum mechanics.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"50 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140257000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-02-12DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0031
Daniel Saudek
{"title":"Implication as Inclusion and the Causal Asymmetry","authors":"Daniel Saudek","doi":"10.1515/mp-2023-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2023-0031","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How does causation in the physical world relate to implication in logic? This article presents implication as fundamentally a relation of inclusion between propositions. Given this, it is argued that an event cannot “causally imply” another, also given the laws of nature. Then, by applying the notion of inclusion to physical objects, a relation “within the possibilities of” is developed, which generates a partial order on sets of entities and is independent of time. Based on this, it is shown that changes of physical objects in time (at any rate, a great many of them) imply, and thus counterfactually depend on, what we call “causes” – an asymmetric dependence which is robust despite the perspectival nature of the concept of “cause”.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"91 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139894469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0007
Adrián Solís
{"title":"Discussing the Formal Components of Material Objects: A New Reply to Bennett","authors":"Adrián Solís","doi":"10.1515/mp-2023-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2023-0007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recently mereological hylomorphism, the theory in which form and matter are considered to be proper parts of objects, has become very important among contemporary metaphysicians. The present work aims to analyse and dismantle Bennett’s criticism regarding the existence of formal proper parts. To do this, I will start by presenting Koslicki’s mereological hylomorphism. Next, I will focus on Bennett’s critique which seeks to deny the existence of formal proper parts. Finally, I will analyse critically the Bennett’s criticism focusing on the scenario of lump of clay and statue. I will show Bennett’s proposal is not explanatorily better than Koslicki’s hylomorphism because she needs to accept a counter-intuitive thesis. Therefore, we should prefer Koslicki’s mereological hylomorphism.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"26 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139896110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
MetaphysicaPub Date : 2024-02-06DOI: 10.1515/mp-2023-0037
Thomas Hauer
{"title":"Sparks of New Metaphysics and the Limits of Explanatory Abstractions","authors":"Thomas Hauer","doi":"10.1515/mp-2023-0037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2023-0037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Physical reality as an explanatory model is an abstraction of the mind. Every perceptual system is a user interface, like the dashboard of an aeroplane or the desktop of a computer. We do not see or otherwise perceive reality but only interface with reality. The user interface concept is a starting point for a critical dialogue with those epistemic theories that present themselves as veridical and take explanatory abstractions as ontological primitives. At the heart of any scientific model are assumptions about which things exist, how they are related, and how we can know them. Scientific models take our knowledge beyond ordinary experience toward explanatory abstractions. The main problem with veridical models lies in why we cannot express our theories and the explanatory abstractions associated with them other than through classical perceptual interface symbols. This study analyses the limits, possibilities and constraints of explanatory abstractions.","PeriodicalId":517137,"journal":{"name":"Metaphysica","volume":"78 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139896179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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