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The RAND Journal of Economics最新文献

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Robust contracts in common agency 共同机构的稳健合同
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-20 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12463
Keler Marku, Sergio Ocampo, Jean-Baptiste Tondji
{"title":"Robust contracts in common agency","authors":"Keler Marku, Sergio Ocampo, Jean-Baptiste Tondji","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12463","url":null,"abstract":"Business activities often involve a common agent managing a variety of projects on behalf of investors with potentially conflicting interests. The extent of the agent's actions is also often unknown to investors, who have to design contracts that provide incentives to the manager despite this lack of crucial knowledge. We consider a game between several principals and a common agent, where principals know only a subset of the actions available to the agent. Principals demand robustness and evaluate contracts on a worst‐case basis. This robust approach allows for a crisp characterization of the equilibrium contracts and payoffs and provides a novel proof of equilibrium existence in common agency by constructing a pseudo‐potential for the game. Robust contracts make explicit how the efficiency of the equilibrium outcome relative to collusion among principals depends on the principals' ability to extract payments from the agent.","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":"10 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141122515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Correlation‐savvy sellers 精通相关性的卖家
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12465
Roland Strausz
{"title":"Correlation‐savvy sellers","authors":"Roland Strausz","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12465","url":null,"abstract":"A multi‐product monopolist sells sequentially to a buyer who privately learns his valuations. Using big data, the monopolist learns the intertemporal correlation of the buyer's valuations. Perfect price discrimination is generally unattainable—even when the seller learns the correlation perfectly, has full commitment, and in the limit where the consumption good about which the buyer has ex ante private information becomes insignificant. This impossibility is due to informational externalities that require information rents for the buyer's later consumption. These rents induce upward and downward distortions, violating the generalized no distortion at the top principle of dynamic mechanism design.","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":" 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140998660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Spillovers from ancillary services to wholesale energy markets 辅助服务对能源批发市场的溢出效应
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-12 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12459
Jesse Buchsbaum, Catherine Hausman, Johanna L Mathieu, Jing Peng
{"title":"Spillovers from ancillary services to wholesale energy markets","authors":"Jesse Buchsbaum, Catherine Hausman, Johanna L Mathieu, Jing Peng","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12459","url":null,"abstract":"In electricity markets, generators are rewarded for providing energy and for enabling grid reliability. The two functions are compensated separately: with energy market payments and ancillary services market payments. We provide evidence of changes in the generation mix in the energy market that are driven by exogenous changes in an ancillary services market. We provide a theoretical framework and quasi‐experimental evidence for understanding the mechanism: it results from the multi‐product nature of power plants combined with discontinuities in costs. Although much research focuses solely on the energy market, our results suggest that spillovers between the two markets are important.","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":"136 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139894861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption? 中国土地市场拍卖:腐败的证据?
IF 2.3
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2013-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12028
Hongbin Cai, J Vernon Henderson, Qinghua Zhang
{"title":"China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?","authors":"Hongbin Cai,&nbsp;J Vernon Henderson,&nbsp;Qinghua Zhang","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12028","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003-2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a \"two stage auction\". The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are \"cold\", which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities.</p>","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":"44 3","pages":"488-521"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"32908898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 179
Accidental death and the rule of joint and several liability. 意外死亡与连带责任原则。
IF 2.3
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2012-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00158.x
Daniel Carvell, Janet Currie, W Bentley MacLeod
{"title":"Accidental death and the rule of joint and several liability.","authors":"Daniel Carvell,&nbsp;Janet Currie,&nbsp;W Bentley MacLeod","doi":"10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00158.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00158.x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Most U.S. states have enacted JSL reform, the move from a regime of joint and several liability (JSL) that allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from any one of multiple defendants to one where defendants are held liable only for the harm they cause. Contrary to previous theoretical work, we show that JSL reform can increase precaution by judgment proof agent by giving \"deep pockets\" an incentive to reduce their own liability by bringing judgment-proof agents into court. This result can help explain our empirical findings showing that JSL reform reduces death rates (and hence increase precaution) for many types of accidents. Together, these results highlight the role that litigation costs and judgment-proof agents play in the functioning of the American tort system.</p>","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":"43 1","pages":"51-77"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00158.x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"32546884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers. 你能得到你所付出的吗?按绩效付费和医疗保健提供者的质量。
IF 2.3
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2010-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00090.x
Kathleen J Mullen, Richard G Frank, Meredith B Rosenthal
{"title":"Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers.","authors":"Kathleen J Mullen,&nbsp;Richard G Frank,&nbsp;Meredith B Rosenthal","doi":"10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00090.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00090.x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Despite the popularity of pay-for-performance (P4P) among health policymakers and private insurers as a tool for improving quality of care, there is little empirical basis for its effectiveness. We use data from published performance reports of physician medical groups contracting with a large network HMO to compare clinical quality before and after the implementation of P4P, relative to a control group. We consider the effect of P4P on both rewarded and unrewarded dimensions of quality. In the end, we fail to find evidence that a large P4P initiative either resulted in major improvement in quality or notable disruption in care.</p>","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":"41 1","pages":"64-91"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00090.x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"29930868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do report cards tell consumers anything they don't know already? The case of Medicare HMOs. 成绩单能告诉消费者一些他们还不知道的事情吗?以医疗保健组织为例。
IF 2.3
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2008-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00039.x
Leemore Dafny, David Dranove
{"title":"Do report cards tell consumers anything they don't know already? The case of Medicare HMOs.","authors":"Leemore Dafny,&nbsp;David Dranove","doi":"10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00039.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00039.x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Estimated responses to report cards may reflect learning about quality that would have occurred in their absence (\"market-based learning\"). Using panel data on Medicare HMOs, we examine the relationship between enrollment and quality before and after report cards were mailed to 40 million Medicare beneficiaries in 1999 and 2000. We find consumers learn from both public report cards and market-based sources, with the latter having a larger impact. Consumers are especially sensitive to both sources of information when the variance in HMO quality is greater. The effect of report cards is driven by beneficiaries' responses to consumer satisfaction scores.</p>","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":"39 3","pages":"790-821"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00039.x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"27843250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 181
Entry and regulation: evidence from health care professions. 进入和监管:来自卫生保健专业的证据。
IF 2.3
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2008-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00045.x
Catherine Schaumans, Frank Verboven
{"title":"Entry and regulation: evidence from health care professions.","authors":"Catherine Schaumans,&nbsp;Frank Verboven","doi":"10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00045.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00045.x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In many countries, pharmacies receive high regulated markups and are protected from competition through geographic entry restrictions. We develop an empirical entry model for pharmacies and physicians with two features: entry restrictions and strategic complementarities. We find that the entry restrictions have directly reduced the number of pharmacies by more than 50%, and also indirectly reduced the number of physicians by about 7%. A removal of the entry restrictions, combined with a reduction in the regulated markups, would generate a large shift in rents to consumers, without reducing the availability of pharmacies. The public interest motivation for the current regime therefore has no empirical support.</p>","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":"39 4","pages":"949-72"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00045.x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"28291832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 39
Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan. 专家代理问题:来自日本处方药市场的证据。
IF 2.3
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2007-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00115.x
Toshiaki Iizuka
{"title":"Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan.","authors":"Toshiaki Iizuka","doi":"10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00115.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00115.x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article examined the physician-patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the mark-up, physicians' prescription decisions may be distorted. Empirical results using anti-hypertensive drugs suggest that physicians' prescription choices are influenced by the mark-up. However, physicians are also sensitive to the patient's out-of-pocket costs. Overall, although the mark-up affects prescription choices, physicians appear more responsive to the patient's out-of-pocket costs than their own profits from mark-up.</p>","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":"38 3","pages":"844-62"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2007-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00115.x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"27440101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 197
Coordinating on lower prices: pharmaceutical pricing under political pressure. 协调降低价格:政治压力下的药品定价。
IF 2.3
The RAND Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2006-01-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00018.x
Sara Fisher Ellison, Catherine Wolfram
{"title":"Coordinating on lower prices: pharmaceutical pricing under political pressure.","authors":"Sara Fisher Ellison,&nbsp;Catherine Wolfram","doi":"10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00018.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00018.x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We investigate the effects of political activity on pharmaceutical prices, focusing on the health care reform period in the early 1990s.We characterize firms based on their vulnerability to future price regulation and find that the more vulnerable firms were more likely to take various actions to forestall regulation, most notably coordinating on a specific percentage price increase during 1993. Since moderating price increases could have averted regulation, the coordination appears to be the industry's response to a collective action problem.</p>","PeriodicalId":517123,"journal":{"name":"The RAND Journal of Economics","volume":"37 2","pages":"324-40"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00018.x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"26545100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 47
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