CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

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Lying with Uninformative Speech Acts 言语行为不一致的谎言
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-05-08 DOI: 10.1017/can.2023.12
Grzegorz Gaszczyk
{"title":"Lying with Uninformative Speech Acts","authors":"Grzegorz Gaszczyk","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.12","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I propose an analysis of lying with uninformative speech acts. The orthodox view states that lying is restricted to assertions. However, the growing case for non-assertoric lies made by presuppositions or conventional implicatures challenges this orthodoxy. So far, the only presuppositions to have been considered as lies were informative presuppositions. In fact, uninformative lies were not discussed in the philosophical literature. However, limiting the possibility of lying to informative speech acts is too restrictive. Firstly, I show that standard, uninformative presuppositions can also be lies. Secondly, I extend this picture into uninformative lies made by declarative statements. To implement my proposal, I do not need a new definition of lying. Recently popular commitment-based definitions of lying are able to properly handle uninformative lies.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45815061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Metaphysically Opaque Grounding Metaphysical不透明接地
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-24 DOI: 10.1017/can.2023.11
Henrik Rydéhn
{"title":"Metaphysically Opaque Grounding","authors":"Henrik Rydéhn","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.11","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explores the concept of metaphysically opaque grounding, a largely neglected form of metaphysical grounding that challenges the commonly held assumptions that grounding is an especially intimate and powerful connection between facts and that it is necessarily connected with the essences of things. I provide a definition of opaque grounding, identify some interesting philosophical views that are committed to it, and explore some consequences for the general theory of grounding. Finally, I briefly address some natural initial doubts about opaque grounding and find them unwarranted. The upshot is that the notion deserves more attention than it has previously received.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49056253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Ideology Critique and Game Theory 意识形态批判与博弈论
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-20 DOI: 10.1017/can.2023.10
Jacob Barrett
{"title":"Ideology Critique and Game Theory","authors":"Jacob Barrett","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.10","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Ideology critics believe that many bad social practices persist because of ideology, and that critiquing ideology is an effective way to promote social reform. Skeptics draw on game theory to argue that the persistence of such practices is better explained by collective action problems, and that ideology critique is causally inefficacious. In this paper, I reconcile these camps. I show that while game theory can help us identify contexts where ideology critique makes no difference, it also reveals causal mechanisms by which ideology critique can have a significant effect. I then consider some objections and directions for further research.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44194926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Critique of Scanlon’s Contractualism 斯坎伦契约主义批判
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-13 DOI: 10.1017/can.2023.9
Ashley Purdy
{"title":"A Critique of Scanlon’s Contractualism","authors":"Ashley Purdy","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.9","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Part of T. M. Scanlon’s project in What We Owe to Each Other (1998) is to explain the importance and priority of moral reasons. But Scanlon also argues that this priority of moral reasons is compatible with the pursuit of other things we value, such as friendship. To this end, Scanlon claims that contractualist moral reasons internally accommodate our interests in such values. In this paper, I argue that Scanlon is unsuccessful in showing the compatibility of morality and the pursuit of our other values. The contractualist may not be able to be a good friend.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46379670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Against Convergence Liberalism: A Feminist Critique 反对趋同自由主义:一种女权主义批判
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-11 DOI: 10.1017/can.2023.4
{"title":"Against Convergence Liberalism: A Feminist Critique","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.4","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Convergence liberalism has emerged as a prominent interpretation of public reason liberalism. Yet, while its main rival in the public reason literature—the Rawlsian consensus account of public reason—has faced serious scrutiny regarding its ability to secure equal citizenship for all members of society, especially for members of historically subordinated groups, convergence liberalism has not. With this article, we hope to start a discussion about convergence liberalism and its (in)ability to address group-based social inequalities. In particular, we aim to show that given the core features of the view and real-world pluralism, the policies needed to secure gender equality and protect equal citizenship for women will not be justified. We make our case by considering various inequalities that are due to the gendered division of labor and potential convergence liberal responses.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41774972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Trust and Contingency Plans 信托及应变计划
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-04 DOI: 10.1017/can.2023.8
Lee-Ann Chae
{"title":"Trust and Contingency Plans","authors":"Lee-Ann Chae","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.8","url":null,"abstract":"Trusting relationships are both valuable and risky. Where the risks are high and the fears of betrayal are also high, it might seem rational to try to mitigate the risks, while still enjoying the benefits of the trusting relationship, by forming a contingency plan. A contingency plan—in the sense I am interested in—involves contingent punishments for defection, which are primarily meant to encourage the trusted partner to act trustworthily. I argue, however, that such contingency plans suffer from an internal tension wherein the contingency planner both seeks and undermines a particular level (or kind) of trust. There are two problems in particular, either of which is sufficient to undermine trusting relationships: one, the planner fails to see the trusted partner as sincerely engaged in the trusting relationship, and two, the planner separates herself out from the trusting relationship by seeing her flourishing as separate from her partner’s (or, even worse, as dependent on her partner’s harm). Continency plans, then, are not just about the future; they cast a moral shadow on what we are doing now.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48644768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems 难易问题的问题
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-31 DOI: 10.1017/can.2022.46
T. Baetu
{"title":"The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems","authors":"T. Baetu","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.46","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 David Chalmers advocates the view that the phenomenon of consciousness is fundamentally different from all other phenomena studied in the life sciences, positing a uniquely hard problem that precludes the possibility of a mechanistic explanation. In this paper, I evaluate three demarcation criteria for dividing phenomena into hard and easy problems: functional definability, the puzzle of the accompanying phenomenon, and the first-person data of subjective experience. I argue that none of the proposed criteria can accurately discriminate between the phenomenon of consciousness and mechanistically explainable phenomena.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45124682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Internal and External Paternalism 内外父权制
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-27 DOI: 10.1017/can.2023.5
Nir Ben-Moshe
{"title":"Internal and External Paternalism","authors":"Nir Ben-Moshe","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.5","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I introduce a new distinction between two types of paternalism, which I call ‘internal’ and ‘external’ paternalism. The distinction pertains to the question of whether the paternalized subject’s current evaluative judgments are mistaken relative to a standard of correctness that is internal to her evaluative point of view—which includes her ‘true’ or ‘ideal’ self—as opposed to one that is wholly external. I argue that this distinction has important implications for (a) the distinction between weak and strong paternalism; (b) the distinction between soft and hard paternalism; and (c) medical practice, where internal paternalism can, and probably often does, occur.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47822684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Potentialism and S5 潜力和S5
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-08 DOI: 10.1017/can.2023.2
Jonas Werner
{"title":"Potentialism and S5","authors":"Jonas Werner","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.2","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Modal potentialism as proposed by Barbara Vetter (2015) is the view that every possibility is grounded in something having a potentiality. Drawing from work by Jessica Leech (2017), Samuel Kimpton-Nye (2021) argues that potentialists can have an S5 modal logic. I present a novel argument to the conclusion that the most straightforward way of spelling out modal potentialism cannot validate an S5 modal logic. Then I will propose a slightly tweaked version of modal potentialism that can validate an S5 modal logic and still does justice to the core claim of potentialism.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43274862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Against Universal Epistemic Instrumentalism 反对普遍认知工具主义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-02 DOI: 10.1017/can.2022.45
J. Willoughby
{"title":"Against Universal Epistemic Instrumentalism","authors":"J. Willoughby","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.45","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Beliefs should conform to some norms. Epistemic instrumentalism holds that your beliefs should conform to these epistemic norms just because conforming is useful. But there seems to be cases where conforming to the epistemic norms isn’t useful at all, as in so-called “too-few-reasons” cases. In response to these cases, universal epistemic instrumentalists argue that despite first appearances, it is always useful to conform to the epistemic norms. I argue that all current versions of this universalist response are objectionable. I conclude with a conjecture about why no version of universalism will succeed.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45528044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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