{"title":"The Great Failure of the IPXI Experiment: Why Commoditization of Intellectual Property Failed","authors":"Merritt L. Steele","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/gqy2c","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/gqy2c","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"102 1","pages":"1115"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45216901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cyber Attack Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act","authors":"P. Anderson","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/qk2gh","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/qk2gh","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"102 1","pages":"1087"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45636139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cross-Market Mergers in Healthcare: Adapting Antitrust Regulation to Address a Growing Concern.","authors":"Thaddeus J Lopatka","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/pqr9f","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/pqr9f","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"102 3 1","pages":"821-52"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49525368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Structure of Federal Public Defense: A Call for Independence","authors":"David Patton","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/562sk","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/562sk","url":null,"abstract":"Independence is a foundational requirement for any good system of public criminal defense. The Constitution guarantees anyone charged with a crime the right to a defense attorney regardless of ability to pay, and that attorney has the ethical obligation to provide a zealous defense, free from any conflicting outside influence. And yet the system of federal public defense is funded, managed, and supervised by the very judges in front of whom defenders must vigorously defend their clients. The arrangement creates serious constitutional, ethical, and policy problems. This Article proposes a solution: an independent federal defense agency. The agency proposed, the Center for Federal Public Defense (CFPD), would administer federal defenders’ offices, manage the system of appointed private attorneys, and seek funding from Congress for indigent defense services.The Article places the discussion of the proposed organization in the context of other independent agencies that do not fit neatly into a single branch of government, sometimes described as “boundary organizations.” In many ways, federal public defense is ideally suited for placement outside of the formal branches of government. Many congressionally created independent organizations are structurally problematic because of separation-of-powers concerns that arise from the agencies’ enforcement or rulemaking authority. Federal public defense attorneys, however, neither make rules nor enforce them. And because of the nature of their work, they legitimately require insulation from direct government control — including from the Judiciary. In a criminal justice system that relies on its adversarial nature to function properly, it would be inconceivable to have judges decide who is hired in a prosecutor’s office, how much they should be paid, or how and whether prosecutors should investigate individual cases. It would be equally problematic to have the Judiciary act as the voice of the Department of Justice in Congress when explaining resource needs and seeking appropriations. And yet the Judiciary currently does all of those things with respect to the defense function. It should not, and the fix is straightforward: the creation of an independent defender organization.","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"102 1","pages":"335"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42063238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Information Gathering in the Era of Mobile Technology: Towards a Liberal Right to Record","authors":"Nicholas J. Jacques","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/axpnr","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/axpnr","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"102 1","pages":"783"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46336332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Let's Keep It Civil: An Evaluation of Civil Disabilities, a Call for Reform, and Recommendations to Reduce Recidivism","authors":"Victor J. Pinedo","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/h4jca","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/h4jca","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"102 1","pages":"513"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44959346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bad Man Revisited","authors":"W. Twining","doi":"10.4324/9781315086323-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315086323-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"58 1","pages":"275-303"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44620546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cross-Market Mergers in Healthcare: Adapting Antitrust Regulation to Address a Growing Concern.","authors":"Thaddeus J Lopatka","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"102 3","pages":"821-52"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"34887658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Rights of Marriage: Obergefell, Din, and the Future of Constitutional Family Law","authors":"Kerry Abrams","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2928770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2928770","url":null,"abstract":"In the summer of 2015 the United States Supreme Court handed down two groundbreaking constitutional family law decisions. One decision became famous overnight: Obergefell v. Hodges declared that same-sex couples have the constitutional right to marry. The other, Kerry v. Din, went largely overlooked. That later case concerned not the right to marry but the rights of marriage. In particular, it asked whether a person has a constitutional liberty interest in living with his or her spouse. This case is suddenly of paramount importance: executive orders targeting particular groups of immigrants implicate directly this right to family reunification. \u0000This Article argues that neither Obergefell nor Din can be understood fully without the other. The constitutional issues in the cases — the right to marry and the rights of marriage — stem from the same text and doctrines, implicate the same relationships, and reflect cultural understandings of the meaning of marriage and family. Read together, the two cases suggest that the rights of unmarried couples and LGBTQ people will be expanded by Obergefell and that the right to family reunification is a necessary “right of marriage” under the Constitution.","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"103 1","pages":"501-564"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44008266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured","authors":"Margo Schlanger","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2920283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2920283","url":null,"abstract":"As American incarcerated populations grew starting in the 1970s, so too did court oversight of prisons. In the late 1980s, however, as incarceration continued to boom, federal court oversight shrank. This Article addresses the most central doctrinal limit on oversight of jails and prisons, the Supreme Court’s restrictive reading of the constitutional provisions governing treatment of prisoners—the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Due Process Clause, which regulate, respectively, post-conviction imprisonment and pretrial detention. The Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban of cruel and unusual punishment, in particular, radically undermined prison officials’ accountability for tragedies behind bars—allowing, even encouraging, them to avoid constitutional accountability. And lower courts compounded the error by importing that reading into Due Process doctrine as well. In 2015, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, a jail use of force case, the Court relied on 1970s precedent, not subsequent caselaw that had placed undue emphasis on the subjective culpability of prison and jail officials as the crucial source of constitutional concern. The Kingsley Court returned to a more appropriate objective analysis. In finding for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court unsettled the law far past Kingsley’s direct factual setting of pretrial detention, expressly inviting post-conviction challenges to restrictive—and incoherent—Eighth Amendment caselaw. The Court rejected not only the defendants’ position, but the logic that underlies 25 years of pro-government outcomes in prisoners’ rights cases. But commentary and developing caselaw since Kingsley has not fully recognized its implications. I argue that both doctrinal logic and justice dictate that constitutional litigation should center on the experience of incarcerated prisoners, rather than the culpability of their keepers. The takeaway of my analysis is that the Constitution is best read to impose governmental liability for harm caused to prisoners—whether pretrial or post-conviction—by unreasonably dangerous conditions of confinement and unjustified uses of force. In this era of mass incarceration, our jails and prisons should not be shielded from accountability by legal standards that lack both doctrinal and normative warrant.","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"103 1","pages":"357-436"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2017-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48913700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}