Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences最新文献_第5页

Habitually breaking habits: Agency, awareness, and decision-making in musical improvisation 习惯性地打破习惯：音乐即兴创作中的代理、意识和决策

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09974-x

{"title":"Habitually breaking habits: Agency, awareness, and decision-making in musical improvisation","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09974-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09974-x","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>In this paper, I explore the question of agency in spontaneous action via a phenomenology of musical improvisation, drawing on fieldwork conducted with large contemporary improvising ensembles. I argue that musical improvisation is a form of ‘participatory sense-making’ in which musical decisions unfold via a feedback process with the evolving musical situation itself. I describe how musicians’ <em>technical</em> expertise is developed alongside a <em>responsive</em> expertise, and how these capacities complicate the sense in which habitual action can be viewed as pre-conscious or ‘automatic.’ Nevertheless, I shall argue that the self-awareness required for expert improvisation does not amount to highly reflective deliberation, arguing instead that the practice of musical improvisation involves an exercise of practical rationality, akin to what Aristotle called <em>phronēsis</em>. Musical decisions – as an expressive form of sense-making – are guided by feelings of ‘rightness’ that are experienced directly and intuitively, responding to the norms and reasons that are embedded in the instruments, sounds, and practices of a particular (sub)culture..</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140149602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Experiences of silent reading 默读体验

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-03-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09966-x

引用次数: 0

Making sense of doing science: on some pragmatic motifs guiding the enactive approach to science 做科学的意义：关于指导积极科学方法的一些实用主题

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09972-z

引用次数: 0

Collective emotions and the distributed emotion framework 集体情感和分布式情感框架

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09965-y

{"title":"Collective emotions and the distributed emotion framework","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09965-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09965-y","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>The main aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of the distributed emotion framework and to conceptualize collective emotions within that framework. According to the presented account, dynamics of mutual affecting and being affected might couple individuals such that macro-level self-organization of a distributed cognitive system emerges. The paper suggests calling a distributed self-organizing system consisting of several emoters a “collective.” The emergence of a collective with a distributed affective process enables the involved individuals to enact emotions together. Accordingly, the suggestion is to conceptualize collective emotions as mereologically complex affective processes consisting of contributions which are distributed among several individuals and integrated through ongoing macro-level self-organization. To spell-out this account, the paper combines key conceptual resources from dynamical systems theory, enactive cognitive science, ecological psychology, and phenomenology. A second aim of the paper is distinguishing collective emotions from group-based emotions and suggesting an understanding of shared emotions as a subtype of collective emotions within the distributed emotion framework.</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140003716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Dialectics of addiction: a psychopathologically-enriched comprehension of the clinical care of the addicted person 成瘾的辩证法：对成瘾者临床治疗的心理病理学丰富理解

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09969-8

{"title":"Dialectics of addiction: a psychopathologically-enriched comprehension of the clinical care of the addicted person","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09969-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09969-8","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>The problem of addiction to psychoactive substances, such as alcohol and other drugs, has been addressed in psychiatry traditionally from the perspective of a mechanistic-reductionist epistemological model, whose main focus in clinical care is to avoid or suppress the use of these substances, rather than understanding the meaning of a treatment and the meaning of the alterations of consciousness produced by these addictive substances. This paper attempts to contribute towards overcoming this epistemological perspective from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology. In the first part of the article, the main characteristics of phenomenology and its incorporation into the field of mental health will be presented. Then the issue of addiction will be analysed from two ways of understanding it: the mechanistic-reductionist model and the phenomenological dialectical model. Finally, the pragmatic consequences of the dialectical perspective of phenomenology, called Dialectical Phenomenology (DPh), which seeks to enrich the diagnostic process in the mental health clinic, allowing scientific diagnoses to approach the complexities of clinical reality, will be presented.</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140003724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

How agency is constitutive of phenomenal consciousness: pushing the first and third-personal approaches to their limits 代理如何构成现象意识：将第一人称和第三人称方法推向极限

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09968-9

{"title":"How agency is constitutive of phenomenal consciousness: pushing the first and third-personal approaches to their limits","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09968-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09968-9","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Husserl characterizes sleep with the idea of “the relaxation of the will.” One finds a similar approach in the work of Maine de Biran, who explains sleep as “the suspension of the will.” More recently, Brian O’Shaughnessy and Matthew Soteriou have argued that mental actions constitute wakeful consciousness. In clinical practice, patients with disorders of consciousness who show “purposeful” behavior are classified as “minimally conscious,” while those in an “unresponsive wakeful state” merely behave reflexively. To what extent and how are these proposals justified? This question pushes both the first- and the third-personal approaches to their limits: in an unconscious state, like a coma, one cannot reflect upon oneself; likewise, one cannot infer from physiological data whether someone is phenomenally conscious. This work offers a critical review of these proposals regarding the constitutive role for agency in phenomenal consciousness. It then presents revised versions of O’Shaughnessy’s and Soteriou’s Arguments from Synthesis and from Self-Consciousness. The argument is that everything of which one is phenomenally conscious is either a potential reason for a possible agentive power exertion, or just that power exertion itself. The “self” referred to in “self”-consciousness is either the agent or a “non-agent,” carrying out functions for the agent. Agency is therefore constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. The resulting view helps to solve the Combination Problem for panpsychism, by suggesting that agency is what raises sub-personal micro-consciousness to the personal level. The view may also justify the notion of a “Minimally Conscious State” in clinical practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140003896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The irreducibility of subjectivity: exploring the intersubjective dialectic of body-subject and body-object in anorexia nervosa 主观性的不可还原性：探索神经性厌食症中身体-主体和身体-客体的主体间辩证关系

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09975-w

{"title":"The irreducibility of subjectivity: exploring the intersubjective dialectic of body-subject and body-object in anorexia nervosa","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09975-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09975-w","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>This paper delves into the complex and conflicting relationship between the body-subject and body-object, as well as the self and the other, within the context of anorexia nervosa. Within the field of phenomenology of medicine and health, the emphasis tends to be on the dimension of the lived body, with limited attention given to the physical dimension of the body. Recognizing the work of scholars who have acknowledged this oversight and made progress in addressing it, this paper aims to further unify the two bodily dimensions of the lived body and the physical body by drawing primarily on Husserl’s phenomenology of constitution and intersubjectivity. The central argument put forth is that in the case of anorexia nervosa, confronted with the inherent split between these dimensions and the conflicting relationship between the self and other, it is crucial to adhere to the constitutive principle of irreducibility of subjectivity. Moreover, there is a need to promote the constitutive interplay between the two dimensions and accentuate the constitutive dialectic structure of the self and other. Through these insights, the paper offers potential avenues for understanding and addressing the lived experiences of individuals battling anorexia nervosa.</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139980669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does artificial intelligence exhibit basic fundamental subjectivity? A neurophilosophical argument 人工智能是否表现出基本的主观性？神经哲学论证

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09971-0

Georg Northoff, Steven S. Gouveia

{"title":"Does artificial intelligence exhibit basic fundamental subjectivity? A neurophilosophical argument","authors":"Georg Northoff, Steven S. Gouveia","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09971-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09971-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Does artificial intelligence (AI) exhibit consciousness or self? While this question is hotly debated, here we take a slightly different stance by focusing on those features that make possible both, namely a basic or fundamental subjectivity. Learning from humans and their brain, we first ask what we mean by subjectivity. Subjectivity is manifest in the perspectiveness and mineness of our experience which, ontologically, can be traced to a point of view. Adopting a non-reductive neurophilosophical strategy, we assume that the point of view exhibits two layers, a most basic neuroecological and higher order mental layer. The neuroecological layer of the point of view is mediated by the timescales of world and brain, as further evidenced by empirical data on our sense of self. Are there corresponding timescales shared with the world in AI and is there a point of view with perspectiveness and mineness? Discussing current neuroscientific evidence, we deny that current AI exhibits a point of view, let alone perspectiveness and mineness. We therefore conclude that, as per current state, AI does not exhibit a basic or fundamental subjectivity and henceforth no consciousness or self is possible in models such as ChatGPT and similar technologies.</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139980661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

What could come before time? Intertwining affectivity and temporality at the basis of intentionality 什么会先于时间出现？在意向性的基础上交织情感性和时间性

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09973-y

{"title":"What could come before time? Intertwining affectivity and temporality at the basis of intentionality","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09973-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09973-y","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>The enactive approach to cognition and the phenomenological tradition have in common a wide conception of ‘intentionality’. Within these frameworks, intentionality is understood as a general openness to the world. For classical phenomenologists, the most basic subjective structure that allows for such openness is time-consciousness. Some enactivists, while inspired by the phenomenological tradition, have nevertheless argued that affectivity is more basic, being that which gives rise to the temporal flow of consciousness. In this paper, I assess the relationship between temporality and affectivity from both a phenomenological and an enactive perspective. I argue that, as opposed to the classical phenomenological view (which favours temporality), and to the enactive view (which favours affectivity), we must take affectivity and temporality as co-emergent. Jointly, affectivity and temporality constitute the basic structures of intentionality. Additionally, using examples from phenomenological psychopathology, I conclude that all intentionality is defined by an anticipatory and affective structure that gives rise to general feelings related to our bodily possibilities in the world.</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139980749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Pragmatic realism: towards a reconciliation of enactivism and realism 实用现实主义：实现颁布主义与现实主义的调和

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09959-w

Catherine Legg, André Sant’Anna

{"title":"Pragmatic realism: towards a reconciliation of enactivism and realism","authors":"Catherine Legg, André Sant’Anna","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-09959-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09959-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (<i>Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,</i> <i>13</i>(3), 461–475, 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit <i>the same world</i>. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s <i>manipulation-based</i> enactivist realism to a richer, <i>inquiry-based</i> enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism.</p>","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"152 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139923943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0